Methodological Naturalism

UPDATE: This post no longer reflects my opinion on this subject. I now believe that science is not bound by methodological naturalism. Science as a way of knowing is free to investigate claims of the supernatural. [Is Science Restricted to Methodologial Naturalism?] [Accommodationism in Dover] [Methodological Naturalism].

In a comment on The Neville Chamberlain Atheists thread "slc" repeats a claim that he/she has been making for several months. I started to reply on that thread but the comment grew too long so I'm making it into a separate posting.
"slc" says,

As I have commented on this and other blogs, Prof. Morans' position, along with Myers and Dawkins is that philosophical naturalism is science and therefore science == atheism.

Indeed, I've seen you make that claim several dozen times. I'm glad it makes you happy.
For the record, I am an atheist so naturally I'm a philosophical naturalist. (Duh!) But I do not claim that good science requires philosophical naturalism. I claim that methodological naturalism is a requirement.
Most of my arguments [e.g. Theistic Evolution: The Fallacy of the Middle Ground] are based on the idea that methodological naturalism is the foundation of science and that, therefore, science is effectively atheistic in practice. I've been trying to show that methodological naturalism all by itself is capable of highlighting all of the important conflicts between science and religion. In my opinion, it's simply not true that the only conflicts that arise are when you make the leap to philosophical naturalism.
In this sense—and this sense only—I'm defending the concept of non-overlapping magisteria (NOMA) promoted by Stephen Jay Gould. As long as religion sticks to it's proper domain (magisterium) and stays out of science then it's okay (e.g., I have no problem with Deism and most versions of Buddhism). The problem is that most believers want to violate the rules of methodological naturalism and still be praised for being good scientists. One of the ways they rationalize this obvious conflict is to try and equate methodological naturalism with philosophical naturalism. They claim that it's okay to allow a little bit of religion into science because science is not the same as atheism. We see an example of that in "slc"'s attempt to dismiss what many of us are saying about the conflict between science and religion.

John Wilkins Revisits Methodological Naturalism

Thank God John has revived Evolving Thoughts!

As usual, his latest post contains lots of food for thought [God and evolution 2: The problem of creation]. I want to pick out one morsel because it's back in the news recently.

It's the problem of "methodological naturalism" and whether it restricts science. Kairosfocus recently posted an article on methodological naturalism at Uncommon Descent [Optimus, replying to KN on ID as ideology, summarises the case for design in the natural world]. He pointed out, quite correctly, that by restricting science to methodological naturalism it means that Intelligent Design Creationism becomes non-scientific by definition.

I've argued frequently in the recent past that science is not bound by methodological naturalism [Is Science Restricted to Methodologial Naturalism?] [Accommodationism in Dover] [Methodological Naturalism]. My stance has evolved over the past few years. Back in 2007 I was a staunch defender of limiting science to methodological naturalism [Methodological Naturalism].

Jerry Coyne agrees with my current position on methodolocical naturalism. We are both upset by the way it's used to support accommodationism at NCSE [The NCSE Position on Science vs Religion] and at AAAS [AAAS Supports Accommodationism, Illogically]. If you're new to the subject, read Jerry's latest post at: Must we assume naturalism to do science?. That will bring you up to date.

John Wilkins and I have debated this controversy several time [e.g. John Wilkins Defends Methodological Naturalism]. The important point, as far as I'm concerned, is that there are respectable philosophers who disagree with the idea that science can't investigate the supernatural because it is constrained by methodological naturalism.

Here's what John said yesterday (in my time zone).

The term “naturalism”, however, is ambiguous. On the one hand it can mean giving a natural explanation through the use of scientific methods such as the use of human reasoning and observation. Or, it can mean the claim that only “natural” things exist. The first is sometimes called “methodological naturalism”, and it is the underpinning of all science, and indeed all learning about the world. The second is sometimes called “metaphysical naturalism”, although I think it is instead a claim about what exists (which is called “ontology” amongst the philosophical community). God might be natural in that sense. There is no real sharp dividing line between the natural and the supernatural that would satisfy most believers. For example, human nature for some is held to include a soul, which is divine. So let us call the second kind ontological naturalism.

Obviously I don't think that methodological naturalism is the "underpinning of all science." I think science is free to investigate claims of the paranormal (i.e. not naturalism) and can, in principle, discover things that don't meet the definition of naturalism.

What makes me nervous is that this is John's field. Is he saying that among philosophers of science the overwhelming consensus believes that that in science you can only give natural explanations? Or is he simply offering his personal opinion disguised to look authoritative?

Is there a slam-dunk philosophical refutation of the position held by the likes of Yonatan Fishman and Maarten Boudry that Jerry Coyne and I (and many others) are unaware of?

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Is Science Restricted to Methodologial Naturalism?

Maarten Boudry, Stefaan Blancke, and Johan Braeckman have an article coming out in Science & Education on "Grist to the Mill of Anti-evolutionism: The Failed Strategy of Ruling the Supernatural out of Science by Philosophical Fiat."

It relates to the idea that science is limited by its insistence on adhering to methodological naturalism. According to this view, science cannot investigate the supernatural. The view is popular among some who oppose creationism since it means that creationism can't be scientific, by fiat. It's also important for accommodationists because it allows science and religion to co-exist in separate magisteria.

I oppose such a definition of science but, up until a few years ago, I was always told that my opinion is irrelevant since all philosophers, and many scientists, agree that science is limited by methodological naturalism. That's why I was so delighted to meet the philosophers from Gent. Finally there was another point of view opposed to the methodological naturalism limitation. Now those who promote this limitation on science have to honestly admit that it's just their opinion and not a universally accepted definition of science.¹

Good News from Gent
Methodological Naturalism
Methodological Naturalism - How Not to Attack Intelligent Design Creationism
Here Be Dragons
An Interview with Maarten Boudry

Here's the abstract of the Science & Education paper.

According to a widespread philosophical opinion, science is strictly limited to investigating natural causes and putting forth natural explanations. Lacking the tools to evaluate supernatural claims, science must remain studiously neutral on questions of metaphysics. This (self-imposed) stricture, which goes under the name of ‘methodological naturalism’, allows science to be divorced from metaphysical naturalism or atheism, which many people tend to associate with it. However, ruling the supernatural out of science by fiat is not only philosophically untenable, it actually provides grist to the mill of anti-evolutionism. The philosophical flaws in this conception of methodological naturalism have been gratefully exploited by advocates of intelligent design creationism to bolster their false accusations of naturalistic bias and dogmatism on the part of modern science. We argue that it promotes a misleading view of the scientific endeavor and is at odds with the foremost arguments for evolution by natural selection. Reconciling science and religion on the basis of such methodological strictures is therefore misguided.

And here's a brief summary of their position ...

A widespread philosophical opinion conceives of methodological naturalism as an intrinsic and self-imposed limitation of science, as part and parcel of the scientific enterprise by definition. According to this view (Intrinsic Methodological Naturalism or IMN) – which is the official position of both the National Center for Science Education and the National Academy of Sciences and has been adopted in the ruling of Judge John E. Jones III in the Kitzmiller vs. Dover case – science is simply not equipped to deal with the supernatural and hence has no authority on the issue.3

In our view, however, methodological naturalism is a provisory and empirically anchored commitment to naturalistic causes and explanations, which is in principle revocable in light of extraordinary evidence (Provisory or Pragmatic Methodological Naturalism – PMN). Methodological naturalism thus conceived derives its rationale from the impressive dividends of naturalistic explanations and the consistent failure of supernatural explanations throughout the history of science.4

The distinction between Intrinsic Methodological naturalism (IMN) and Pragmatic Methodological Naturalism (PMN) is important. PMN is a conclusion based on centuries of scientific evidence strongly suggesting that natural explanations are sufficient to explain all phenomena. Those investigations include looking onto possible supernatural explanations.

