John Wilkins has written a series of posts about the war between science and religion.
Accommodating Science overview
I find the arguments confusing because I'm never quite sure what John defines as "science." I think he's referring to the things that scientists do. This is the narrow definition of science and I think it explains why he claims that there are aspects of religion that do not conflict with science.
Last week I commented on whether bigots should be given permission to discriminate against gays just because the bigots belong to a religion that promotes bigotry [The Kansas anti-gay bill]. My opinion is that societies should not tolerate bigotry no matter what motivates people to discriminate. I said ...
I read some newspaper articles, and some blog posts, that stated the obvious. It is totally wrong, all the time, to discriminate against someone based on their sexual preferences. If they use religion as an excuse then they should re-evaluate their religion. There is NEVER a time when an enlightened society should tolerate, let alone legalize, bigotry. I guess it's almost impossible to come out and say this on television, or maybe I'm just watching the wrong channels (mostly FOX and CNN).
What I mean is that enlightened societies will almost always reach a consensus on discrimination against minorities. They will decide that society functions best when all types of discrimination are bad and should not be tolerated.
Massimo Pigliucci doesn't get enough respect. He's upset by the "New Atheists" who place a great deal of emphasis on the scientific way of knowing and demand evidence that any other way of knowing is successful. These mean New Atheists (I count myself as one of them) use a very broad definition of science that includes most of the admirable activities of philosophers. Pigliucci is mostly a philosopher and he doesn't think that philosophy is getting enough respect from the New Atheists.
Here's the cartoon he published on his blog to illustrate the problem [see Rationally Speaking cartoon: Sam Harris].
John Wilkins linked to essay by someone named William Reville on "Philosophers must oppose arrogance of scientism." Reville is not a philosopher—he's a retired biochemist and Public Awareness of Science Officer from the University College Cork in Ireland.
He writes a regular column for The Irish Times on the relationship between science and religion. He's a Roman Catholic.
I'm interested in the conflict between science and religion and I usually pay attention to anything that John Wilkins recommends so I looked at this article. I think it might be fun to examine it to see how some theists think about the issue. Let's see how he starts out ...
The Princeton Guide to Evolution is a collection of 107 articles on various aspect of evolution. The editors felt they should address the obvious conflict between evolution/science and religion. There are at least five different approaches they could have taken.
- An atheist perspective on the incompatibility of evolution/science and religion. Richard Dawkins or Jerry Coyne would be good choices.
- An atheist perspective on the compatibility of science and religion (the accommodationist view). Michael Ruse or Nick Matzke are obvious choices.
- A theist view of the incompatibility of evolution and religion. Phillip Johnson could have explained this view but so could a number of other creationists.
- A theist explanation of the compatibility of evolution/science as long as they stick to their proper magisteria. Francis Collins, Ken Miller, and several other religious scientists could present their case.
- The editors could have published four articles representing the main viewpoints or commissioned a single article that would have covered all the angles.
The big advantage of an atheist perspective is that it fairly represents the views of a majority of evolutionary biologists. Having a theist write the article would not be as fair. I think we can all agree that option #5 is by far the best choice.
Before reading any further, take a minute to decide what you would do if you were the editors of The Princeton Guide to Evolution.
One of the problems in most debates and discussions in the problem of definitions. It's common for two opponents to end up talking past one another because they don't agree on what they are arguing about. That's why an important component of critical thinking is to define your terms so that everyone knows what you are defending (or attacking).
But there's more. If you are going to be a good critical thinker, then you have to be aware of other points of view. If there are other, equally valid, definitions out there then you MUST acknowledge them and incorporate them into your argument. You can't, for example, just make up your own definition of words like "noncoding," "junk," or "function," and declare that you are right. Since you know that there are other definitions out there, you are obliged to show why YOUR definition is the only correct one. That's a crucial part of the debate.
If you don't even know that there are other valid definitions then you are not an expert and you should not be pretending to be an authority on the subject. This is why I object to people who argue against the Central Dogma of Molecular Biology without understanding what Francis Crick actually said.
Let's look at a video of Elliott Sober lecturing on "Some Questions for Atheists to Think About." He begins by asking the members of his audience whether they are atheists or agnostics. Apparently, most members of the audience are atheists and ony a few are agnostics.
Next, he defines his terms ...
