Boudry vs Plantinga

Alvin Plantinga is a famous philosopher who is widely respected and seems to be able to publish in all the right places. He is a theist (Calvinist) and for a long time he was at the University of Notre Dame in Indiana (USA). Since his retirement from there, he has taken a position at Calvin College.

Plantinga has long advocated the accommodationist position from the perspective of Christian apologetics. I bought his latest book, Where the Conflict Really Lies, because I'm interested in the conflict between science and religion.

I've been struggling for weeks with how to explain Plantinga's case. My problem was that I found the whole book quite ridiculous and it seemed to me that Plantina's idea of logic and rationality was much closer to kindergarten philosophy than to something one might expect from a distinguished scholar. I hesitated to say that out loud because it sounds very condescending coming from a scientist.

I had to be missing something. There must be some sophisticated philosophy in there somewhere and I just wasn't getting it. I couldn't post.

John Wilkins Defends Methodological Naturalism

Methodological Naturalism is an a priori argument in favor limiting science to investigations of the natural world. It serves to protect religion from science since most religious questions are concerned with the supernatural and science, by fiat, isn’t allowed to ask those questions. Coincidentally, it also protects philosophy from science since metaphysical questions now become the exclusive domain of philosophy.

There are some philosophers who see through this house of cards but they are few and far between. It’s mostly scientists—and those who think like scientists—who say "What the heck are they talking about?"

Maarten Boudry, Stefaan Blancke, and Johan Braeckman from the Department of Philosphy at the University of Gent (Belgium) represent the heretics and dissenters among philosophers. If you want a summary of posts on this topic go to: Is Science Restricted to Methodologial Naturalism?. Here’s an excerpt from Grist to the Mill of Anti-evolutionism: The Failed Strategy of Ruling the Supernatural Out of Science by Philosophical Fiat (Boudry et al. 2012).

Does Philosophy Generate Knowledge?

I began this discussion a few days ago by questioning the purpose of some common philosophical arguments. The example I selected concerned the claim that evolution is unguided. A prominent philosopher, Elliott Sober, tells us that even though there’s no evidence that evolution is guided it is still possible to imagine a supernatural being who could control evolution by tweaking molecules at the level of quantum mechanics. If this being was clever enough, and wanted to leave no trace of his activity, then one could imagine a situation where evolution was guided without anyone realizing it. Thus, theistic evolutionists need not despair because the scientific way of knowing can’t legitimately say that evolution is unguided.

I used the analogy of The Flying Spaghetti Monster Steals Meatballs to poke fun at this spurious way of reasoning.

John Wilkins Defends Philosophy: A Bit of History

There was a time, not so long ago, when science and philosophy coexisted in (relative) peace and harmony. This began to change when science came under increasing attack from religion and from others who simply denied the knowledge that had been produced by the scientific way of thinking. (The latter group included advocates of parapsychology. The modern versions include those who deny climate change and those who think vaccinations cause autism. These groups are not necessarily religious.)

The rise of anti-scientism provoked a response from scientists, just as you might expect. Scientists began to speak out against the irrational claims of these science deniers. The counter-attack necessarily covered many people with strong religious beliefs. Gradually, many scientists came to the realization that the main problem was not the specifics of evolution or whether ESP could be tested. The real battleground was a war between rationalism and superstition. This led to a number of scientists coming out in support of atheism and focusing their attention on the flaws in religious thinking (i.e. superstition).

Now, you would think that philosophy would be a natural ally in this fight since the most important feature of philosophy is its ability to distinguish logical arguments from ones that are illogical. In other words, philosophy should be on the side of rationalism and not on the side of superstition.

The Flying Spaghetti Monster Steals Meatballs (What's the Purpose of Philosophy?)

The Flying Spaghetti Monster is all-powerful and all-knowing and she loves meatballs. She is also very sneaky and doesn't want to leave any evidence of her existence. That's why she's very careful to only steal meatballs that won't be missed. (How often do you count the meatballs in your spaghetti?).

As far as I know this is a perfectly valid philosophical argument. If you accept the premises then it's quite possible that meatballs are disappearing from kitchens and restaurants without us ever being aware of the problem.

I'm not a philosopher but I strongly suspect that there aren't any papers on the possible existence of the Flying Spaghetti Monster in the philosophical literature. I doubt that there are any Ph.D. theses on the topic.

Humanities Aren't Science? More's the Pity

Science is a way of knowing that is evidence based and requires rational thinking and healthy skepticism. It's the only successful way of knowing that has ever been invented.

Whenever investigators in the humanities discover new knowledge it turns out that they have been using a scientific approach. They've been thinking like a scientist. What else could they be doing?

Maria Konnikova is a graduate student in psychology at Columbia University. She writes in Scientific American that Humanities aren’t a science. Stop treating them like one.

Well, it's certainly true that many disciplines in the humanities are very unscientific—evolutionary psychology comes to mind—but this is one of the first times I've ever heard someone be proud of the fact that they don't think scientifically. Why in the world would she say that?

Turns out she's confused about what science is and what it isn't. She thinks that science requires lots of quantitative data and lots of mathematics and statistics.

Sometimes, there is no easy approach to studying the intricate vagaries that are the human mind and human behavior. Sometimes, we have to be okay with qualitative questions and approaches that, while reliable and valid and experimentally sound, do not lend themselves to an easy linear narrative—or a narrative that has a base in hard science or concrete math and statistics. Psychology is not a natural science. It’s a social science. And it shouldn’t try to be what it’s not.