Scientists have actually investigated possible miracles and found no evidence for them. Scientist have actually investigated the supernatural explanation for a world-wide deluge and refuted it. And if someone says that God made bacterial flagella, real scientists will try and find out whether that's true instead of just throwing up their hands and claiming that such an explanation is outside of science.

The implications of PMN are profound. It means that science and religion really are in conflict.

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1. Of course the accommodationists will admit no such thing as I'm sure you are about to see in the comments. Such an admission would require them to say that they mislead Judge Jones in the Dover trial.

Methodological Naturalism

Here's the abstract from a talk given by Maarten Boudry at the Darwin Conference in Toronto last November (see Good News from Gent).

Maarten Boudry, Ghent University
Methodological Naturalism as an Intrinsic Property of Science: A Grist to the Mill of Intelligent Design Theory

In recent rounds of debate between evolutionists and supporters of Intelligent Design, the principle of methodological naturalism (MN) has been an important battleground. Creationists and intelligent design proponents have previously claimed that the commitment of evolutionists to naturalism and materialism constitutes a philosophical prejudice on their side, because it rules out any kind of supernatural causes by fiat. In response to these charges, some philosophers and scientists have argued that science is only committed to something they call methodological naturalism: Science does not deal with supernatural causes and explanations, but that does not mean that the latter do not exist. However, there has been some philosophical discussion about the correct understanding of MN. The principle of MN is often conceived of as an intrinsic and self-imposed limitation of science, as something that is part and parcel of the scientific enterprise by definition. According to this view (Intrinsic MN or IMN) - which is defended by people like Eugenie Scott, Michael Ruse and Robert Pennock and has been adopted in the ruling of Judge John E. Jones III in the Kitzmiller vs. Dover case - science is simply not equipped to deal with the supernatural and therefore has no authority on the issue. It is clear that this depiction of science and MN offers some perspectives for reconciling science and religion. Not surprisingly, IMN is often embraced by those sympathetic to religion, or by those who wish to alleviate the sometimes heated opposition between the two.

However, we will argue that this view of MN does not offer a sound rationale for the rejection of supernatural explanations. Alternatively, we will defend MN as a provisory and empirically grounded commitment of scientists to naturalistic causes and explanations, which is in principle revocable by future scientific findings (Qualified MN or QMN). In this view, MN is justified as a methodological guideline by virtue of the dividends of naturalistic explanation and the consistent failure of supernatural explanations in the history of science.

We will discuss and reject four arguments in favour of IMN: the argument from the definition of science, the argument from lawful regularity, the science stopper argument, and the argument from procedural necessity. Moreover, we will argue that defining the supernatural out of science is a counterproductive strategy against ID creationism, and, for that matter, against any theory involving supernatural explanations. More specifically, IMN has been eagerly exploited by proponents of ID to bolster their false claims about the philosophical and metaphysical prejudices of evolutionists. As ID proponent Philip Johnson rhetorically noted, if science is about following the evidence wherever it leads, why should scientists exclude a priori the possibility of discovering evidence for the supernatural? Therefore, IMN is actually grist to the ID mill.
We conclude that IMN is philosophically artificial and that its attempt to reconcile science and religion is ill-conceived. QMN, alas, does not provide any such ready reconciliation either, but it does offer a sound rationale for the rejection of supernatural designers in modern science.

Here's the problem. You can't just arbitrarily restrict science to methodological naturalism. That's like ruling out supernatural explanations by fiat and not by logic. If God exists, then there's no reason why supernatural explanations can't be a legitimate part of science. This is one of the arguments made by Philip Johnson and it hasn't been adequately addressed by most philosophers.

But there's another problem with using methodological naturalism as a defense of accommodationism. How do draw the line between methodological naturalism and philosophical naturalism? Obviously, there's no difference for an atheist; in fact, the distinction seems rather silly. If supernatural explanations are never found to be necessary in explaining the natural world then doesn't it make sense to conclude that fairies and Santa Claus don't exist?

But for theists it's important to make a distinction so that they can adhere to methodological naturalism as scientists without having to abandon their belief in supernatural beings outside of the laboratory.

Where is the boundary and how do you tell when the line has been crossed? Accommodationists are absolutely convinced that they can tell the difference between methodological naturalism and philosophical naturalism but they are never very clear about explaining this difference to others.

Here's your chance. Let's see if anyone can come up with a good way of telling when the practice of methodological naturalism becomes philosophical naturalism.

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Methodological naturalism at Dover

I'm one of those scientists who don't think that science as a way of knowing is restricted to investigating natural causes [John Wilkins Revisits Methodological Naturalism ]. I think that science can easily investigate supernatural claims and show that they are wrong. In theory, science might even show that the supernatural exists. Some (most?) philosophers agree. Maarten Boudry is the best known [Is Science Restricted to Methodologial Naturalism?].

This year is the tenth anniversary of Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District. At that trial, the plaintiffs successfully convinced Judge Jones that intelligent design isn't a science because it invokes supernatural causes. The expert witnesses testified that, by definition, science is limited by methodological naturalism. I disagree with the expert witnesses at the trial and I agree with many leading philosophers that science is not restricted to methodological naturalism [Can Science Test Supernatural Worldviews? ].

John Wilkins Defends Methodological Naturalism

Methodological Naturalism is an a priori argument in favor limiting science to investigations of the natural world. It serves to protect religion from science since most religious questions are concerned with the supernatural and science, by fiat, isn’t allowed to ask those questions. Coincidentally, it also protects philosophy from science since metaphysical questions now become the exclusive domain of philosophy.

There are some philosophers who see through this house of cards but they are few and far between. It’s mostly scientists—and those who think like scientists—who say "What the heck are they talking about?"

Maarten Boudry, Stefaan Blancke, and Johan Braeckman from the Department of Philosphy at the University of Gent (Belgium) represent the heretics and dissenters among philosophers. If you want a summary of posts on this topic go to: Is Science Restricted to Methodologial Naturalism?. Here’s an excerpt from Grist to the Mill of Anti-evolutionism: The Failed Strategy of Ruling the Supernatural Out of Science by Philosophical Fiat (Boudry et al. 2012).

What did Judge Jones say in 2005? (Part III)

For those or you who are still interested in the debate over the nature of science and how it played out in Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District back in 2005, I present to you ....

A Reading List
Science at the Bar—Cause for Concern by Larry Laudan

Skeptics Must Be Atheists

The skeptic movement has been in a bit of a turmoil over the past few years. One of the problems concerns the role of atheism in the movement. Many people think that outspoken criticism of religion (i.e. Gnu Atheism) is not a necessary part of skepticism. I agree—just as you don't have to be an outspoken critic of chiropractors to be a skeptic.

However, that doesn't mean that belief in god(s), or belief in the grandiose claims of chiropractors, is compatible with skepticism. They aren't.

PZ Myers and Steve Novella are debating this issue. The latest round is from last week on Pharyngula: Atheists are skeptics. (His title is wrong ... more about that in another post.¹) Novella is one of those skeptics who think that skepticism requires scientific thinking [Bigfoot Skeptics, New Atheists, Politics and Religion] but he also believes that the scientific way of knowing has limits and that belief in god(s) falls outside of those limits. The "limit" is, as we all know, methodological naturalism. (Novella's main interest is quack medicine.) Here's how he describes one of the attributes of a skeptic ...