Theism = God exists
Atheism = God does not exist
Agnosticism = We don't know whether God exists
The lecture is about something called "evidentialism." Elliott Sober claims that the following proposition is true ...
For any proposition, you should believe it only if you have evidence that it is true and you should disbelieve it only if you have evidence that it is false.
He then goes on to show that we can never have evidence that God does not exist. Therefore, "If 'God exists' is untestable, you ought not to be an atheist. You should be an agnostic."
He suggests that all the atheists in the audience should become agnostics because of evidentialism. If I had been in the audience, I would have pointed out that MY definition of atheist is that an atheist is someone who doesn't believe in god(s). My definition is such a common definition that it's part of the Wikipedia article on Atheism. Since I do not need "evidence" to not believe in something, I'll remain an atheist, thank-you very much. My position is perfectly consistent with the proposition about evidentialism.
Here's the problem. Elliott Sober is a prominent philosopher. Doesn't he realize that his argument relies entirely on his definition of "atheism"? Doesn't he realize that his argument is completely useless if an atheist is simply someone who doesn't buy into the God delusion? This sort of thing makes me livid and it makes me wonder whether there's something seriously wrong with modern philosophy.1
1. I am not suggesting that Sober's definition is wrong. He should not be ignoring the fact that many members of his audience don't agree with his definition and that's why they are atheists.
I'm been filing and organizing my mother's genealogical data and I came across a list of people buried in various Prince Edward Island (Canada) cemeteries. One of the tombstones in the Lower Bedeque United Church Cemetery says, "In Memory Of / Edwin Proctor Robins, / Born At / Central Bedeque / July 2, 1872. / Died at / Cornell University, Ithaca, N. Y. / April 19 1899. / Mors Janua Vitae [Death is the gate of [everlasting] life]" [Edwin Proctor Robins].
This was intriguing. I know I am related to all the Robins (Robbins) descendents from Prince Edward Island but I'd never heard of Edwin Proctor Robins. His great-grandfather, Robert Robbins, is a United Empire Loyalist who came to PEI from New Jersey when the American Revolution ended. Edwin Proctor Robins and I are fourth cousins, three times removed. Why did he die at Cornell University?
I still don't know how he died and why he was so young (26 years old) but I did find a book he published on Some Problems of Lotze's Theory of Knowledge. I think the book was first published in 1900—a year after he died. Sounds like Edwin Proctor Robins might have been an epistemologist. Does anyone know anything about my relative or about Lotz's Theory of Knowledge?
Jerry Coyne has been following the debate between Steven Pinker and Leon Wieseltier on the topic of scientism [see The final round: Pinker vs. Wieseltier on scientism]. Jerry seems to agree with both Pinker and Wieseltier that there are "two magisteria" (science and humanities) ...
[Wieseltier] calls for a “two magisteria” solution, with science and humanities kept separate, but with “porous boundaries.” But that is exactly what Pinker called for, too! Wieseltier claims that Pinker and other advocates of scientism advocate “totalistic aspirations,” i.e., the complete takeover of humanities by the sciences (“unified field theories,” Wieseltier calls them), but Pinker explicitly said that he wasn’t calling for that.
...
As you can see above, Steve never argued that science is, or should be, supreme in all the contexts. Indeed, in his earlier piece he noted that art and literature, while they might be informed in some ways by science, nevertheless have benefits independent of science. To me, those benefits include affirming our common humanity, being moved by the plight of others, even if fictional, and luxuriating in the sheer beauty of music, words, or painting. (Note, though, that one day science might at least explain why we apprehend that beauty.)
I'm not sure how Pinker, Wieseltier, and Coyne are defining science but it's clear that they aren't using the same definition I use.
I think that science is a way of knowing based on evidence and logic and healthy skepticism. I think that all disciplines seeking knowledge use the scientific approach. This is the broad definition of science used by many philosophers and scientists.
I have expressed little confidence in the viability of the territorial demarcation problem, and even less interest in solving it. Not only is there no clear-cut way to disentangle epistemic domains like science and philosophy, but such a distinction carries little epistemic weight. The demarcation problem that deserves our attention is the one between science and pseudoscience (and the analogous ones between philosophy and pseudophilosophy and between history and pseudohistory).
