Orac is the nom-de-plume of a doctor who debunks the claims of non-evidence-based medicine (also known as "woo") on Respectful Insolence. His latest is a posting on the value of acupuncture based on recent scientific studies [Sham acupuncture is better than "true" acupuncture!]. Here's how Orac begins ...
Believe it or not, there was a time when I didn't consider acupuncture to be a form of woo.None of us have time to investigate every form of superstition and irrational thinking. Sometimes we have to rely on trusted experts to do the required homework. Orac is one of those.
I know, I know, it's hard to believe, given the sorts of posts I've done recently on acupuncture, but it's true. Certainly, I didn't believe the whole rigamarole about needles somehow "restoring the flow of qi" or anything like that, but I did wonder if maybe there was some physiologic mechanism at work behind acupuncture that produced real benefits in terms of pain relief above that of placebo. Sure, I may have dismissed homeopathy as the pure magical thinking that it was, but acupuncture I wasn't so sure about.
Obviously, that's changed.
The reason my opinion has changed and now I place acupuncture firmly in the "woo" category is that I've actually been reading the scientific literature on acupuncture over the last year or so....
8 comments :
None of us have time to investigate every form of superstition and irrational thinking. Sometimes we have to rely on trusted experts to do the required homework.
..fair comment... but is this trust in these experts arrived by way of scientific investigation? Or are those experts themselves subject to the opinion of other experts in whom one trusts? What then is the basis of such beliefs? Does one "experiment" on one's social nexus in order to demonstrate the validity of the 'social texts' it delivers to one's door? Apart from the very small window of direct experimental protocols accessible to an individual, a very high percentage of one's knowledge is mediated by social context. Although it may be that in principle a large proportion of reality is amenable to scientific testing, in practice this seems not to be the case, and group identification, allegiances etc have a bearing on the advance of knowledge.
(This is not to say that I accept acupuncture and homeopathy)
fair comment... but is this trust in these experts arrived by way of scientific investigation? ... What then is the basis of such beliefs?
These are interesting epistemological questions. In context, however, they seem to be apologetics.
There's trust and then there's trust. The issue here is not personal trust, but methodological trust. There's a difference between trusting the conclusions of a scientist on scientific issues and trusting, say, a cleric on religious issues.
The scientist reaches conclusions of fact relatively transparently. They are up for challenge and peer review. They must be reproducible and subject to further research under established, rigorous methods. If they are wrong, contrary studies or other criticisms or debunkings will be published. In contrast, the cleric's statements of fact are generally personal, speculative, irreproduceable and, typically, unfalsifiable.
So, yes, scientific experts are "subject to the opinion of other [trusted] experts" and subect to experimentation on "one's social nexus." That's what science, as a social enterprise, is all about. It is among the defining characteristics of science.
Thus, when one trusts a scientist – or, more accurately, trusts her research and conclusions based on that research – one is not trusting the person, but the method and the community that polices that method. Sure, studies can be gamed and results and conclusions can be incorrect. But the system is set up to recognize, accomodate and correct for these variables.
I'm going on at such length because this is a criticism of science that I've heard all too often from religious folk. I apologize if this was not your angle. The argument, though, is that there's no difference between, on the one hand, having faith in some construct of a a god or the words of a book or a preacher, and, on the other hand, trusting in scientific results and conclusions without having oneself performed each experiment. Well, there is an enormous difference, as described above – at least until the core tenets of religion are up for rigorous, empirical analysis.
I just found out that my extended health insurance not only covers acupuncture, but chiropractic too. Oh, the waste. I guess a lot of people demand it. So far, tarot readings are not covered.
Thus, when one trusts a scientist – or, more accurately, trusts her research and conclusions based on that research – one is not trusting the person, but the method and the community that polices that method. Sure, studies can be gamed and results and conclusions can be incorrect. But the system is set up to recognize, accomodate and correct for these variables.
I can buy most of that, but some qualification is needed. The questions I raised are not just epistemological but also ontological in as much as they are about the ontology of epistemology: that is, questions about the ontology of the ‘method and a community’ delivering information about the objects it scrutinizes. Is the ontology of this ‘method and community’ such that it delivers reliable information? Does it limit toward a reliable depiction of the objects it studies?
In as much as the notions of ‘community and method’ are abstract concepts that are reified on human flesh and blood we cannot separate any trust we might have in this system from human traits. Thus any attempt to cast this system as something set apart from human factors such as perception, belief, identification, allegiances and darker aspects of human nature is doomed to failure (an analogous consideration applies to the controls of democratic systems of government)
In science we may desire to get hold of something simple, elemental and absolute that bypasses the complexities and foibles of human beings but a declaration of trust in a ‘method and community’ is but short hand for a system that necessarily taps into human resources, whether good or bad.
But even so, is trust in science’s method and community justified? I personally believe it is, but to justify it can we turn the critical scrutiny of this method and community on to itself? To a certain extent yes, and this is what historians, sociologists and philosophers can do. However, the method and community of science is a meta object that is far more ontologically complex than the objects it studies and in turn is far less epistemologically amenable than the relatively simple objects of physical science. As the ontology of the objects of rational study gets more complicated, the notions of reproducibility and falsifiability that work for the relatively elementary objects of simple Popperian science become more problematical. Popper’s notion of falsifiability, as he made clear himself, was intended to draw a line round a subset of rationality, not to define rationality itself. For example, historical and sociological objects are far less amenable to reproducibility and falsifiability. In this context the efficacy of a theory has more to do with its ability to make sense and interpret what is available to our perception.