Recourse to the Miraculous is Always a Regressive, Obfuscating Move

 
The same issue of Skeptical Inquirer that contained the Michael Ruse article [Appeasers and Other Atheists] also has an article by Frederick Crews.

Crews, F. (2007) Follies of the Wise. Skeptical Inquirer March/April 2007 pp.27-31.

Crews addresses the same issue as Ruse; namely whether it's a good idea to distinguish between Intelligent Design Creationists and Theistic Evolutionists. However, he delves deeper into the issue that Ruse does. I'm tempted to say that Crews is being more scholarly than Ruse.

Whenever we (e.g., PZ, Dawkins etc.) try to make the case that Theistic Evolution is just as fuzzy-headed as Intelligent Design Creationism we are accused of over-stepping the limits of science. While everyone recognizes that scientists must practice methodological naturalism, there seem to be lots of people who don't know what that is. They seem to think that it's okay to believe in miracles and still brag about being scientific. I've tried to point out the inconsistencies in such a position in my essay [Theistic Evolution: The Fallacy of the Middle Ground]. As Crews says below, "recourse to the miraculous is always a regressive, obfuscating move." This applies to Intelligent Design Creationism of course, but it also applies to the Theistic Evolution of Ken Miller, Francis Collins, and Simon Conway-Morris. I just don't see how atheists can dismiss the miracles of Dembski, Denton, and Behe while accommodating the miracles of Miller, Collins, and Conway-Morris. That makes no sense to me.

Crews takes a different approach. He argues that metaphysical naturalism is a valid and rational extension of methodological naturalism. This is contrary to Ruse and to the people at NCSE (e.g., Eugenie Scott). I present the Crews argument below. Let me know what you think. Personally I agree with him, even though I'm prepared to argue that most of the so-called "science" in books by Theistic Evolutionists is in violation of methodological naturalism not just metaphysical naturalism.

... some scientists and philosophers who are privately indifferent or hostile to transcendent claims nevertheless seek an accommodation with them. They do so from the best of motives, in order to stem the infiltration of bumpkin "creation science" or its slick city cousin "intelligent design," into biology curricula. Their hope is to show that scientific research and education have no bearing on issues of ultimate meaning and hence needn't be feared by the pious. To that end, they emphasize that science exemplifies only methodological naturalism, whereby technical reasons alone are cited for excluding nonmaterial factors from reasoning about causes and effects. Hence, they insist, the practice of science doesn't entail metaphysical naturalism, or the atheist's claim that spiritual causation is not only inadmissible but altogether unreal.

In one sense this is an impregnable argument. Even when science is conducted by ardent believers, it has to disregard theological claims because those claims typically entail no unambiguous, real-world implications, much less quantitative ones, that might be tested for their supportive or falsifying weight. The allegation that God was responsible for a given natural fact can't be either established or refuted by any finding; it is simply devoid of scientific interest. And thus it is true enough that scientists stand under no logical compulsion to profess metaphysical naturalism.

Any God worthy of the name has to be capable of miracles, and each of the great Western religions attributes a number of very special miracles to their conception of God. What can science say about a miracle? Nothing. By definition, the miraculous is beyond explanation, beyond our understanding, beyond science.

Ken Miller in "Finding Darwin's God" p. 239Quite obviously, however, trust in the supernatural does get shaken by the overall advancement of science. This is an effect not of strict logic, but of an irreversible shrinkage in mystery's terrain. Ever since Darwin forged an exit from the previously airtight argument of design, the accumulation of corroborated materialist explanations has left the theologian's "God of the gaps" with less and less to do. An acquaintance with scientific laws and their uniform application is hardly compatible with faith-based tales about walking on water, a casting out of devils,and resurrection of the dead.

Metaphysical naturalism may be undiplomatic, but it is favored by the totality of evidence at hand. Only a secular Darwinian perspective, I believe, can make general sense of humankind and its works. Our species appears to have constituted an adaptive experiment in the partial and imperfect substitution of culture for instinct, with all the liability to self-deception and fanaticism that such an experiment involves. We chronically strain against our animality by inhabiting self-fashioned webs of significance—myths, theologies, theories—that are more likely than not to generate illusory and often murderous "wisdom." That is the price we pay for the same faculty of abstraction and pattern drawing that enables us to be not mere occupiers of an ecological niche but planners, explorers, and, yes, scientists, who can piece together facts about our world and our own emergence and makeup.

Here it may be objected that myths, theologies, and theories themselves, as nonmaterial things that can nevertheless set in motion great social movements and collisions of armies, confound a materialist or metaphysically naturalist perspective. Not at all. We materialists don't deny the force of ideas; we merely say that the minds precipitating them are wholly situated within brains that, like everything else about which we possess some fairly dependable information, seem to have emerged without any need for miracles. Although it is not a provable point, it is a necessary aid to clear thought, because now that scientific rationality has conclusively shown its formidable explanatory power, recourse to the miraculous is always a regressive, obfuscating move.

Here Be Dragons

I first met Stefaan Blancke (left) and Maarten Boudry (right) when they came to Toronto for a conference in November, 2009. A few months later I visited Maarten at the University of Gent in Belgium (Stefaan wasn't there on the day I visited) [Good News from Gent].

These young philosophers presented a paper on Methodological Naturalism that impressed me enormously. The paper was eventually published in June 2010 [Methodological Naturalism - How Not to Attack Intelligent Design Creationism].

The essence of their paper is that science is not intrinsically limited to methodological naturalism in spite of what many people—especially accommodationists—might say. (And in spite of what was said in court in Dover, Pennsylvania.) Boudry and Blanke (and Johan Braeckman) claim that science is perfectly capable of investigating supernatural claims. However, whenever scientists have done this they have discovered that the claims are either false or unsupported by evidence. Hence, science is characterized by "provisory" methodological naturalism based on empirical evidence. This is very different from "intrinsic" methodological naturalism.

Maarten Boudry has written lots more about pseudoscience in general and Intelligent Design Creationism in particular. It's all published in his thesis: Here Be Dragons. I suggest you read the whole thing!

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[Image Credit: rbh.Smaug.jpg. Smaug is from The Hobbit. It's also the favorite dragon of my colleague Craig Smibert who discovered the Smaug (Smg) gene/protein in Drosophila melanogaster.]

Jerry Coyne on Lewontin and methodological naturalism

I'm working my way through Jerry Coyne's new book. There's lots of good stuff in there but I was particularly interested in his comment about his former Ph.D. supervisor, Richard Lewontin. The issue is whether science is confined to methodological naturalism leaving religion as the only way to investigate supernatural claims.

We've been over this many times in the past few decades but it's still worth reminding people of the only rational response to such a claim. This is from pages 91 and 92 of Faith vs. Fact: Why Science and Religion Are Incompatible.

... some scientists persist in claiming, wrongly, that naturalism is a set-in-stone rule of science. One of these is my Ph.D. advisor, Richard Lewontin. In a review of Carl Sagan's wonderful book The Demon Haunted World, Lewontin tried to explain the methods of science:

It is not that the methods and institutions of science somehow compel us to accept material explanation of the phenomenal world, but, on the contrary, that we are forced by our a priori adherence to material causes to create an apparatus of investigation and a set of concepts that produce material explanations, no matter how counter-intuitive, no matter how mystifying to the uninitiated. Moreover, that materialism is absolute, for we cannot allow a Divine Foot in the door.

That quotation has been promulgated with delight by both creationists and theologians, for it seems to show the narrow-mindedness of scientists who refuse to even admit the possibility of the supernatural and immaterial. But Lewontin was mistaken. We can in principle allow a Divine Foot in the door; it's just that we've never seen the Foot. If, for example, supernatural phenomena like healing through prayer, accurate religious prophecies, and recollection of past lives surfaced with regularity and credibility, we might be forced to abandon our adherence to purely natural explanations. And in fact we've sometimes put naturalism aside by taking some of these claims seriously and trying to study them. Examples include ESP at other "paranormal phenomena" that lack any naturalistic explanation.