Hmmmm ... that might explain a lot. I guess if you are seeking knowledge in the social sciences it's okay to use a non-scientific approach to gain knowledge. I wonder what approach they follow? Do they pray for guidance? Use a Ouija board? Or do they just make stuff up?

Maybe Konnikova is just saying that humanities disciplines are not chemistry, physics, biology or geology? Nah, that's too obvious. It doesn't merit an article in "Scientific" American. Maybe we'll find out what she really means when her book comes out in January. It's title is: Mastermind: How to Think Like Sherlock Holmes. Did Sherlock Holmes think like a scientist or did he think like someone in the humanities?

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[Hat Tip: Mike the Mad Biologist]

Science and Christianity—Different Ways of Finding Truth?

Chris Mulherin is an Anglican Minister who studies the relationship of science and religion. In this video he claims that science and religion are compatible. Specifically, science and Christianity are compatible.

UPDATE: Eric MacDonald does an excellent job of taking down Chris Mulherin in Science and Religion Again!. MacDonald is a former Anglican priest. (Hat Tip: Jerry Coyne.

He doesn't explain how rising from the dead, miracles, souls, heaven, and a Bible full of lies are compatible with science. Instead, he concentrates on the old saw of different magisteria. Christianity answers different questions than science and discovers different truths.


Id' like to echo the challenge I made some years ago and the one Jerry Coyne issues today [Do both science and faith produce truth?]. Can anyone give us an example of a "truth" discovered by religion—one that we all recognize as genuine knowledge? Name a "why" question that religion answers in a way that we all accept as meaningful and true.¹

Those who think that science and religion are compatible like to accuse us of not understanding the serious philosophical issues. I don't think that's correct but, if it is, here's a chance for the serious courtier theologian to set us straight.

Waiting .....

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1. It's not good enough to say that if only Christians accept the answer as true, then Christianity has discovered truth. If that were the case then astrology and homeopathy are also valid ways of finding truth even if astologers and homeopaths are the only ones who believe the answers. I'm guessing that no serious philosopher would defend such a ridiculous position.

"Curiosity" Driven Science

The engineers and technicians have done their job, and what a fantastic job they did! "Curiosity" is now on the surface of Mars and it's time for the science to begin.

Have you been wondering about the scientific mission? The search for life is getting all the publicity but, let's face it, the chances of success are slim.

What about the other missions? Rebecca Ghent of the Dept. of Earth Sciences at the University of Toronto explains why she's interested in the data that "Curiosity" will collect [Curiosity: planetary science and the latest Mars mission].

One of the things I'm interested in is the physical characteristics of planetary regoliths - the surface layer of broken rock, dust, etc., that covers planetary surfaces. It's important to understand how this layer formed and has evolved, because it holds a record of the geological processes that have occurred on each planet. Mars has a very complex surface geological record involving the actions of wind, volcanism, impact cratering, and possibly, water; so this new information about the composition and physical characteristics of the rocks at the Curiosity landing site will provide valuable new insights into the roles of these various processes in forming Mars' surface rocks.

For scientists, the best is yet to come. I hope the science journalists can keep the public focused on the real mission and the importance of the data.

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Stress and Telomere Length—Do You Believe this Study?

Healthy skepticism is an important part of science. One of the biggest differences between scientists and intelligent design creationists, for example, is that the creationists are rarely skeptical of anything they read in the scientific literature. If it appears to support their agenda, then it goes right onto the blogs without any discussion of whether it might be true or not.

Scientists, on the other hand, are often very skeptical of work that appears in the scientific literature. They treat most papers as tentative results that need to be confirmed. The most obvious flawed papers will be refuted by further work, as in the recent arsenic in DNA paper or earlier work on cold fusion. Usually, flawed papers will just be ignored and they will die a quiet death.

What's Wrong with Michael Ruse's View of Accommodationism?

Michael Ruse wrote a book called Science and Spirituality: Making Room for Faith in the Age of Science (2010). It's a defense of accommodationism—the position of atheists who maintain that science and religion are compatible because they are different ways of knowing. Ruse is one of the main proponents of Methodological Naturalism, which postulates that science is restricted, or limited, to investigations of the natural world. Since religion deals, by definition, with the supernatural world, it falls outside the domain of science and is, therefore, compatible with science. This leads Ruse to define several criteria of Christianity that are immune to scientific investigation [The Essence of Christianity].

This position used to be overwhelmingly accepted by the majority of scientists and philosophers, especially in America. It has become the standard view of most professional scientific organizations and of The National Center for Science Education (NCSE). It's a convenient way for atheist scientists and religious people who are mostly accepting of science to avoid conflict as they make common cause against the extreme creationists.

But that view is now being challenged and it's no longer acceptable to claim that it represents the only view of science. That's what the good guys did during the Dover trial a few years ago but it wouldn't work today because there are dozens of prominent philosophers of science who would argue against such a limitation of science.

One of them is Peter Slezak of the School of History and Philosophy, University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia. He recently wrote a review of Ruse's book: Michael Ruse: Science and Spiritutality: Making Room for Faith in the Age of Science (Slezak, 2011).

Much of the conflict depends on definitions and Slezak clearly endorses a much broader view of science than Ruse. Here's how Slezak challenges the view that science has limits.