In summary: trust in the human element looms large in science, but that trust must be tempered with criticism and accountability. I may be a theist, but for me personally the same applies to clerics and religious sources of all kinds and, in fact, anybody else who makes claims about the primary ontology of the cosmos or anything relating to the meaning (or lack of it) of life.
In summary: trust in the human element looms large in science, but that trust must be tempered with criticism and accountability.
Well, of course. That's fundamental.
What's the relevance, though, as against systems of woo and religion?
What’s the relevance, though, as against systems of woo and religion?
You might like to comment on that yourself as it was you that made the religious connection and brought the subject up: I wasn’t going to mention the ‘R word’ myself, but I was anxious to get to the bottom of this reference to ‘Trust’. Yes, it’s the usual old philosophical questions: How do we know and how do we know we know? Perhaps it might seem a bit off topic for a science blog, but if an unreserved and dismissive position is being adopted on the basis of a reference to ‘Trust’ a bit of ‘Hey wait a minute…let’s analyze this…’ is not out of the way. I am sure you will agree that any source delivering a ‘text’ to our ears (or eyes) deserves the same treatment.
Science is about probing ontology, but in turn the epistemology of science presupposes a certain kind of ontology and so one can’t separate ontology and epistemology. As I am sure Popper himself would agree, the complex ontology of many objects presented to us by our world are not readily amenable to a simple postulate-test-refute/confirm procedure; the upshot is that we must adopt a more general empiricism that sees our perceptions as just the ‘visible’ tip of a much larger explanatory and sense making cognitive iceberg that attempts to ‘support’ our perceptions. One of the most complex and most problematical icebergs (partly down to self-referencing problems and the fact that it embraces the human) is epistemology itself.
As I have said above when probing one of these huge cognitive icebergs with our perceptions: Apart from the very small window of direct experimental protocols accessible to an individual, a very high percentage of one's knowledge is mediated by social context . Thus, most of our knowledge is mediated by ‘The Text’ and in that sense both scientist and religious pundit are working in the same medium; they are delivering ‘sense making’ texts to society. Hopefully, both are willing to subject themselves to accountability and their texts to criticism, and so in that sense the foregoing considerations are relevant to ‘systems of woo and religion’
if an unreserved and dismissive position is being adopted on the basis of a reference to ‘Trust’
It's not, at least not on this blog.
most of our knowledge is mediated by ‘The Text’ and in that sense both scientist and religious pundit are working in the same medium...
I disagree. I think that the empirical rigor of science makes it different in kind, not merely degree, from religious inquiry and, more importantly, religious conclusions and pronouncements. To be sure, there can be scientific inquiry into religious topics. But ideally religion trades in dogmae, while science trades in questions and criticism (the Central Dogma not withstanding).
I think you do both science and religion a disservice by conflating their modes of operation through recourse to the nature of knowledge as socially dependent.
[Both scientists and religious pundits] are delivering ‘sense making’ texts to society.
Again, your abstraction elides critical, life-and-death differences between the two endeavors.
Hopefully, both are willing to subject themselves to accountability and their texts to criticism, and so in that sense the foregoing considerations are relevant to ‘systems of woo and religion’
This begs the question. It is precisely the point that religious pundits (in general) and woo-mongers are unwilling to subject themselves and their texts to accountability and criticism.
Again, I see no reason to state "all systems must be open to criticism" in a discussion of woo, except to defend woo (and other religious beliefs) by implying that science, too, is closed and dogmatic.
Thanks for the reply Aloutata.
I hadn’t intended to imply that science is necessarily closed and dogmatic - although if linked to an ulterior weltanschauung (as was epicyclist theory) it can be quite resilient to challenging evidence. I’ll certainly concede your point that much religion is not only dogged by dogmatism, but on occasion it actually celebrates a rejection of reason and criticism: That’s what they call fideism. I’m certainly not defending this!
However, the endlessly elaborative, undisciplined creativity, and mystical quality of mythological thinking is not just associated with a theistic background paradigm. The background paradigm may be materialistic and yet still allow a similar feverish and uncritical multiplication of entities. Consider for example: the conspiracy theorists, the ‘aliens’ cults, the personality cult of surrounding mao-tse-tung, the “free energy” web sites, the mythology surrounding the Philadelphia experiment etc..etc… In the trade-off between creativity and criticism a rabid and tacky creativity is prevailing in these cases and seems to be driven by deep emotional complexes, instincts, aspirations and needs that give little account of themselves. In my opinion the real culprit is not theism or atheism per se but very human mental disciplines, or rather lack of them, enthralling these ‘theorists’.
Complicating matters still further is the fact that the ontology of the cosmos doesn’t make all objects equally as epistemologically tractable and it is often difficult to determine whether a lauded ontology is the result of some deep emotional complex driving a theorist into a kind ‘theoretical delirium’ or due to genuine epistemological difficulties seriously compromising empirical rigor: the Martian ‘canal’ debacle is a case in point.
In defense of myself I have to reaffirm that from my perspective all theoretical constructions look to be part the same class in that they are all attempts to make sense of our basic ‘protocol’ perceptions. However, they do differ very widely in the quality of attitude, mental discipline, background ontological paradigm (or what have you) that has created them and the epistemological tractability of the objects in view. Moreover, as direct perception forms such a small window on the cosmos these theories and their ‘confirming’ observations arrive at our door for evaluation via The Text.
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