Sadly, arguments similar to Lewontin's—that naturalism is a unbreakable rule of science—are echoed by scientific organizations that want to avoid alienating religious people. Liberal believers can be useful allies fighting creationism, but accommodationists fear that those believers will be driven away by any claim that science can tackle the supernatural. Better to keep comity and pretend that science by definition can say nothing about the divine. This coddling of religious sentiments was demonstrated by Eugenie Scott, the former director of an otherwise admirable anti-creationist organization, the National Center for Science Education:

First, science is a limited way of knowing, in which practitioners attempt to explain the natural world using natural explanations. By definition, science cannot consider supernatural explanations: if there is an omnipotent deity, there is no way that a scientist can exclude or include it in a research design. This is especially clear in experimental research: an omnipotent deity cannot be "controlled" (as one wag commented, "you can't put God in a test tube, or keep them out of one"). So by definition, if an individual is attempting to explain some aspect of the natural world using science, he or she must act as if there were no supernatural forces operating on it. I think this methodological naturalism is well understood by evolutionists.

Note that Scott claims naturalism as part of the definition of science. But that's incorrect, for nothing in science prohibits us from considering supernatural explanations. Of course, if you define "supernatural" as "that which cannot be investigated by science," then Scott's claims become tautologically true. Otherwise, it's both glib and misleading to say that God is off-limits because he can't be "controlled" or "put in a test tube." Every study of spiritual healing or the efficacy of prayer (which, if done properly, includes controls) puts God into a test tube. It's the same for tests of non-divine supernatural phenomena like ESP, ghosts, and out-of-body experiences. If something is supposed to exist in a way that has tangible effects of the universe, it falls within the ambit of science. And supernatural beings and phenomena can have real-world effects.

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"Ways of Knowing" According to the Union of Concerned Scientists

 
The Union of Concerned Scientists is based in Cambridge MA (USA). The group has released a short Statement on Science, Evolution, and Intelligent Design. The statement is supported by a pamphlet on Science, Evolution, and Intelligent Design.

Most of you have heard about other ways of knowing beside science. UCS has provided a list of those other ways of knowing for our edification. Here it is ...

Ways of knowing used in society include the following:

• Authority: Parents, teachers, community leaders, and physicians are all figures of authority. The level of trust we have in them depends on our personal experiences and access to knowledge about them.
• Belief: God or gods, or other external or internal supernatural powers can impart or support beliefs. There are numerous deities and levels and types of belief within any society.
• Logic: Logic includes tests and rules that help to identify what is true and false. It is an important element of scientific inquiry but is limited by its lack of reference to the natural world.
• Scientific Inquiry: Science provides knowledge based on empirical evidence from the natural world. Science is the only way of knowing that provides explanations that are testable and verifiable. Ideas in science accumulate over time and are subject to revision and change.

You're probably wondering whether the Union of Concerned Scientists have a position on the possible conflict between science and religion.

They do.

For many scientists there is no conflict between science and religion (2)—science explores how things work while religion and philosophy ask why. They can coexist as separate areas of inquiry and even lead to enlightening discussions. Indeed, some mainstream religions (3)—such as the Roman Catholic Church—support the theory of evolution as an explanation of how humans and other organisms arose on Earth. Recent attempts to incorporate religion-based alternatives to evolution in the science classroom have elicited strong reactions by many of these groups.

Our policy makers rely on independent scientific information to make informed decisions that protect our health, safety, and the environment. Unfortunately, a growing level of political and ideological interference threatens the integrity of science (4) in public decision making, with wide-ranging repercussions for our social, economic, and environmental future.

This is a bit confusing. Apparently, some religious beliefs conflict with science and threaten the integrity of science but other religious beliefs do not conflict. I guess it depends on which scientists you talk to.

In footnote (2) they refer to a poll ...

A poll of 460 college and university science professors in Ohio found that 84% thought there was no conflict between accepting the theory of evolution and a belief in God. Science is based on what is termed “methodological naturalism,” a rule of science that limits an explanation of natural phenomenon to natural causes. It has no opinion on the role of spirituality, only that it is not part of science. A related but philosophical view called “materialist or philosophical naturalist,” goes beyond methodological naturalism to say that only natural causes exist (i.e. there is no God). This is an important distinction as accusations that scientists and especially evolutionists are by definition materialist naturalists, and therefore atheists, is common in the intelligent design literature and should be countered.

This isn't very helpful. It's just another version of The Doctrine of Joint Belief. Just because 84% of professors in Ohio don't see a conflict doesn't mean there is no conflict.

The difference between methodological naturalism and philosophical naturalism is interesting but not relevant. Besides, their definition is ridiculous. When they say, "'methodological naturalism' [is] a rule of science that limits an explanation of natural phenomenon to natural causes" that leaves the door wide open. All you have to do is declare that something has a supernatural cause and it is automatically outside of science and, therefore, compatible with science. Intelligent Design Creationism not in conflict with science because all the intelligent designing is out of bounds to scientific investigation.

What we really want to know is how many of those 386 science professors believe in things that conflict with scientific explanations of the natural world as most of us understand them.

Do some of them believe in a Jesus who was born of a virgin, walked on water, brought dead people back to life, rose from the dead after being executed by the Romans, and ascended into something called heaven? If so, do they believe that none of those things conflict with science? If those things don't conflict with science then what about the miracle of God creating the universe in six days and making it look old to deceive us? Is that also compatible with science?

Inquiring minds want to know ...

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Accommodationism in Dover

The Kitzmiller v. Dover trial took place in September/October 2005. The issue was whether Intelligent Design Creationism should be presented to Dover high school students as a valid scientific controversy [Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District. The plaintiffs successfully argued that Intelligent Design was a religious view and as such it should be excluded from the science classroom.

The general thrust of the plaintiff's argument was laid out in the opening remarks of their lawyer (Eric Rothschild). They intended to show that science is restricted to natural causes. It cannot make statements about the supernatural. Since intelligent design refers to God it must be religion, not science, and should not be presented in a science classroom.

At this trial, you will hear the parties use the term "methodological naturalism." Methodological naturalism is the term used to describe science as self-imposed limitation, that it will only consider natural causes for natural phenomena. Science does not consider supernatural explanations because it has no way of observing, measuring, repeating, or testing supernatural events. It doesn't mean that supernatural events, including divine miracles, have not happened, just that science cannot properly make any statements about them.

But intelligent design will not accept the well-established boundaries of science and openly rejects methodological naturalism, the way science has been practiced for centuries. Why? Because it has to. In the end, no matter how many stones intelligent design throws at the theory of evolution, the only alternative it presents for the development and diversity of life, the only explanation for how a bacterial flagellum or the human eye came to be is a miracle, an abrupt appearance, an act of supernatural creation. That, by itself, establishes intelligent design as a religious argument, not a scientific argument, for the creation of biological life that cannot be taught to public school students.

This position is convenient because it defines non-overlapping magisteria. It means that someone can believe in miracles and supernatural beings without violating the principles that govern science. It's a good way of making the claims of intelligent design appear to be outside the bounds of science while, at the same time, allowing moderate religious scientists to live under the big tent of science.

It's a politically and legally effective tactic, but it it correct? I don't think it is. I think science is allowed to investigate claims of miracles and whether there are supernatural beings, just as it's allowed to investigate claims of the paranormal.