This is a widely held and obviously appealing line to adopt for those, like Ruse, who are committed to the scientific enterprise and its claims. However, I will suggest that, despite its appearance of open-minded ecumenicalism, the posture faces insuperable intellectual difficulties. In wishing to leave room beyond ‘‘the allowable scope of science’’ (p. 235), Ruse is effectively endorsing a traditional demarcation between science and metaphysics in order to restore respectability to some claims in the latter category. However, this recidivist project does not properly address the hegemonic nature of the scientific enterprise. This conception is expressed in the final remarks of Bertrand Russell’s (1935) book Religion and Science. Aside from questions of value that lie outside the realm of truth and falsehood,

Russell says:

Whatever knowledge is attainable, must be attained by scientific methods; and what science cannot discover, mankind cannot know (1935, p. 243).

The title of Freud’s (1927, 92) book The Future of an Illusion refers to religion and ends with the exactly the same sentiments: ‘‘an illusion it would be to suppose that what science cannot give us we can get elsewhere’’. These expressions of a positivist conception are less dogmatic than they appear because they may be understood as statements of the openmindedness of science rather than its opposite. That is, ‘‘science’’ doesn’t exclude anything simply because the honorific label is used for anything worth believing. That is, if there are any rational grounds for a proposition, it will become included within the domain of established science. Or, rather, perhaps we should say that it will be included on the spectrum of claims ranging across ‘good, bad and bogus’ to use the sub-title of Gardner’s (1981) book. The point is captured in Laudan’s (1983) account of the ‘‘Demise of the Demarcation Problem’’ since he shows that ‘‘the problem of demarcation … is spurious’’ and the heterogeneity of beliefs and activities means that there are no lines to be drawn (see Special Issue of Science & Education, 2011, volume 20, 5–6). In particular, this means that the claims of religion fall somewhere on the spectrum, arguably nearer the bogus end. However, this means that they are subject to the usual criteria for deciding what is worth believing, which is, in any case, clear enough from the nature of the claims as we will note presently.

Ruse and his allies believe that any attempt to step outside the limits of science constitute a venture into metaphysics and this is not science but something else. Peter Slezak rejects this argument ...

Plantinga (1991, 8) suggests that the question of the clash between faith and reason is ‘‘enormously difficult’’ requiring ‘‘penetrating grasp of the relevant theological and philosophical issues’’ as well as the complex science. However, this is sheer bluff since the arguments don’t depend on any such arcane knowledge. Thus, citing Plantinga, Ruse (p. 183) seeks room for claims alongside and independent of science on the grounds that there are alternative ‘‘world views’’ and, therefore, a choice between two ‘‘metaphysical’’ options— naturalism and theism. The air of reasonableness and even profundity in this stance produces a vacant illusion of explanation but disguises sophistry. First, even if we are to talk this fancy philosophical way with Plantinga, it remains obscure why the Christian theistic ‘‘metaphysics’’ is the only alternative to the ‘‘naturalistic’’ one. One could presumably find or invent many others that would have equal status as alternatives to naturalism by virtue of having nothing to recommend them. Does Plantinga think that Mexican metaphysics based on the theology of Quetzalcoatl deserves equal consideration with his Christian variety?

The very idea that we can transcend what Ruse calls the ‘‘limitations of a science based knowledge’’ (p. 10), or that we have a choice between alternative ‘‘metaphysics’’, is an illusion. There is no alternative to our best theories other than worse ones. Naturalism is just the picture provided by our current science and is, therefore, the best we’ve got. Pretentious philosophical talk of ‘‘metaphysical’’ options can’t change the fact that naturalism is the only game in town since it is simply the totality of our theories in physics, chemistry, biology, neuroscience, geology and so on. Does Christian metaphysics provide a better account of quantum physics, cosmology or the structure of DNA?

Slezak is going to be accused of scientism or, at the very least, naturalism. The accommodationists will claim that the leap to naturalism is overstepping the limits of what science can or cannot claim. That's not true. Science teaches us that the scientific approach works and that most things have a naturalistic explanation. It follows that any claim of a valid a non-naturalistic explanation must have at least as much to recommend it or else it is nothing more than hand-waving.

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Slezak, P. (2011) Michael Ruse: Science and Spiritutality: Making Room for Faith in the Age of Science Sci & Educ 21:403-413. [DOI 10.1007/s11191-011-9373-0]

The Trouble with Scientism?

Philip Kitcher is a philosopher who specializes in the philsophy of science. He is a professor at Columbia University in New York, USA. He's well known in the atheist, skeptical community and he's an outspoken critic of creationism.

He just published an article in The New Republic entitled: The Trouble with Scientism: Why history and the humanities are also a form of knowledge.

Many of the debates on the issue of "scientism" depend on how you define "science." As you can see from the subtitle of his essay, it's about the two cultures. Kitcher separate the search for knowledge in the humanities from the search for knowledge in the natural sciences. Here's what he says ...

It is so easy to underrate the impact of the humanities and of the arts. Too many people, some of whom should know better, do it all the time. But understanding why the natural sciences are regarded as the gold standard for human knowledge is not hard. When molecular biologists are able to insert fragments of DNA into bacteria and turn the organisms into factories for churning out medically valuable substances, and when fundamental physics can predict the results of experiments with a precision comparable to measuring the distance across North America to within the thickness of a human hair, their achievements compel respect, and even awe. To derive one’s notion of human knowledge from the most striking accomplishments of the natural sciences easily generates a conviction that other forms of inquiry simply do not measure up. Their accomplishments can come to seem inferior, even worthless, at least until the day when these domains are absorbed within the scope of “real science.”