Sven Ove Hanson is more specific because he actually defines "science in a broad sense" in a way that I have been using it for several decades. This is from his chapter on "Defining Pseudoscience and Science" in Philosophy of Pseudescience: Reconsidering the Demarcation Problem.
Unfortunately neither "science" nor any other established term in the English language covers all the disciplines that are parts of this community of knowledge disciplines. For lack of a better term, I will call them "science(s) in the broad sense." (The German word "Wissenschaft," the closest translation of "science" into that language, has this wider meaning; that is, it includes all the academic specialties, including the humanities. So does the Latin "scientia.") Science in a broad sense seeks knowledge about nature (natural science), about ourselves (psychology and medicine), about our societies (social science and history), about our physical constructions (technological science), and about our thought construction (linguistics, literary studies, mathematics, and philosophy). (Philosophy, of course, is a science in this broad sense of the word.)
If this is what we mean by science" then there's no difference between the ways we try to acquire knowledge in the humanities or the natural sciences and the debate between Pinker and Wieseltier takes on an entirely different meaning.
There aren't "two magisteria" but only one. Unless, of course, someone is willing to propose a successful non-scientific way of knowing. I have asked repeatedly for examples of knowledge ("truth") that have been successfully acquired by any other way of knowing. So far, nobody has come up with an answer so we can tentatively conclude that science (in the broad sense) is the only valid way of acquiring true knowledge.
Clearly we don't have all the answers to everything so it's clear that neither science nor anything else has all the answers. What about the questions? Are there any knowledge questions that science (in the broad sense) can't address? I don't think there are. I think "science" covers all the questions even though it doesn't (yet) have all the answers.
If this is "scientism" then I'm guilty. What is the alternative? Is it revelation (revealed truth)? Or is there some other way of knowing that I haven't heard about?
I've been meaning to comment on Sean Carroll's post from last July (July 3, 2013) but there always seems to be something else that commands my attention. The issue is important, in fact I've just finished an entire book on the question (Philosophy of Pseudoscience: Reconsidering the Demarcation Problem edited by M. Pigliucci and M. Boudry).
Sean Carroll (the physicist)1 has a view that's quite similar to my own. Read his post at: What Is Science?. Here are some key points.
I'm about to start teaching my course on "Scientific Misconceptions" and one of the most important issues is defining science and dealing with the demarcation problem. Vincent Joseph Torley is also interested in this question—for a different reason—and he discovered an 1945 essay by George Orwell (Eric Arthur Blair (1903-1950)).
It's worth quoting the relevant passages.
Doublethink means the power of holding two contradictory beliefs in one's mind simultaneously and accepting both of them.
George OrwellIn last week’s Tribune, there was an interesting letter from Mr. J. Stewart Cook, in which he suggested that the best way of avoiding the danger of a “scientific hierarchy” would be to see to it that every member of the general public was, as far as possible, scientifically educated. At the same time, scientists should be brought out of their isolation and encouraged to take a greater part in politics and administration.
As a general statement, I think most of us would agree with this, but I notice that, as usual, Mr. Cook does not define Science, and merely implies in passing that it means certain exact sciences whose experiments can be made under laboratory conditions. Thus, adult education tends “to neglect scientific studies in favour of literary, economic and social subjects”, economics and sociology not being regarded as branches of Science, apparently. This point is of great importance. For the word Science is at present used in at least two meanings, and the whole question of scientific education is obscured by the current tendency to dodge from one meaning to the other.
Science is generally taken as meaning either (a) the exact sciences, such as chemistry, physics, etc., or (b) a method of thought which obtains verifiable results by reasoning logically from observed fact.
If you ask any scientist, or indeed almost any educated person, “What is Science?” you are likely to get an answer approximating to (b). In everyday life, however, both in speaking and in writing, when people say “Science” they mean (a). Science means something that happens in a laboratory: the very word calls up a picture of graphs, test-tubes, balances, Bunsen burners, microscopes. A biologist, and astronomer, perhaps a psychologist or a mathematician is described as a “man of Science”: no one would think of applying this term to a statesman, a poet, a journalist or even a philosopher. And those who tell us that the young must be scientifically educated mean, almost invariably, that they should be taught more about radioactivity, or the stars, or the physiology or their own bodies, rather than that they should be taught to think more exactly.
Every war when it comes, or before it comes, is represented not as a war but as an act of self-defense against a homicidal maniac.