Whether or not this is a good description of science, it's clear that in the context of Kitzmiller v Dover the tactic was very successful. The Judge, John E. Jones III, accepted the definition of science and noted in his ruling that science is limited to methodological naturalism [Memorandum Opinion: Kitzmiller et al v. Dover Are School District et al.].

Expert testimony reveals that since the scientific revolution of the 16th and 17th centuries, science has been limited to the search for natural causes to explain natural phenomena. (9:19-22 (Haught); 5:25-29 (Pennock); 1:62 (Miller)). This revolution entailed the rejection of the appeal to authority, and by extension, revelation, in favor of empirical evidence. (5:28 (Pennock)). Since that time period, science has been a discipline in which testability, rather than any ecclesiastical authority or philosophical coherence, has been the measure of a scientific idea’s worth. (9:21-22 (Haught); 1:63 (Miller)). In deliberately omitting theological or “ultimate” explanations for the existence or characteristics of the natural world, science does not consider issues of “meaning” and “purpose” in the world. (9:21 (Haught); 1:64, 87 (Miller)). While supernatural explanations may be important and have merit, they are not part of science. (3:103 (Miller); 9:19-20 (Haught)). This self-imposed convention of science, which limits inquiry to testable, natural explanations about the natural world, is referred to by philosophers as “methodological naturalism” and is sometimes known as the scientific method. (5:23, 29-30 (Pennock)). Methodological naturalism is a “ground rule” of science today which requires scientists to seek explanations in the world around us based upon what we can observe, test, replicate, and verify. (1:59-64, 2:41-43 (Miller); 5:8, 23-30 (Pennock)).

As the National Academy of Sciences (hereinafter “NAS”) was recognized by experts for both parties as the “most prestigious” scientific association in this country, we will accordingly cite to its opinion where appropriate. (1:94, 160-61 (Miller); 14:72 (Alters); 37:31 (Minnich)). NAS is in agreement that science is limited to empirical, observable and ultimately testable data: “Science is a particular way of knowing about the world. In science, explanations are restricted to those that can be inferred from the confirmable data – the results obtained through observations and experiments that can be substantiated by other scientists. Anything that can be observed or measured is amenable to scientific investigation. Explanations that cannot be based upon empirical evidence are not part of science.” (P-649 at 27).

This rigorous attachment to “natural” explanations is an essential attribute to science by definition and by convention. (1:63 (Miller); 5:29-31 (Pennock)). We are in agreement with Plaintiffs’ lead expert Dr. Miller, that from a practical perspective, attributing unsolved problems about nature to causes and forces that lie outside the natural world is a “science stopper.” (3:14-15 (Miller)). As Dr. Miller explained, once you attribute a cause to an untestable supernatural force, a proposition that cannot be disproven, there is no reason to continue seeking natural explanations as we have our answer.

One of the people who testified for the plaintiffs was John Haught, a Roman Catholic Theologian. He was asked to define science and distinguish it from religion. His testimony is a very good example of the accommodationist position so I'm quoting it below in order to illustrate that view. (The transcripts are freely available on the NCSE website, see Kitzmiller Trial Transcripts.)

Q. Focusing on natural science, what is science?
A. Science is a mode of inquiry that looks to understand natural phenomena by looking for their natural causes, efficient and material causes. It does this by first gathering data observationally or empirically. Then it organizes this data into the form of hypotheses or theories. And then, thirdly, it continually tests the authenticity of these hypotheses and theories against new data that might come in and perhaps occasionally bring about the revision of the hypothesis or theory.

Q. You said that science seeks to understand the natural world through natural explanations. Is that important?
A. Yes, that's critical. The science, by definition, limits itself self-consciously, methodologically, to natural explanations. And that means that anything like a supernatural reality or transcendent reality, science is simply not wired to pick up any signals of it, and therefore any reference to the supernatural simply cannot be part of scientific discourse. And this is the way that science carries on to our present day.

Q. Would that mean this is the way modern science is conducted?
A. Modern science we date from roughly the end of the 16th to the 17th Century, in that period of time. And it was at that time that the great figurists of modern science, almost all of whom were deeply religious men themselves, decided self-consciously that this new mode of inquiry would not appeal to anything that's not natural, would not appeal to things like value, importance, divine causation, or even anything like intelligent causation.

These are not scientific categories of explanation. And ever since the 16th and 17th Century, modern science, as it's called, leaves out anything that has to do with theological or ultimate explanation.

....

Q. Does this make science at odds with religion?
A. By no means. Science and religion, as I've written in all of my books, are dealing with two completely different or distinct realms. They can be related, science and religion, but, first of all, they have to be distinguished. The medieval philosopher said, we distinguish in order to relate. And when we have a failure to distinguish science from religion, then confusion will follow.

So science deals with questions relating to natural causes, to efficient and material causes, if you want to use Aristotelian language. Religion and theology deal with questions about ultimate meaning and ultimate purpose. To put it very simply, science deals with causes, religion deals with meanings. Science asks "how" questions, religion asks "why" questions.

And it's because they're doing different things that they cannot logically stand in a competitive relationship with each other any more than, say, a baseball game or a baseball player or a good move in baseball can conflict with a good move in chess. They're different games, if you want to use that analogy, playing by different rules.

Q. You've used another analogy in discussions with me that might be illuminating. This is the boiling water analogy. Could you give us that?
A. Yes. I think most of the issues in science and religion discussions, most of the confusion that occurs happens because we fail to distinguish different levels of explanation. And so what I advocate is layered or -- layered explanation or explanatory pluralism, according to which almost every phenomenon in our experience can be explained at a plurality of levels.

And a simple example would be a teapot. Suppose a teapot is boiling on your stove and someone comes into the room and says, explain to me why that's boiling. Well, one explanation would be it's boiling because the water molecules are moving around excitedly and the liquid state is being transformed into gas.

But at the same time you could just as easily have answered that question by saying, it's boiling because my wife turned the gas on. Or you could also answer that same question by saying it's boiling because I want tea.

All three answers are right, but they don't conflict with each other because they're working at different levels. Science works at one level of investigation, religion at another. And it would be a mistake to say that the teapot is boiling because I turned the gas on rather than because the molecules are moving around. It would be a mistake to say the teapot is boiling because of molecular movement rather than because I want tea. No, you can have a plurality of levels of explanation. But the problems occur when one assumes that there's only one level.

And if I could apply this analogy to the present case, it seems to me that the intelligent design proponents are assuming that there's only one authoritative level of inquiry, namely the scientific, which is, of course, a very authoritative way of looking at things. And they're trying to ram their ultimate kind of explanation, intelligent design, into that level of explanation, which is culturally very authoritative today, namely the scientific.

And for that reason, science, scientists justifiably object because implicitly they're accepting what I'm calling this explanatory pluralism or layered explanation where you don't bring in "I want tea" while you're studying the molecular movement in the kettle. So it's a logical confusion that we have going here.

I think that's a prety good description of the accommodationist position as I understand it.

One of the interesting aspects of the trial is that when John Haught started to testify as an expect on science there was an objection from the defendant's lawyer. He claimed that Haught was a philosopher, not a scientist, and therefore was not an expert witness with respect to defining science. The objection had to be withdrawn when the defendant's lawyer discovered that he had already approved pre-trial documents where Haught discussed science.

Later on there was the following exchange,

Q. Well, according to Gould, the message of Darwinian science is that life has no purpose. Is that a scientific claim?
A. No. And I think if you ask Gould, he would have to admit that, also.

Q. Okay. Daniel Dennett, do you know who he is?
A. Yes.

Q. He's a philosopher. Is that right?
A. He's a philosopher at Tufts University.

Q. Right. And he claims that Darwin is incompatible with religious beliefs?
A. Yes. He's a philosopher, not a scientist. That's a philosophical belief.