It's clear the he thinks of "science" as something that only natural scientists do. This is a different definition that the one I prefer. I think of "science" as a way of knowing that involves evidence, skepticism, and rationalism. I agree with Rush Holt [Rush Holt on Science and Critical Thinking] that critical thinking is an important part of science as a way of knowing and I agree with him that the scientific approach can be used everywhere—even in philosophy departments.

Kitcher's view is different. That leads him to define scientism as ...

The problem with scientism—which is of course not the same thing as science—is owed to a number of sources, and they deserve critical scrutiny. The enthusiasm for natural scientific imperialism rests on five observations. First, there is the sense that the humanities and social sciences are doomed to deliver a seemingly directionless sequence of theories and explanations, with no promise of additive progress. Second, there is the contrasting record of extraordinary success in some areas of natural science. Third, there is the explicit articulation of technique and method in the natural sciences, which fosters the conviction that natural scientists are able to acquire and combine evidence in particularly rigorous ways. Fourth, there is the perception that humanists and social scientists are only able to reason cogently when they confine themselves to conclusions of limited generality: insofar as they aim at significant—general—conclusions, their methods and their evidence are unrigorous. Finally, there is the commonplace perception that the humanities and social sciences have been dominated, for long periods of their histories, by spectacularly false theories, grand doctrines that enjoy enormous popularity until fashion changes, as their glaring shortcomings are disclosed.

That's a really stupid definition of scientism. I don't know anyone who actually thinks like that. Do you know any "natural science imperialists" who dismiss the humanities and the social sciences?¹

I believe that people in the humanities and social sciences use the same approach as those in the natural sciences. I call that way of knowing "science" but if someone wants to come up with a better name, I'm all ears. As far as I'm concerned, science (as I define it) is the ONLY way of knowing that has actually been successful in discovering true knowledge. I guess that makes me guilty of "scientism."

It's very easy to refute scientism as I define it. All you have to do is show that there's some other way of knowing that produces universal truths or true knowledge. Perhaps philosophers have discovered truths using some other way of knowing?

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1. I criticize evolutionary psychology. The reason why I'm so critical is precisely because they don't conform to the scientific way of knowing. They are not doing "good science" by any definition of the word "science."

Rush Holt on Science and Critical Thinking

I don't know Rush Holt from Adam. I'm told that he's a US Congressman from New Jersey but I find that difficult to believe. :-)

Here's an interview he gave with The Humanist: Thinking Like a Scientist.

The Humanist: How do you define critical thinking?

Rush Holt: Let me define instead what I like to call “thinking like a scientist.” It’s asking questions that can be answered based on evidence; it’s expressing questions in a way that allows someone to check your work. If you don’t have both of those elements, it’s too easy to fool yourself or to get lazy in your thinking. I wouldn’t say that critical thinking is hard thinking, because I don’t want to discourage people from doing it, but like anything else, it’s easier if you practice.

Third graders, for example, are often very good at thinking like scientists. Like scientists, they know that if you ask how something works, what something means, or how something happens, you should do it in a way that allows for more than just pure thinking. There should be some evidence, something empirical. You should form your question so that it allows someone else to ask that same question and observe the evidence to see if they get the same answer as you do. And that’s the essential part of critical thinking. If you say, “I’ve been thinking about this deeply and, by golly, now I understand it,” but then you try to explain it to someone else and can’t, then you probably don’t understand it … or it’s not very reliable knowledge.

I keep trying to get science taught in a way that, even if you can’t remember a single Latin term or are a klutz at solving equations, you’ve learned how to frame questions and sift evidence. I talk about verification but another way of putting it is: be ready for the cross-examination. Prepare to explain yourself.

The Humanist: How valuable is critical thinking to everyday life?

Holt: It’s invaluable, whether you’re making a consumer decision like which laundry detergent to buy or whether you’re trying to decide what career you want to pursue. There are ways to ask yourself both what you’re trying to accomplish and how to measure whether you’ve accomplished it. If you’re able to express it that way, then you’re thinking critically.

This is important on every level, not just on a personal level, not just in regards to consumer decisions or life choices. I think it’s quite likely we wouldn’t have invaded Iraq if more people in the CIA or in Congress had been thinking critically and asking, “What’s the evidence? You say Saddam Hussein is doing things that will hurt our national interests. Now tell me exactly: what is he doing? Does he have chemical weapons, nuclear weapons? Where’s the evidence?” Of course, there wasn’t any.

This is important stuff. I think of "science" as a way of knowing but it can also be thought of as a way of thinking. It's intimately associated with critical thinking.

In this sense, "science" is not confined to the so-called "natural sciences" but it can be applied to everything that requires a search for reliable truth. Everybody should be thinking like a scientist and that includes politicians and philosophers. In my experience, there is no other way of knowing that has a proven track record.

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[Hat Tip: RichardDawkins.net]

On the Difference Between "Evolutionary Theory" and Scientific Fact

There's been a lot of discussion about Elliott Sober's talk at the University of Chicago. You can watch the entire talk and the questions & answers at [The Problem with Philosophy: Elliott Sober].

Most of the debate is taking place on Jerry Coyne's site [Can God create mutations? Elliott Sober says we can’t rule that out.] and on Jason Rosenhouse's blog [The Reason For the Ambivalence Towards the Philosophy of Science]. Things aren't going well for Elliott Sober and, by implication, for the philosophy of science.