George OrwellI agree with Orwell when he prefers the broad definition of science. I see it as a way of knowing that can be applied to any discipline. I think that everyone should become more scientifically literate but by that I don't mean they should lean more about metabolic pathways or quantum chromodynamics. I mean that they should become more familiar with the scientific approach to acquiring knowledge. That's the fundamental skill that we need to learn.
Clearly, scientific education ought to mean the implanting of a rational, sceptical, experimental habit of mind. It ought to mean acquiring a method – a method that can be used on any problem that one meets – and not simply piling up a lot of facts. Put it in those words, and the apologist of scientific education will usually agree. Press him further, ask him to particularise, and somehow it always turns out that scientific education means more attention to the sciences, in other words – more facts. The idea that Science means a way of looking at the world, and not simply a body of knowledge, is in practice strongly resisted. I think sheer professional jealousy is part of the reason for this. For if Science is simply a method or an attitude, so that anyone whose thought-processes are sufficiently rational can in some sense be described as a scientist – what then becomes of the enormous prestige now enjoyed by the chemist, the physicist, etc. and his claim to be somehow wiser than the rest of us?
A hundred years ago, Charles Kingsley described Science as “making nasty smells in a laboratory”. A year or two ago a young industrial chemist informed me, smugly, that he “could not see what was the use of poetry”. So the pendulum swings to and fro, but it does not seem to me that one attitude is any better than the other. At the moment, Science is on the upgrade, and so we hear, quite rightly, the claim that the masses should be scientifically educated: we do not hear, as we ought, the counter-claim that the scientists themselves would benefit by a little education. Just before writing this, I saw in an American magazine the statement that a number of British and American physicists refused from the start to do research on the atomic bomb, well knowing what use would be made of it. Here you have a group of sane men in the middle of a world of lunatics. And though no names were published, I think it would be a safe guess that all of them were people with some kind of general cultural background, some acquaintance with history or literature or the arts – in short, people whose interests were not, in the current sense of the word, purely scientific.
Where did the George Orwells of this world go? Why don't we have more people like him today? Have they just been drowned out by idiots with access to a microphone?
You can read Max Andrews' blog posting at: Junk DNA Isn’t Junk. Be careful, you might find it very difficult to see the connection between this philosophy student's view of biology and anything you might recognize as real science.
It goes without saying that Max Andrews gets the Central Dogma wrong—many scientists make the same mistake. But here's a taste of what else he gets wrong.
The argument from junk DNA suggests that a designer would be maximally efficient in his use of information. There appears to be some information that does not execute or have any meaningful coding. Darwinism takes this issue and uses it as the result of the prediction that there would be left over information not being used due to natural selection and random mutation. However, it doesn’t appear that all junk DNA is actually junk.
Genome organization is patterned to be maximally informative. The overlapping codes observed are known to be evolutionarily costly, because random mutations will likely have a deteriorating effect, not an instructing role So the complex specified information entailed by any genomic region is orders of magnitude higher than previously suspected by, say, Dembski. Any seemingly random aspect of chromosome sequence arrangement is not. A case in point involves endogenous retroviruses (ERV’s). This implies that the taxonomically-specific formatting, indexing, punctuation, etc., of genomes were precisely written. Morphogenetic information is not reducible to the genotype—though it is strongly dependent upon it. Therefore, changes in DNA do not equal changes in the information that structures the body plan.
I wonder who his supervisor is? Maybe Dan or I could be external reviewer on his Ph.D. oral?
Lawrence Krauss says on Facebook ...
six days and counting till the World Premiere of The Unbelievers at Hotdocs International Film Festival in Toronto. An extra screening of the film just added. Stay tuned after that for announcements.
We're going on May 1st. Why not join us?
Jerry Coyne's recent post on methodological naturalism was based on a recent paper by Fishman and Boudry (2013). Previously Jerry had addressed a paper by Yonatan Fishman from 2009 (Fishman, 2009) [Can science test the supernatural? Yes!!] I think it's worth highlighting that 2009 paper because it makes a strong case against limiting science. I'm a bit confused by the stance taken by John Wilkins (and others) as I mentioned in the comments to my recent post [John Wilkins Revisits Methodological Naturalism]. Perhaps they could respond to this argument from the Fishman (2009) paper?