Q. Well, what about E. O. Wilson, who is a biologist at Harvard, he puts Darwin's science in direct competition with religion, does he not?
A. Yes, because he is one of these people who unconsciously conflates his very good evolutionary science with a very suspect metaphysical belief system. Not always, but at times.

I'm sorry, but I can't help but snicker at such testimony from a Roman Catholic philosopher. He's testifying as an expert on science but criticizes another philosopher for making statements about science (justifiable, in my opinion, but still hypocritical). Then he criticizes a scientist for mixing up his science with his metaphysical beliefs.

What, exactly are those "very suspect metaphysical belief system" that John Haught avoids but which entraps E.O. Wilson? Why it's the "religion" of materialism.

Q. And by a materialist world-view or belief system, what does that mean?
A. Materialism is a belief system that claims that matter, lifeless and mindless matter, is the ultimate foundation of all reality, and there's nothing more ultimate than that. So it's kind of religious in the first sense of my term, a belief in something of ultimate importance. For the materialist, matter is the ultimate creator, the ultimate source of all being, and therefore it excludes the existence of anything supernatural, certainly the existence of God.

So, materialism isn't something that could just arise by default among those people who don't fall for religion. No siree. It has to be a religious view of its own.

If you think about it, that's very strange. Western Europeans are raising a whole generation of children who will have never been brainwashed by religion. They will be materialists by default because they've never known anything else. But according to Haught (he's not alone) they will be engaging in adopting a form of religious belief system, just like E.O. Wilson. How does that work?

So, what exactly are the limitations of science that we are supposed to adhere to? Earlier I criticized the concept of methodological naturalism because it seemed to rule out investigations of the paranormal as well as investigations of miracles. Robert Pennock, another philosopher, was asked about that during his testimony and he had a ready answer. See if you are convinced.

Q. Isn't it true that as we sit here today scientists are investigating what some people call psychic powers?
A. I know that there are a few scientists who did that I believe. Mack is one name, someone who's done this. So there are a few scientists who have done that, that's right, and what they do in that case is really the same thing. It's often misunderstood to think, to call something paranormal means that it is supernatural. Essentially what's going on in those scientific investigations is to say no, that's not so. We will again treat this purported phenomenon, ESP or telekinesis for example, as though this is a natural, still yet unknown, but ordinary causal process, treating it essentially in the same way we treat other things under the constraints of methodological naturalism, reconceptualizing it as a natural thing rather than a supernatural.

Cool. You can investigate the paranormal because it's not supernatural and you can treat it as a potential natural phenomenon. Presumably you will reach the conclusion that is is not a paranormal event.

But for some reason you can't do that for miracles and the role of God in theistic evolution. That's forbidden science.

Excuse me if I'm confused.

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Can Science Test Supernatural Worldviews?

Jerry Coyne's recent post on methodological naturalism was based on a recent paper by Fishman and Boudry (2013). Previously Jerry had addressed a paper by Yonatan Fishman from 2009 (Fishman, 2009) [Can science test the supernatural? Yes!!] I think it's worth highlighting that 2009 paper because it makes a strong case against limiting science. I'm a bit confused by the stance taken by John Wilkins (and others) as I mentioned in the comments to my recent post [John Wilkins Revisits Methodological Naturalism]. Perhaps they could respond to this argument from the Fishman (2009) paper?

The recent court ruling in the United States against the teaching of ‘Intelligent Design’ (ID) as an alternative to evolution in biology classes (Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District; Jones 2005) has sparked public interest and has been hailed as a victory by the scientific community. One of the reasons given for the verdict is the notion that science is limited strictly to the study of natural phenomena and therefore that ID and other claims involving supernatural phenomena are outside the proper domain of scientific investigation.

While the verdict is widely viewed as correct for other reasons cited in the court’s opinion, that particular rationale upon which it is based is questionable. Indeed, is science limited to the study of ‘natural’ phenomena? Does science presuppose Naturalism and thereby exclude supernatural explanations by definition? Are claims involving ‘supernatural’ phenomena inherently untestable and therefore outside the province of science? The present article argues that this is not the case. Science does not presuppose Naturalism and supernatural claims are amenable in principle to scientific evaluation [see Monton (2006) and Stenger (2006a) for a similar critique of Judge Jones’ verdict]. Indeed, science does have implications for the probable truth of supernatural worldviews (Gauch 2006, defends a similar thesis).

To exclude, a priori, the supernatural would validate the complaint voiced by some ID adherents and other creationists that science is dogmatically committed to Naturalism and thus opposed in principle to considering supernatural explanations (Johnson 1999; see Stenger 2006a). On the other hand, if there is no fundamental barrier preventing science from evaluating supernatural claims, then to declare the study of supernatural phenomena out of bounds to scientific investigation imposes artificial constraints on scientific inquiry, which potentially would deny science the noble task of purging false beliefs from the public sphere or the opportunity to discover aspects of reality that may have significant worldview implications.

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Fishman, Y.I. (2009) Can science test supernatural worldviews? Science and Education 18:165-189. [doi: 10.1007/s11191-007-9108-4

Fishman, Y.I. and Boudry, M. (2013) Does Science Presuppose Naturalism (or Anything at All)? Science & Education (published online January 7, 2013) [doi: 10.1007/s11191-012-9574-1]

Illinois Federation of Teachers: Resolution #11

The Illinois Federation of Teachers has passed Resolution #11: KEEP SUPERNATURALISM OUT OF THE SCIENCE CURRICULUM. It represents a certain point of view that I don't agree with so I'll make a few comments in order to provoke discussion.

WHEREAS, science is a systematic method for investigating natural phenomena through experimentation, observation and measurement leading to falsifiable explanations that are open to continuous testing; and ...

I think of science as a way of knowing ... everything. It is not limited to "natural phenomena" in the sense that's normally attributed to that phrase. The scientific way of knowing applies rational thinking, evidence, and skepticism to any problem we encounter and this includes history and English literature. Thus, by my definition, "experimentation" isn't a requirement and "measurement" is far too restrictive. I also don't accept "falsifiability" as an important criterion for science.

What the Illinois Federation of Teachers should have said was "There are many different definitions of science. We adopt the following definition, recognizing that many scientists and philosophers disagree."

Right from the start, the teachers have created a situation where they can keep religion out of the science class but not out of art, history, and geography classes.

WHEREAS, science proceeds on the basis of methodological naturalism and assumes observed phenomena of the universe are real, nature is consistent and understandable, and nature is explainable in terms of laws and theories; and ...

The teachers should have said the following, "Whereas many philosophers and scientists restrict science to the practice of methodological naturalism while others disagree, we adopt the methodological naturalism position for the purposes of this resolution."

Then they should have gone on to say, "We believe that nature can eventually be fully explained by laws and theories because so far there's no evidence to suggest otherwise."

WHEREAS, a scientific theory is consistent with evidence from multiple and independent sources of evidence, explains many different facts and allows predictions of subsequent discoveries; and

WHEREAS, the theory of evolution satisfies these criteria fully, is the foundation of biological science, is supported by a coherent body of integrated evidence from other disciplines in science and is consistent with theories from other scientific disciplines including anthropology, geology, physics, astronomy and chemistry; and ...

Evolution is much more than a theory [Evolution Is a Fact, Evolution Is a Fact and a Theory]. Most of what's taught in public school is not evolutionary theory but evolution fact and the history of life. It's a fact that humans and chimpanzees share a recent common ancestor, for example. It's a fact that natural selection leads to antibiotic resistance in bacteria.