I want to discuss another troubling aspect of Sober's talk. Throughout the talk he refers frequently to "evolutionary theory" or "the theory of evolution." This is consistent with the introduction by Robert Richards where he says they are considering "... the application of evolutionary theory to the humanities and social sciences" (27 sec). The title of Sober's talk is "Naturalism and Evolutionary Theory."

What do they mean by "evolutionary theory"? To me, evolutionary theory means the kinds of things that are discussed in Stephen Jay Gould book "The Structure of Evolutionary Theory." It includes things like population genetics and the potential influence of genome size on the fixation of alleles. It includes things like species sorting and punctuated equilibria. It even includes speculation about selfish genes and the level of selection.

Evolutionary theory does NOT include whether birds and dinosaurs share a recent common ancestor, the age of the Earth, the amount of junk DNA in our genome, or the causes of mutation. Those are interesting questions that bear on evolution but the answers to those questions are not a fundamental part of evolutionary theory. The are questions of scientific fact, in my opinion.

Do philosophers like Elliott Sober agree with this distinction? I don't think so. The main point of Sober's talk is whether evolutionary theory can show that mutations are random. He concludes that evolutionary theory cannot conclusively prove that all mutations arose by chance; therefore, there's room for God-directed mutations as long as their frequency is indistinguishable from randomness.

Sober has a paper that discusses this issue [Evolution without Naturalism]. Here's the part that describes "evolutionary theory" (page 5).

What is this thing called “evolutionary theory,” which theistic evolutionism is able to encompass consistently? It includes the origin of life from nonliving materials by physical processes, the branching genealogical process whose upshot is that current organisms are connected to each other by relations of common ancestry, the random origin of new mutations, and the processes that govern trait evolution within lineages, such as selection and drift. Among these several propositions, the idea that mutations are “random” may seem to be a sticking point.

This is not what I think of when I use the term "evolutionary theory." I don't think the origin of life is a part of evolutionary theory. I don't think that the random origin of new mutations is part of evolutionary theory. As far as I'm concerned, the discovery that mutations occurred preferentially in hotspots or that there was a base composition bias—which there is—would not refute evolutionary theory. I think my understanding of evolutionary theory is closer to that of the majority of evolutionary biologists and it's troubling to me that philosophers seem to use a different definition.

Here's another example from that same paper (page 4) ...

Although evolutionary theory is silent on the question of whether there is a God, it is not neutral with respect to logically stronger hypotheses about God. Consider, for example, the statement

Life appeared on earth about 10,000 years ago due to divine intervention.

This statement is inconsistent with evolutionary theory.

The Young Earth Creationist statement is inconsistent with all available scientific evidence on the age of the Earth. This evidence is so overwhelming that it is a scientific fact (sensu Gould) that the Earth is billions of years old. Why does Sober think that "evolutionary theory" plays a role here?

This is not just a semantic quibble. By confusing "evolutionary theory" with scientific facts Sober makes it much more difficult to follow his line of reasoning.

Is it true that the majority of philosophers of science use "evolutionary theory" when they should frequently be referring to scientific facts? Is it true that most philosophers think that the age of the Earth is a "theory"? Do they also think that evolution is only a theory?

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The Problem with Philosophy: Elliott Sober

Elliott Sober is an important philosopher who appears to be widely respected in the philosophy community. So when he comes up with a really silly position on the compatibility of science and religion, we should all take notice. What does this say about the discipline?

Jerry Coyne comments on a recent talk by Sober at the University of Chicago [Can God create mutations? Eliott Sober says we can’t rule that out]. Unfortunately Jerry wasn't able to attend but here's a link to a video of the presentation : "Naturalism and Evolutionary Theory."

Naturalism and Evolutionary Theory

I urge you to read the comments on Jerry Coyne's blog website and join the discussion over there. There are two important questions: (1) Does Sober's argument make any sense to a scientist?, and (2) What does this say about the state of philosophy of science?

With respect to the first question, it's easy to paraphrase Sober's argument ...

Imagine that there are evil aliens who want to destroy human life on this planet and take it over for themselves. These are very patient evil aliens and, furthermore, they don't want us to recognize what they're up to.

They have chosen to manipulate evolution by gradually introducing mutations into our genome that will lead to destructive behavior and by inserting mutations that cause diseases. They do this in a very subtle manner so that we can't distinguish between random mutations and a very small number of directed mutations. The bad alleles are indistinguishable from those that are occasionally fixed by random genetic drift so that, over the course of millions of years, we don't notice anything unusual.

Since science is incapable of detecting the actions of these evil aliens, it follows that science is perfectly compatible with the existence of evil aliens who want to destroy us by manipulating our genome.

We all recognize, I hope, that the argument is silly. It's just as silly if you substitute some kind of God in place of evil aliens.

The second question is more of a challenge. I can see why philosophers want to rule out unprovable claims such as "I know for certain that there are no evil aliens." You can't prove a negative and maybe there are some people out there who need reminding. However, the same logic applies to all kinds of claims including the existence of Santa Claus and the tooth fairy. It even applies to homeopathy and weapons of mass destruction. You can't prove conclusively that homeopathic remedies will never, under any circumstances, cure someone of asthma. You can't prove, beyond a shadow of doubt, that there were never any weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.

Philosophers can make an important contribution by explaining why, and how, we make decisions based on probability and not on mathematical proofs. They could explain why nobody really believes in the existence of evil aliens, tooth fairies, and Santa Claus, in spite of the fact that you can't conclusively prove their non-existence.