The recent court ruling in the United States against the teaching of ‘Intelligent Design’ (ID) as an alternative to evolution in biology classes (Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District; Jones 2005) has sparked public interest and has been hailed as a victory by the scientific community. One of the reasons given for the verdict is the notion that science is limited strictly to the study of natural phenomena and therefore that ID and other claims involving supernatural phenomena are outside the proper domain of scientific investigation.
While the verdict is widely viewed as correct for other reasons cited in the court’s opinion, that particular rationale upon which it is based is questionable. Indeed, is science limited to the study of ‘natural’ phenomena? Does science presuppose Naturalism and thereby exclude supernatural explanations by definition? Are claims involving ‘supernatural’ phenomena inherently untestable and therefore outside the province of science? The present article argues that this is not the case. Science does not presuppose Naturalism and supernatural claims are amenable in principle to scientific evaluation [see Monton (2006) and Stenger (2006a) for a similar critique of Judge Jones’ verdict]. Indeed, science does have implications for the probable truth of supernatural worldviews (Gauch 2006, defends a similar thesis).
To exclude, a priori, the supernatural would validate the complaint voiced by some ID adherents and other creationists that science is dogmatically committed to Naturalism and thus opposed in principle to considering supernatural explanations (Johnson 1999; see Stenger 2006a). On the other hand, if there is no fundamental barrier preventing science from evaluating supernatural claims, then to declare the study of supernatural phenomena out of bounds to scientific investigation imposes artificial constraints on scientific inquiry, which potentially would deny science the noble task of purging false beliefs from the public sphere or the opportunity to discover aspects of reality that may have significant worldview implications.
Fishman, Y.I. (2009) Can science test supernatural worldviews? Science and Education 18:165-189. [doi: 10.1007/s11191-007-9108-4
Fishman, Y.I. and Boudry, M. (2013) Does Science Presuppose Naturalism (or Anything at All)? Science & Education (published online January 7, 2013) [doi: 10.1007/s11191-012-9574-1]
Thank God John has revived Evolving Thoughts! 
As usual, his latest post contains lots of food for thought [God and evolution 2: The problem of creation]. I want to pick out one morsel because it's back in the news recently.
It's the problem of "methodological naturalism" and whether it restricts science. Kairosfocus recently posted an article on methodological naturalism at Uncommon Descent [Optimus, replying to KN on ID as ideology, summarises the case for design in the natural world]. He pointed out, quite correctly, that by restricting science to methodological naturalism it means that Intelligent Design Creationism becomes non-scientific by definition.
I've argued frequently in the recent past that science is not bound by methodological naturalism [Is Science Restricted to Methodologial Naturalism?] [Accommodationism in Dover] [Methodological Naturalism]. My stance has evolved over the past few years. Back in 2007 I was a staunch defender of limiting science to methodological naturalism [Methodological Naturalism].
Jerry Coyne agrees with my current position on methodolocical naturalism. We are both upset by the way it's used to support accommodationism at NCSE [The NCSE Position on Science vs Religion] and at AAAS [AAAS Supports Accommodationism, Illogically]. If you're new to the subject, read Jerry's latest post at: Must we assume naturalism to do science?. That will bring you up to date.
John Wilkins and I have debated this controversy several time [e.g. John Wilkins Defends Methodological Naturalism]. The important point, as far as I'm concerned, is that there are respectable philosophers who disagree with the idea that science can't investigate the supernatural because it is constrained by methodological naturalism.
Here's what John said yesterday (in my time zone).
The term “naturalism”, however, is ambiguous. On the one hand it can mean giving a natural explanation through the use of scientific methods such as the use of human reasoning and observation. Or, it can mean the claim that only “natural” things exist. The first is sometimes called “methodological naturalism”, and it is the underpinning of all science, and indeed all learning about the world. The second is sometimes called “metaphysical naturalism”, although I think it is instead a claim about what exists (which is called “ontology” amongst the philosophical community). God might be natural in that sense. There is no real sharp dividing line between the natural and the supernatural that would satisfy most believers. For example, human nature for some is held to include a soul, which is divine. So let us call the second kind ontological naturalism.
Obviously I don't think that methodological naturalism is the "underpinning of all science." I think science is free to investigate claims of the paranormal (i.e. not naturalism) and can, in principle, discover things that don't meet the definition of naturalism.