We should not be referring to these fact as "the theory of evolution."

WHEREAS, there have been attempts in some states to include supernaturalism in the science curriculum as an alternative to scientific explanations of nature, particularly as an alternative to evolutionary theory; and

WHEREAS, arguments that invoke supernaturalism are grounded in religious or philosophical considerations outside the realm of science; and ...

I do not agree that supernaturalism is outside the realm of science. Supernatural explanations have been investigated by scientists and have been shown to be false or unnecessary. They are excluded from the classroom because they are bad science, not because they are "not science."

Statements like this imply that supernaturalism is a separate way of knowing. A supernatural explanation may even be correct but you can't teach it in science class because we say so. This is a very puzzling situation. What if there really is a God and He guides evolution? How would we be justified in keeping that from our children?

We need to teach critical thinking and this means addressing all claims—including the supernatural—to see if they are right or wrong.

WHEREAS, attempts to subvert the validity or teaching of evolutionary theory are also attacks on all scientific inquiry and, therefore, also attacks on the validity of using reason and experimentation to understand the universe; and ...

This is correct. Attacks on evolution are attacks on science. That's why we need to teach children why those attacks are unjustified and wrong. Ignoring them or banning them from the classroom won't demonstrate why they subvert the validity of science.

WHEREAS, legislation that conflates supernaturalism, or limits, or prohibits the teaching of any scientific theory negatively impacts our ability to make informed decisions; and

WHEREAS, it is the responsibility of the Illinois Federation of Teachers to preserve the integrity of science in the classroom; therefore be it

resolved, that the Illinois Federation of Teachers affirm, through a positional statement on its website, the validity of science as a methodology for understanding the nature of the universe, and affirm the validity and foundational importance of organic evolution to science as a whole and biology, specifically; and be it further

RESOLVED, that the IFT affirm, through a positional statement on its website, that supernaturalism is not a scientific endeavor and, therefore, is inappropriate for inclusion in the science curriculum; and be it further

RESOLVED, that this resolution does not make it the official position of the IFT that there is no God and should not be interpreted as a statement either for or against religion or belief in God; and be it further

RESOLVED, that the IFT call upon its members to assist those engaged in overseeing science education policy to understand the nature of science, the content of contemporary evolutionary theory and the inappropriateness of including non-science subjects (e.g., intelligent design and creationism) in our science curriculum; and be it further

RESOLVED, that the IFT communicate to the local, regional and national public media, to educational authorities and to appropriate legislators its opposition to the inclusion of non-science approaches and subjects (e.g., creationism and intelligent design) into the science education curricula of our public school system; and be it finally

RESOLVED, that the IFT members also promote these concerns and help resolve these issues in their home communities among educators, parents, school boards and students in appropriate public forums.

I hope that Illinois teachers are going to make a strong effort to teach evolution and critical thinking in their classrooms in spite of any opposition they may encounter from local schools boards and parents.

This is one of 27 resolutions that they passed.

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[Hat Tip: Panda's Thumb]

Methodological Naturalism - How Not to Attack Intelligent Design Creationism

My philosopher friends from Ghent have published their paper ...

Boudry, M., Blancke, S., and Braeckman, J. (2010) How Not to Attack Intelligent Design Creationism: Philosophical Misconceptions About Methodological Naturalism. Foundations of Science doi:10.1007/s10699-010-9178-7.

Abstract
In recent controversies about Intelligent Design Creationism (IDC), the principle of methodological naturalism (MN) has played an important role. In this paper, an often neglected distinction is made between two different conceptions of MN, each with its respective rationale and with a different view on the proper role of MN in science. According to one popular conception, MN is a self-imposed or intrinsic limitation of science, which means that science is simply not equipped to deal with claims of the supernatural (Intrinsic MN or IMN). Alternatively, we will defend MN as a provisory and empirically grounded attitude of scientists, which is justified in virtue of the consistent success of naturalistic explanations and the lack of success of supernatural explanations in the history of science (Provisory MN or PMN). Science does have a bearing on supernatural hypotheses, and its verdict is uniformly negative. We will discuss five arguments that have been proposed in support of IMN: the argument from the definition of science, the argument from lawful regularity, the science stopper argument, the argument from procedural necessity, and the testability argument. We conclude that IMN, because of its philosophical flaws, proves to be an ill-advised strategy to counter the claims of IDC. Evolutionary scientists are on firmer ground if they discard supernatural explanations on purely evidential grounds, instead of ruling them out by philosophical fiat.

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The Stockbridge 14

Fourteen people have been invited to a special meeting in Stockbridge Massachusetts (USA). They are: Sean Carroll, Jerry Coyne, Richard Dawkins, Terrence Deacon, Simon DeDeo, Dan Dennett, Owen Flanagan, Rebecca Goldstein, Janna Levin, David Poeppel, Alex Rosenberg, Don Ross, Steven Weinberg, and Massimo Pigliucci. So far they've discussed the meaning of "naturalism," including the nature of reality (morning session) and evolution, complexity and emergence (afternoon session") [Moving Naturalism Forward].

You can read Jerry Coyne's description at: Interim report: Moving Naturalism Forward Meeting. Massimo Pigliucci has also written about the first day at: From the naturalism workshop, part I.

So far it sounds quite boring. It looks looks like some of the philosophers have tricked the scientists into debating the precise meaning of words that nobody has been able to define precisely in the past one hundred years. Does anyone outside of philosophers actually care whether we have precise definitions of "naturalism" and "supernatural"? We all know what we're talking about when we discuss the existence of god(s).

And what about "emerging properties"? Surely that's a topic that's already been debated to death? What in the world do they expect to learn other than the fact they disagree on the definition of what an enregent property actually means?

As for complexity, it's either so simple that we all recognize it when we see it, or so "complex" that nobody cares. Here's what Coyne says ...

The discussion of complexity, introduced by Simon DeDeo and much discussed by Janna Levin, was way over my head. I found some consolation in the fact that Dennett, too, announced that he didn’t understand what was being said!

That doesn't sound very promising.

I'm not looking forward to the results of the next two days because they're going to tackle silly topics like the nature of morality, free will, "meaning," and "purpose". I wonder if they're going to debate the difference between methodological naturalism and philosophical naturalism? I wonder when they'll get to the issues of how many angels can dance on the head of a pin?

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[Photo Credit: One Angel Dancing on the Head of a Pin]

NCSE v National Association of Biology Teachers

There's been a lot of discussion recently about the proper role of scientific organizations, such as the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), The Royal Society, and the National Academies of Science (NAS), in the conflict between science and religion. Many people, including me, think that these scientific organizations should remain neutral on the issue of possible conflict between sceince and religion.

The situation with respect to the National Center for Science Education (NCSE) is more complicated. I believe that NCSE should also avoid taking a stand in favor of some religions over others, and in favor of religious versus non-religious interpretations of the conflict.

It's worth reminding people of how this issue has played out in the past so I'm posting a brief summary of an incident that took place over ten years ago.

In 1995, the National Association of Biology Teachers issued the following statement.

The diversity of life on earth is the result of evolution: an unsupervised, impersonal, unpredictable and natural process of temporal descent with genetic modification that is affected by natural selection, chance, historical contingencies and changing environments.

A number of theologians and theistic evolutionists objected to the inclusion of "unsupervised," "impersonal," and "unpreditable" since this clearly conflicted with their religious beliefs.

In 1997, NABT reviewed their statement in light of these complaints and rejected them, voting to keep the original statement. At that point, Eugenie Scott, the Executive Director of NCSE stepped in and persuaded the teachers to drop "unsupervised" and "impersonal" from the statement.