This is where science comes in. The scientific way of knowing operates on the quaint notion that extraordinary claims (e.g. evil aliens) require extraordinary evidence—with the emphasis on evidence. Beliefs that are held in the absence of any favorable evidence are not beliefs that are worth holding, especially if those beliefs are going to rule your life. What if you encountered a cult that was building a large spaceport in Saskatchewan in order to welcome the aliens after we have all died in a nuclear holocaust? What would you think of their sanity? Would it help to know that philosophers think their core belief is rational?

I think we need a pragmatic philosophy for the 21st century. One that can actually help us make rational decisions without focusing on sophistry or on pedantic issues that are only of interest to a handful of naive philosophers who are way out of touch with reality. Science and the existence of "evil aliens" are incompatible because there's no need for the "evil alien" hypothesis to explain the world as we see it. There's no evidence for evil aliens. They appear, to all intents and purposes, to be delusions. We don't need to prove their non-existence in order to recognize the incompatibility.

Same thing for gods.

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Is Science Restricted to Methodologial Naturalism?

Maarten Boudry, Stefaan Blancke, and Johan Braeckman have an article coming out in Science & Education on "Grist to the Mill of Anti-evolutionism: The Failed Strategy of Ruling the Supernatural out of Science by Philosophical Fiat."

It relates to the idea that science is limited by its insistence on adhering to methodological naturalism. According to this view, science cannot investigate the supernatural. The view is popular among some who oppose creationism since it means that creationism can't be scientific, by fiat. It's also important for accommodationists because it allows science and religion to co-exist in separate magisteria.

I oppose such a definition of science but, up until a few years ago, I was always told that my opinion is irrelevant since all philosophers, and many scientists, agree that science is limited by methodological naturalism. That's why I was so delighted to meet the philosophers from Gent. Finally there was another point of view opposed to the methodological naturalism limitation. Now those who promote this limitation on science have to honestly admit that it's just their opinion and not a universally accepted definition of science.¹

Good News from Gent
Methodological Naturalism
Methodological Naturalism - How Not to Attack Intelligent Design Creationism
Here Be Dragons
An Interview with Maarten Boudry

Here's the abstract of the Science & Education paper.

According to a widespread philosophical opinion, science is strictly limited to investigating natural causes and putting forth natural explanations. Lacking the tools to evaluate supernatural claims, science must remain studiously neutral on questions of metaphysics. This (self-imposed) stricture, which goes under the name of ‘methodological naturalism’, allows science to be divorced from metaphysical naturalism or atheism, which many people tend to associate with it. However, ruling the supernatural out of science by fiat is not only philosophically untenable, it actually provides grist to the mill of anti-evolutionism. The philosophical flaws in this conception of methodological naturalism have been gratefully exploited by advocates of intelligent design creationism to bolster their false accusations of naturalistic bias and dogmatism on the part of modern science. We argue that it promotes a misleading view of the scientific endeavor and is at odds with the foremost arguments for evolution by natural selection. Reconciling science and religion on the basis of such methodological strictures is therefore misguided.

And here's a brief summary of their position ...

A widespread philosophical opinion conceives of methodological naturalism as an intrinsic and self-imposed limitation of science, as part and parcel of the scientific enterprise by definition. According to this view (Intrinsic Methodological Naturalism or IMN) – which is the official position of both the National Center for Science Education and the National Academy of Sciences and has been adopted in the ruling of Judge John E. Jones III in the Kitzmiller vs. Dover case – science is simply not equipped to deal with the supernatural and hence has no authority on the issue.3

In our view, however, methodological naturalism is a provisory and empirically anchored commitment to naturalistic causes and explanations, which is in principle revocable in light of extraordinary evidence (Provisory or Pragmatic Methodological Naturalism – PMN). Methodological naturalism thus conceived derives its rationale from the impressive dividends of naturalistic explanations and the consistent failure of supernatural explanations throughout the history of science.4

The distinction between Intrinsic Methodological naturalism (IMN) and Pragmatic Methodological Naturalism (PMN) is important. PMN is a conclusion based on centuries of scientific evidence strongly suggesting that natural explanations are sufficient to explain all phenomena. Those investigations include looking onto possible supernatural explanations.

Scientists have actually investigated possible miracles and found no evidence for them. Scientist have actually investigated the supernatural explanation for a world-wide deluge and refuted it. And if someone says that God made bacterial flagella, real scientists will try and find out whether that's true instead of just throwing up their hands and claiming that such an explanation is outside of science.

The implications of PMN are profound. It means that science and religion really are in conflict.

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1. Of course the accommodationists will admit no such thing as I'm sure you are about to see in the comments. Such an admission would require them to say that they mislead Judge Jones in the Dover trial.

"Yes," "No," and "I Don't Know"

John Wilkins has continued the discussion about agnosticism, atheism, and the meaning of debate [Once more into the fray, dear agnostics]. I'll try and respond to the specific points he makes in a minute or two, but first I need to make my own position (more) clear.

I teach a course on critical thinking about scientific issues such as evolution/creationism. Most (all?) of the "scientific" debates that enter the public realm can be divided into two groups: those where one side is right and the other side is wrong, and those where the issue is controversial. From a personal perspective, that means you can have three responses when asked if you agree with a scientific argument: "yes," "no," and "I don't know."