What makes me nervous is that this is John's field. Is he saying that among philosophers of science the overwhelming consensus believes that that in science you can only give natural explanations? Or is he simply offering his personal opinion disguised to look authoritative?
Is there a slam-dunk philosophical refutation of the position held by the likes of Yonatan Fishman and Maarten Boudry that Jerry Coyne and I (and many others) are unaware of?
Here's a video of Michael Ruse criticizing Richard Dawkins for being too simplistic in his attack on belief in god(s). What Ruse is saying is that theologians have a much more sophisticated view of religion than Dawkins admits. It goes without saying that really good philosophers, like Ruse, understand the sophisticated version of Christian apologetics so they would never write a book like The God Delusion.
Ruse gives us an example of the worst form of accomodationism. Beginning at 2:11, Ruse treats us to a defense of the cosmological argument for the existence of god. Here's his (Ruse's) brief description.
1. Everything has a cause.
2. The world is a thing therefore the world must have a cause.
3. Call it god.
This is somewhat simplistic (), a more sophisticated version can be found on Wikipedia (above) or at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Cosmological Argument.
Udo Schüklenk is a Professor of Philsophy at Queen's University in Kingston, Ontario, Canada. His specialty is bioethics.
Udo gave a presentation at Eschaton 2012 on Myths About Atheist Values. He covered three topics ...
1. Are atheists moral? Yes
2. Does life have meaning or purpose? No, not the same kind of meaning and purpose that theists imagine.
3. Do atheists value human life? Yes.
Udo has a blog and one of the services he provides on his blog is to teach us about bioethics. Part of this service is to expose quacks masquerading as bioethicists. It's a thankless job but someone has to do it.
Fortunately, Udo concentrates on Canadian quacks so you won't be overwhelmed. There are only a few hundred, mostly doctors.
Perhaps Canada's most famous quack bioethicist is Margaret Somerville, a Professor of Law at McGill University, (Montreal, Quebec, Canada). She's best known for her opposition to same-sex marriage and she's been advertised on television and in newspapers as a bioethicist who has rational views on the dangers of legalizing same-sex marriage. (She wasn't very persuasive since same-sex marriage is legal in Canada.}1
Udo Schüklenk chaired an experts panel on end-of-life decisions for the Royal Society of Canada [End-of-Life Decision-Making in Canada: The Report by the Royal Society of Canada Expert Panel on End-of-Life Decision-Making].
Margaret Sommerville didn't like their recommendations. She claims that further legalization of euthanasia will lead to people being killed against their will.
Here's how Udo deals with that issue ... Evidence has never been Ms. Somerville's strongest point. So, without any evidence to back up her claims she declares on the Catholic website, "One of the things that's wrong with respect to Justice (Lynn) Smith's judgment (in Carter v. Attorney General of B.C.) is that she purports to review the use of euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide in the jurisdictions that have legalized it. She said there is no problem, there is no slippery slope. Well, that's simply not right factually." It turns out, in our Report on end of life decision-making in Canada we reviewed the empirical evidence on the slippery slope matter and concluded that there is no evidence that assisted dying leads us down slippery slopes to unwanted killings. Of course, we reviewed evidence, Ms Somerville is in full preaching mode.
I like this guy! He thinks that real, scientific, "evidence" is an important part of any debate.
1. We're anxiously waiting to see if her predictions about kids of gay parents being traumatized will come true.
In my opinion, science is a way of knowing characterized by a requirement for evidence, healthy skepticism, and rationality. "Knowing" refers to something called "universal truth" because knowledge has to be more than just something that an individual believes is true.
I'm not aware of any other way of knowing that has produced something we can reliably classify as "knowledge" by any reasonable criteria. From time to time I've asked for examples but nobody has been able to provide any example of "universal truth" (i.e. knowledge) that has been reached by any other process.
Today Barry Arrington of Uncommon Descent decided to enlighten us [Science is Good, But Not That Good].
Consider history for example. We know with a high degree of reliability that Abraham Lincoln was the president of the United States in 1863. I did not arrive at this knowledge through scientific means. I know it because someone told me, and they in turn learned it from someone else, who in turn learned it from someone else back to the actual people who witnessed first-hand a man who called himself “Abraham Lincoln” sitting in the White House in 1863 and acting for all the world like he was the president of the United States.