Why did NCSE support the theologians and theistic evolutionists against the biology teachers? It's because Genie draws a line between materialistic naturalism and philosophical naturalism and she thinks the biology teachers stepped over that line (see National Association of Biology Teachers incident for a description of the event). She believes that science cannot know whether evolution is unsupervised and/or impersonal.

I suppose she would have been comfortable with the following statement ....

The diversity of life on earth is the result of evolution: a natural process of temporal descent with genetic modification that is affected by natural selection, chance, historical contingencies and changing environments. Science is unable to tell whether evolution was unsupervised and impersonal or whether it was supervised by a personal god.

That's what she and her allies really want the teachers to say even though they don't insist upon it.

I disagree. I think that scientific evidence points overwhelmingly to a life that was not designed for a purpose. I think there's no evidence whatsoever to suggest that evolution was guided and I don't think we should censor ourselves from saying this.

I think Genie and NCSE are making too big of a distinction between methodological naturalism and philosophical naturalism. Saying that there is no evidence of purpose and direction is a perfectly good methodological statement and the conclusion that, therefore, evolution is unsupervised and unguided is rational based on what we know about science.

It was wrong of NCSE to pressure the biology teachers to change their statment.

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What did Judge Jones say in 2005? (Part I)

It is generally recognized that we don't do a very good job of teaching the nature of science. We also don't do a good job of teaching students how to think critically. This issue is going to heat up in a few months when Jerry Coyne's new book comes out.

Let's light a few fires right now. We'll look at the decision in Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District. It was written by Judge John E. Jones III and it reflects on the nature of science and whether intelligent design (ID) is science. You can find the complete transcript on the TalkOrigins Archive website at: Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District: Decision of the Court. The decision was published in December 2005.

Let's look at Section E4: "Whether ID is Science." I'll put Judge Jones' statement in boldface italics and my comments in regular type.

What's Wrong with Michael Ruse's View of Accommodationism?

Michael Ruse wrote a book called Science and Spirituality: Making Room for Faith in the Age of Science (2010). It's a defense of accommodationism—the position of atheists who maintain that science and religion are compatible because they are different ways of knowing. Ruse is one of the main proponents of Methodological Naturalism, which postulates that science is restricted, or limited, to investigations of the natural world. Since religion deals, by definition, with the supernatural world, it falls outside the domain of science and is, therefore, compatible with science. This leads Ruse to define several criteria of Christianity that are immune to scientific investigation [The Essence of Christianity].

This position used to be overwhelmingly accepted by the majority of scientists and philosophers, especially in America. It has become the standard view of most professional scientific organizations and of The National Center for Science Education (NCSE). It's a convenient way for atheist scientists and religious people who are mostly accepting of science to avoid conflict as they make common cause against the extreme creationists.

But that view is now being challenged and it's no longer acceptable to claim that it represents the only view of science. That's what the good guys did during the Dover trial a few years ago but it wouldn't work today because there are dozens of prominent philosophers of science who would argue against such a limitation of science.

One of them is Peter Slezak of the School of History and Philosophy, University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia. He recently wrote a review of Ruse's book: Michael Ruse: Science and Spiritutality: Making Room for Faith in the Age of Science (Slezak, 2011).

Much of the conflict depends on definitions and Slezak clearly endorses a much broader view of science than Ruse. Here's how Slezak challenges the view that science has limits.

This is a widely held and obviously appealing line to adopt for those, like Ruse, who are committed to the scientific enterprise and its claims. However, I will suggest that, despite its appearance of open-minded ecumenicalism, the posture faces insuperable intellectual difficulties. In wishing to leave room beyond ‘‘the allowable scope of science’’ (p. 235), Ruse is effectively endorsing a traditional demarcation between science and metaphysics in order to restore respectability to some claims in the latter category. However, this recidivist project does not properly address the hegemonic nature of the scientific enterprise. This conception is expressed in the final remarks of Bertrand Russell’s (1935) book Religion and Science. Aside from questions of value that lie outside the realm of truth and falsehood,

Russell says:

Whatever knowledge is attainable, must be attained by scientific methods; and what science cannot discover, mankind cannot know (1935, p. 243).

The title of Freud’s (1927, 92) book The Future of an Illusion refers to religion and ends with the exactly the same sentiments: ‘‘an illusion it would be to suppose that what science cannot give us we can get elsewhere’’. These expressions of a positivist conception are less dogmatic than they appear because they may be understood as statements of the openmindedness of science rather than its opposite. That is, ‘‘science’’ doesn’t exclude anything simply because the honorific label is used for anything worth believing. That is, if there are any rational grounds for a proposition, it will become included within the domain of established science. Or, rather, perhaps we should say that it will be included on the spectrum of claims ranging across ‘good, bad and bogus’ to use the sub-title of Gardner’s (1981) book. The point is captured in Laudan’s (1983) account of the ‘‘Demise of the Demarcation Problem’’ since he shows that ‘‘the problem of demarcation … is spurious’’ and the heterogeneity of beliefs and activities means that there are no lines to be drawn (see Special Issue of Science & Education, 2011, volume 20, 5–6). In particular, this means that the claims of religion fall somewhere on the spectrum, arguably nearer the bogus end. However, this means that they are subject to the usual criteria for deciding what is worth believing, which is, in any case, clear enough from the nature of the claims as we will note presently.

Ruse and his allies believe that any attempt to step outside the limits of science constitute a venture into metaphysics and this is not science but something else. Peter Slezak rejects this argument ...

Plantinga (1991, 8) suggests that the question of the clash between faith and reason is ‘‘enormously difficult’’ requiring ‘‘penetrating grasp of the relevant theological and philosophical issues’’ as well as the complex science. However, this is sheer bluff since the arguments don’t depend on any such arcane knowledge. Thus, citing Plantinga, Ruse (p. 183) seeks room for claims alongside and independent of science on the grounds that there are alternative ‘‘world views’’ and, therefore, a choice between two ‘‘metaphysical’’ options— naturalism and theism. The air of reasonableness and even profundity in this stance produces a vacant illusion of explanation but disguises sophistry. First, even if we are to talk this fancy philosophical way with Plantinga, it remains obscure why the Christian theistic ‘‘metaphysics’’ is the only alternative to the ‘‘naturalistic’’ one. One could presumably find or invent many others that would have equal status as alternatives to naturalism by virtue of having nothing to recommend them. Does Plantinga think that Mexican metaphysics based on the theology of Quetzalcoatl deserves equal consideration with his Christian variety?

The very idea that we can transcend what Ruse calls the ‘‘limitations of a science based knowledge’’ (p. 10), or that we have a choice between alternative ‘‘metaphysics’’, is an illusion. There is no alternative to our best theories other than worse ones. Naturalism is just the picture provided by our current science and is, therefore, the best we’ve got. Pretentious philosophical talk of ‘‘metaphysical’’ options can’t change the fact that naturalism is the only game in town since it is simply the totality of our theories in physics, chemistry, biology, neuroscience, geology and so on. Does Christian metaphysics provide a better account of quantum physics, cosmology or the structure of DNA?

Slezak is going to be accused of scientism or, at the very least, naturalism. The accommodationists will claim that the leap to naturalism is overstepping the limits of what science can or cannot claim. That's not true. Science teaches us that the scientific approach works and that most things have a naturalistic explanation. It follows that any claim of a valid a non-naturalistic explanation must have at least as much to recommend it or else it is nothing more than hand-waving.

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Slezak, P. (2011) Michael Ruse: Science and Spiritutality: Making Room for Faith in the Age of Science Sci & Educ 21:403-413. [DOI 10.1007/s11191-011-9373-0]