John Wilkins on Sandwalk

 

I like John Wilkins. If he lived in Toronto I would want to talk to him several times a week and I'd even pay for the the coffee and lunches. It's embarrassingly easy to teach me things I don't know, or correct my errors, but John has done way more than his fair share over the past twenty years.

I think he's mad at me [Prescriptions for atheists].

First, Larry points out that arguments about the existence of God require one to take a position on fairies. One can only be agnostic about gods to the extent one is agnostic about fairies. My previous argument that this is comparing unlikes has, in one fell swoop, been demolished! Of course, there must be other reasons for thinking that we can rule fairies out of contention (let us call them faeries to avoid confusion) which do exist but are undetectable. It cannot be the principle that “if it is unscientific it is irrational” for that would be the positivist presumption and that would be unscientific. I know I am wrong about positivism here, because Dan Hicks pointed out that some positivists weren’t positivists about everything. So positivism is never self-defeating, even when the positivist presumption is applied by some to everything.

Larry must have other reasons for showing that faeries do not exist – other than being uninterested in what some people claim; this, as Larry must appreciate, is not about what I the reasoner think is true, but about what others who make these claims must be called. I look forward to him enlightening me on this.

John Haught in Kitzmiller v Dover

John Haught has been in the blogosphere news recently because of his debate with Jerry Coyne. The discussion of that now-famous video is going to last for a few more days and many different issues will be brought up. One of them will be accommodationism and whether John Haught should be treated as one of the "good guys" or one or the "bad guys." I've heard prominent accomodationists complain about Coyne's "attack" on Haught on the grounds that we shouldn't be criticizing a prominent theologian who is allied with evolutionary biologists in the fight against creationism.

Haught testified for the Kitzmiller side in Kiztmiller v Dover (2005). Here's part of his testimony when being questioned by the attorney for the parents (Mr. Wilcox). [transcript: Haught testimony]

Q. Focusing on natural science, what is science?

A. Science is a mode of inquiry that looks to understand natural phenomena by looking for their natural causes, efficient and material causes. It does this by first gathering data observationally or empirically. Then it organizes this data into the form of hypotheses or theories. And then, thirdly, it continually tests the authenticity of these hypotheses and theories against new data that might come in and perhaps occasionally bring about the revision of the hypothesis or theory.

Here Be Dragons

I first met Stefaan Blancke (left) and Maarten Boudry (right) when they came to Toronto for a conference in November, 2009. A few months later I visited Maarten at the University of Gent in Belgium (Stefaan wasn't there on the day I visited) [Good News from Gent].

These young philosophers presented a paper on Methodological Naturalism that impressed me enormously. The paper was eventually published in June 2010 [Methodological Naturalism - How Not to Attack Intelligent Design Creationism].

The essence of their paper is that science is not intrinsically limited to methodological naturalism in spite of what many people—especially accommodationists—might say. (And in spite of what was said in court in Dover, Pennsylvania.) Boudry and Blanke (and Johan Braeckman) claim that science is perfectly capable of investigating supernatural claims. However, whenever scientists have done this they have discovered that the claims are either false or unsupported by evidence. Hence, science is characterized by "provisory" methodological naturalism based on empirical evidence. This is very different from "intrinsic" methodological naturalism.

Maarten Boudry has written lots more about pseudoscience in general and Intelligent Design Creationism in particular. It's all published in his thesis: Here Be Dragons. I suggest you read the whole thing!

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[Image Credit: rbh.Smaug.jpg. Smaug is from The Hobbit. It's also the favorite dragon of my colleague Craig Smibert who discovered the Smaug (Smg) gene/protein in Drosophila melanogaster.]

Philosophers, Science, and Creationism

Investigating the boundary between science and religion

Richard Johns is a Sessional Instructor in the Department of Philosophy at the University of British Columbia. He came to my attention because he just posted a note on Uncommon Descent where he points us to a paper he recently published. Here's the link to his posting: The Limits of Self Organization.

You know as well as I do that anyone posting on that blog is a creationist, specifically an Intelligent Design Creationist. Thus, it won't surprise you to read that his work supports that version of creationism even if the paper itself doesn't mention Intelligent Design Creationism. (Where have we heard that before?)

I’m writing to tell people about a paper of mine that was published in Synthese last month, titled: "Self-organisation in dynamical systems: a limiting result". While the paper doesn’t address intelligent design as such, it indirectly establishes strict limits to what such evolutionary mechanisms as natural selection can accomplish. In particular, it shows that physical laws, operating on an initially random arrangement of matter, cannot produce complex objects with any reasonable chance in any reasonable time.

Synthese is "An International Journal for Epistemology, Methodology and Philosophy of Science." It is not a science journal. Please keep that in mind. Here's a link to Richard Johns' article published online last month [Self-organisation in dynamical systems: a limiting result]. Most of you won't be able to see that article so he kindly provided a link to Pre-published version.

The abstract makes you sit up and take notice.

Abstract
There is presently considerable interest in the phenomenon of “self-organisation” in dynamical systems. The rough idea of self-organisation is that a structure appears “by itself” in a dynamical system, with reasonably high probability, in a reasonably short time, with no help from a special initial state, or interaction with an external system. What is often missed, however, is that the standard evolutionary account of the origin of multi-cellular life fits this definition, so that higher living organisms are also products of self-organisation. Very few kinds of object can self-organise, and the question of what such objects are like is a suitable mathematical problem. Extending the familiar notion of algorithmic complexity into the context of dynamical systems, we obtain a notion of “dynamical complexity”. A simple theorem then shows that only objects of very low dynamical complexity can self organise, so that living organisms must be of low dynamical complexity. On the other hand, symmetry considerations suggest that living organisms are highly complex, relative to the dynamical laws, due to their large size and high degree of irregularity. In particular, it is shown that since dynamical laws operate locally, and do not vary across space and time, they cannot produce any specific large and irregular structure with high probability in a short time. These arguments suggest that standard evolutionary theories of the origin of higher organisms are incomplete.