Consider geography. I have never been to Russia, but I am quite certain that Moscow is the capital of that country. I did not arrive at this knowledge through scientific means either.
If timothya will stop and think a moment, he will realize that practically everything he knows he knows because someone told him, not because the truth of the proposition has been confirmed by science.
I guess that settles it. If lots of people tell you that god exists then it must be true. Epistemology is finished and the demarcation problem is solved.
Lots of people tell me that Intelligent Design Creationists aren't very bright.
I've been having discussion with several of my friends and colleagues about whether the activities of the Intelligent Design Creationists count as "science." My position is that much of what they do is science, especially when they criticize existing scientific explanations. It may not be very good science but that's not the question. After all, there are atheist scientists who don't do much better.
One argument is that simply criticizing current theories doesn't count as science unless you can also offer a plausible, scientific, competing model. I don't think that's a requirement. Here's an example we can discuss ...
One of the latest posts on Evolution News & Views (sic) is an article by Casey Luskin criticizing the old Urey-Miller experiment by pointing out that their origninal conditions didn't mimic the conditions on the primitive Earth [On the Miller-Urey Experiment, Wikipedia Offers a Citation Bluff]. He goes on to say that scientists still haven't shown convincingly that amino acids (and other molecules) could have formed spontaneously on Earth. Furthermore, the "chirality problem" hasn't been solved.1
Luskin correctly points out that a Wikipedia reference misrepresents the science it reports.
Is this (Luskin's article) scientific? Isn't criticism of current models and hypotheses an example of how science is supposed to work?
1. I agree that the spontaneous formation on Earth of significant amounts of amino acids, carbohydrates, and, especially, nucleotides, is extremely unlikely. That's why I support "Metabolism First." I disagree about the chirality problem—I think we have a good explanation.
Fourteen people have been invited to a special meeting in Stockbridge Massachusetts (USA). They are: Sean Carroll, Jerry Coyne, Richard Dawkins, Terrence Deacon, Simon DeDeo, Dan Dennett, Owen Flanagan, Rebecca Goldstein, Janna Levin, David Poeppel, Alex Rosenberg, Don Ross, Steven Weinberg, and Massimo Pigliucci. On the first day they discussed "naturalism" (morning session) and evolution, complexity and emergence (afternoon session"). Read the summaries in the links to my first post [The Stockbridge 14].
We all use the term "critical thinking to describe one of the primary goals of education. What do we mean by "critical thinking"?
As usual, it takes a philosopher to sort out the various meanings and arrive at a reasonable definition. (Philosophers are experts at critical thinking, although they often use it when it's not necessary.) Read what John Wilkins has to say at: What is critical thinking. Contrast his critical thinking about the subject with that illustrated in the Wikipedia article on Critical Thinking.
Here's his bottom line but you really need to see his examples of what is not critical thinking.
Critical thinking is the application of careful analysis and rational reconstruction to arguments, so that the correctness of the reasoning and the truth of the premises can be evaluated and the support for the conclusion determined.
Rational thinking is the assent of the reasoner to any conclusion that is both correctly reasoned and founded on known to be true, or likely to be true, premises.
In short, a critical and rational thinker is one who accepts the conclusions of good arguments.
I agree with John and this is what Chris DiCarlo and I teach in our course. But, you should read the comments on John's blog.
Once you've mastered the basic rules of logic, most arguments should be about whether the premises are likely to be true.
Jerry Coyne's recent post on methodological naturalism was based on a recent paper by Fishman and Boudry (2013). Previously Jerry had addressed a paper by Yonatan Fishman from 2009 (Fishman, 2009) [Can science test the supernatural? Yes!!] I think it's worth highlighting that 2009 paper because it makes a strong case against limiting science. I'm a bit confused by the stance taken by John Wilkins (and others) as I mentioned in the comments to my recent post [John Wilkins Revisits Methodological Naturalism]. Perhaps they could respond to this argument from the Fishman (2009) paper?
Thank God John has revived Evolving Thoughts! 
Jerry Coyne agrees with my current position on methodolocical naturalism. We are both upset by the way it's used to support accommodationism at NCSE [The NCSE Position on Science vs Religion] and at AAAS [AAAS Supports Accommodationism, Illogically]. If you're new to the subject, read Jerry's latest post at: Must we assume naturalism to do science?. That will bring you up to date.
