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Friday, November 20, 2026

Agency, purpose and evolution

There's been a lot of discussion recently about the role of agency and purpose in biology. Denis Noble and Philip Ball are leading proponents of the idea that the history of life shows evidence of some underlying agency or some purpose. They don't overtly subscribe to the idea that god is behind this; instead, they imply some natural tendency to evolve complexity.

It's often very difficult to understand what people like Noble and Ball really mean when they talk about agency and purpose. For example, here's what Denis Noble says at the end of his book Dance to the Tune of Life: Biological Relativity (p. 264).

There may or may not be an ultimate purpose, whatever that may mean, I doubt whether empirical science can answer that question. But it certainly can use the approach of Biological Relativity and the relativity of epistemology to explain why organisms have genuine purposes and why creative purposiveness as defined and used in this book is a real phenomenon that arises naturally from the social interactions of organisms and which is therefore within the range of knowledge of science.

And here's what Philip Ball says at the end of his book How Life Works (p. 459).

This brings us to agency. "Any proper unit of evolution, any evolvable system," says Jaeger, "must have some kind of agency." Indeed it must, and in retrospect this should have been obvious all along. The gene-centric view of Darwinian evolution makes organisms oddly passive. Sure, they might look anything but as they allegedly make their savage and ruthless way in the world. But in the end (according to this picture) either the organism has, on average, the "right genes" to survive, or it doesn't—and the struggle for survival is a harsh judge. Yet some of those calling for an extended evolutionary synthesis point out that organisms have, on the contrary, the agential ability to actively shape their environment and their trajectory, and that this creates two-way causation between organism and environment. It's true that at least some such considerations have long played a part in conventional evolutionary theory, but we can't expect to do them justice until we understand what organismal agency is and how it arises.

It's easy to criticize and refute the misrepresentations of science in both these books, but it's much more difficult to deal with the arguments for agency and purpose because these arguments are so (deliberately?) nebulous. As an atheist and a materialist1, I find arguments like those above to be disconcerting and troubling because they suggest that something mysterious is going on. But I don't feel confident about arguing against them because I don't really understand the logic.

Erik Svensson is much braver (more foolish?) than I. He makes the case that agency and purpose have no place in biology and he tackles the thorny issue of teleology. He's also fairly direct about the motivation of agents such as Denis Noble and Philip Ball.

Svensson, E.I. (2026) Agency and Natural Purpose Should Not Be Part of Modern Evolutionary Biology. Philosophy, Theory, and Practice in Biology 18:5. [doi: 10.3998/ptpbio.7256]

Most evolutionary biologists today view the concepts of agency, natural purpose, and teleology with suspicion. These concepts were popular in the pre-Darwinian era and prior to the formation of the Modern Synthesis of evolutionary biology, but they are nowadays associated with discredited notions of idealism, mysticism, panpsychism, orthogenesis, Neo-Lamarckism and vitalism. With the development of population and quantitative genetic theory and molecular biology, agency, natural purpose and teleology were gradually abandoned in evolutionary biology. However, there has recently been increasing interest in both agency and natural purpose in evolutionary biology, supported by large research grants from the John Templeton Foundation – as reflected by a steady stream of edited books, special issues, reviews, opinion articles and position papers. Those who advocate for agency and natural purpose challenge current evolutionary theory, which is largely, although not entirely, based on population and quantitative genetics. Here, I critically evaluate the increasing popularity of agency and natural purpose in evolutionary biology, tracing the roots of these pre-Darwinian concepts back to the ancient Greek philosophy of Aristotle and to German transcendental idealism and romanticism, exemplified by Kant, Goethe, Schelling, and Fichte. Although agency and natural purpose can be epistemically useful as metaphors and in guiding empirical research, the historical and metaphysical legacies of both concepts are problematic. I argue that biologists should not embrace agency and natural purpose, to avoid anthropomorphizing the evolutionary process. What some perceive as agency and natural purpose are ultimately only historical products of evolution by natural selection. Agency and natural purpose do therefore not add much to our understanding of evolution, and risk steering empirical research into directions of naïve and excessive adaptationism. Rejecting agency and natural purpose does not mean that biologists must deny multi-scale feedbacks, that we must embrace strict genetic reductionism and naïve panadaptationism, or that natural selection is the only recognized evolutionary mechanism. On the contrary, the current pluralistic theoretical evolutionary framework clearly leaves room for multiple processes that operate at different levels of biological organization, as well as feedbacks between levels.


1. I'm not a materialist by adopting it as a "metaphysical" premise. I'm a pragmatic materialist because I see no reason to suppose that the universe is composed of anything other than matter that obeys the laws of physics and chemistry. I have a mind open to the possibility that there's something else but not so open that my brains are at risk of falling out.

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