All the code words are there. There's no way the editors of Synthese could be unaware of the implications of this work. It purports to be evidence of the existence of God. We can safely conclude that the discipline of philosophy has admitted the possibility that science could prove the existence of God.

(Don't bother reading the paper. It's one of those complicated lines of argument involving lots of mathematical equations. There probably aren't more than a few dozen people in the entire world who can understand the paper and offer objective criticism. I don't know if any of them reviewed the paper—I suspect not, but what do I know?)

Richard Johns concludes that current evolutionary theory is incomplete.

I have argued that there is an important limitation on the kinds of object that can appear spontaneously in a dynamical system. Such systems, with laws that operate locally and invariantly across space and time, are able to control only the local structure of the state. The state as a whole is therefore uncontrolled, except insofar as it is constrained by the local structure. This led us to the Limitative Theorem, which says that an irregular object, i.e. one that is largely undetermined by its local structure, cannot easily be produced in a dynamical system. Indeed, it was shown that its production is no easier than the appearance of an object of very similar size in a purely random system.

This result, while relevant to biology, does not of course contradict the theory of evolution in its most general form, i.e. that life evolved through a process of descent with modification. This is just as well, since the historical process of phylogeny is very well supported by the evidence. Nevertheless, the Limitative Theorem does suggest that the currently recognised processes driving evolutionary change are incomplete.

Doesn't this create some problems concerning the border between science and philosophy? You betcha, and Richard Johns is fully aware of the implications. Here's what he wrote on his blog [Why should self-organisation be limited?].

My theorem is also pure doom and gloom. Let's be honest: It offers no positive suggestion at all.

Can such negative claims be part of science? It is often said that a scientist must propose hypotheses that are empirically testable. That's not really true, however. While that's a big part of science, a lot of good scientific work is indeed negative. Much useful work is done by experimentalists who show that, while hypothesis H might predict empirical result E, E doesn't actually occur. Also, while most theorists are busily showing that H predicts E, other theorists very helpfully point out that H doesn't really predict E at all, even though we thought it did. A really negative scientist might even show that no hypothesis of a certain type will ever predict E.

I'm afraid I'm one of those really negative scientists. I've shown that no hypothesis in a very broad class predicts the existence of complex living organisms. More precisely, life cannot self organise in any dynamical system whose laws are local and invariant under spatial translation.

This is a very important point. Is it scientific to show that something cannot happen? I think it is.

Let's take a simple case like group selection. George Williams made a name for himself back in the 1960s by presumably showing that group selection could not occur by any known mechanism of evolution. Nobody, as far as I know, suggested that he wasn't being scientific. Lamarckian evolution is anther example. Although it's theoretically possible to pass on acquired characteristics, we discount that possibility because we can show that the connection between phenotypic changes and altering the genome rules out Lamarckian inheritance as a general mechanism of evolution.

If showing that something is theoretically impossible is valid science in some cases then why do we declare that attempts to do the same thing by Intelligent Design Creationists are automatically ruled non-scientific?

Richard Johns faces a special problem because he seems to have bought into methodological naturalism as a limitation on science. Again, from his blog ...

At this point a worrying possibility emerges. This no-go theorem is so broad that it rules out just about any naturalistic theory of the origin of life! It certainly seems to rule out all the naturalistic theories presently proposed. Yet, the whole business of science is to provide natural explanations for phenomena, so this result is unscientific after all. (Even if it is technically correct, take note.)

Well, this is an awkward business! What are we to do?

Indeed. What is he to do? Let's assume, for the sake of argument, that Johns has made a reasonable case for his argument. Let's assume that there may be ways of showing that life is impossible under the known laws of chemistry and physics. Is that science? Does it fit into the restriction of methodological naturalism?

I think the answer to the first question is "yes." It may be bad science, it may even be really bad science, but it's still science to investigate whether completely naturalistic explanations can account for life as we know it.

Let's not pretend to be naive. If there's no naturalistic explanation then there has to be some other kind of explanation.

So I think we have to broaden our horizons, and be open to new kinds of explanation. Perhaps it won't be that bad? And we have no other choice, if we want our explanations to be true.

We know what that means. By ruling out naturalistic causes, we are forced to consider supernatural causes. Is that what makes Richard Johns' work unscientific but not that of George Williams and many other theoreticians of biology? 'Cause if that's what methodological naturalism is all about then it's an ass.

I think everything is fair game for science. Our goal is not to develop rigid rules that make us feel good by ruling our opponents out of bounds just because we don't like their conclusions. Our goal should be to show that they are wrong.

I fully expect that people like Wesley Elsbery and Jeffrey Shallit and will show us why Richard Johns is wrong, just as they did for similar arguments by Bill Dembski. As they do that, Elsbery and Shallit will be practicing science as a way of discovering truth. It would make no sense to declare that Richard Johns has stepped outside the realm of science but Elsbery and Shallit remain inside its boundaries.

The Intelligent Design Creationist attacks on evolution are wrong because they are bad science, not because they are not science.

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