Why Philosophy of Biology?

Robert Lawrence Kuhn has published a series of videos on his "Closer to Truth" site. On March 4, 2024 he posted a teaser video introducing Season 23: "Why Philosophy of Biology." The video contains short clips of his interviews with philosophers of biology (see list below).

Here's the blurb covering the introduction to the new season.

How can philosophy advance biology? How can biology influence philosophy? In this first series on Philosophy of Biology, Closer to Truth explores the challenges and implications of evolution. We ask how life on earth came to be as it is, and how humans came to be as we are. We address biologically based issues, such as sex/gender, race, cognition, culture, morality, healthcare, religion, alien life, and more. When philosophy and biology meet, sparks fly as both are enriched.

Those are all interesting questions. Some of them can only be answered by philosophers but others require major input from scientists. One of the important issues for philosophy of science seems to be the confict between the philosophy of the early 20th century, which was developed with physics as the model science, and the the success of molecular biology in the latter half of the 20th century, which didn't play by the same rules. (See the short interview with Paul Griffiths, whom I greatly admire, for a succinct explanation of this problem.)

I'm very conflicted about the role of philosphy in understanding the science of biology and even more conflicted about whether philosophers can recognize good science from bad science (Richard Dawkins, Denis Noble). I'm also puzzled by the apparent reluctance of philosophers to openly challenge their colleagues who get the science wrong. Watch the video to see if my scepticism is warranted.

• Michael Ruse
• Elliot Sober
• Elisabeth Lloyd
• Peter Godfrey-Smith
• John Dupré
• Paul Griffiths
• Richard Dawkins
• Quayshawn Spencer
• Denis Noble
• Samir Okasha
• Massimo Pigliucci
• Alan Love
• Philip Kitcher

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Evelyn Fox Keller (1936 - 2023) and junk DNA

Evelyn Fox Keller died a few days ago (Sept. 22, 2023). She was a professor of History and Philosopher of Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Boston, MA, USA). Most of the obituaries praise her for her promotion of women scientists and her critiques of science as a male-dominated discipline. More recently, she turned her attention to molecular biology and genomics and many philosophers (and others) seem to think that she made notable contributions in that area as well.

"Has Science Killed Philosophy?"

This is a debate sponsored by the Royal Institute of Philosophy on the question "Has science killed philosophy?" It suffers from one of the main problems of the philosphy of science and that's an unreasonable focus on theoretical physics. What's interesting is that the question even arises because that suggests to me that there's some reason to suspect that philosophy might not be as important as most philosophers think.

Watch the debate and decide for yourselves whether philosophy is still useful. Frankly, I found it very boring. I didn't learn anything that I didn't know before and I didn't find the defense of philosophy compelling. The philosopher's best answer to the challenge is that their discipline has complete control over rational thinking so every time you are thinking seriously about something you are doing philosophy. Ergo, philosophy will never be killed by science.

What do you think of Eleanor Knox's description of the differences between your right hand and your left hand? Is she on to a deep metaphysical question that science can't address? Or is this an example of why scientists are skeptical of the value of philosophy?

All three panelists were asked to identify a modern philosopher who made a significant contribution to science. Alex Rosenberg immediately identified someone named Samir Okasha whom I've never heard of. Apparently, Okasha made a significant contribution to the levels of selection question in evolution. According to Alex Rosenberg, the philosophers that he listens to tell him that if anyone has settled these question it's Okasha. Perhaps he should listen to evolutionary biologists to get their view on the subject?

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Philosophers argue that scientific conclusions need not be accurate, justified, or believed by their authors

A remarkable paper has just been posted to a philosophy of science preprint website. (It will be published in Synthase.) Like many papers in this field it's difficult to read and the logic is obtuse but the bottom line is that scientists don't really need to be held to the old standards that we scientists used to think are essential.

Dang, Haixin and Bright, Liam Kofi (2021) Scientific Conclusions Need Not Be Accurate, Justified, or Believed by their Authors. PhilSci Archive {PDF]

We argue that the main results of scientific papers may appropriately be published even if they are false, unjustified, and not believed to be true or justified by their author. To defend this claim we draw upon the literature studying the norms of assertion, and consider how they would apply if one attempted to hold claims made in scientific papers to their strictures, as assertions and discovery claims in scientific papers seem naturally analogous. We first use a case study of William H. Bragg’s early 20th century work in physics to demonstrate that successful science has in fact violated these norms. We then argue that features of the social epistemic arrangement of science which are necessary for its long run success require that we do not hold claims of scientific results to their standards. We end by making a suggestion about the norms that it would be appropriate to hold scientific claims to, along with an explanation of why the social epistemology of science—considered as an instance of collective inquiry—would require such apparently lax norms for claims to be put forward.

Is science the only way of knowing?

Most of us learned that science provides good answers to all sort of questions ranging from whether a certain drug is useful in treating COVID-19 to whether humans evolved from primitive apes. A more interesting question is whether there are any limitations to science or whether there are any other effective ways of knowing. The question is related to the charge of "scientism," which is often used as a pejorative term to describe those of us who think that science is the only way of knowing.

I've discussed these issue many times of this blog so I won't rehash all the arguments. Suffice to say that there are two definitions of science; the broad definition and the narrow one. The narrow definition says that science is merely the activity carried out by geologists, chemists, physicists, and biologists. Using this definition it would be silly to say that science is the only way of knowing. The broad definition can be roughly described as: science is a way of knowing that relies on evidence, logic (rationality), and healthy skepticism.

The broad definition is the one preferred by many philosophers and it goes something like this ...

Unfortunately neither "science" nor any other established term in the English language covers all the disciplines that are parts of this community of knowledge disciplines. For lack of a better term, I will call them "science(s) in the broad sense." (The German word "Wissenschaft," the closest translation of "science" into that language, has this wider meaning; that is, it includes all the academic specialties, including the humanities. So does the Latin "scientia.") Science in a broad sense seeks knowledge about nature (natural science), about ourselves (psychology and medicine), about our societies (social science and history), about our physical constructions (technological science), and about our thought construction (linguistics, literary studies, mathematics, and philosophy). (Philosophy, of course, is a science in this broad sense of the word.)

Sven Ove Hanson "Defining Pseudoscience and Science" in Philosophy of Pseudescience: Reconsidering the Demarcation Problem.

Is science a social construct?

Richard Dawkins has written an essay for The Spectator in which he says,

"[Science is not] a social construct. It’s simply true. Or at least truth is real and science is the best way we have of finding it. ‘Alternative ways of knowing’ may be consoling, they may be sincere, they may be quaint, they may have a poetic or mythic beauty, but the one thing they are not is true. As well as being real, moreover, science has a crystalline, poetic beauty of its own.

The essay is not particularly provocative but it did provoke Jerry Coyne who pointed out that, "The profession of science" can be contrued as a social construct. In this sense Jerry is agreeing with his former supervisor, Richard Lewontin¹ who wrote,

"Science is a social institution about which there is a great deal of misunderstanding, even among those who are part of it. We think that science is an institution, a set of methods, a set of people, a great body of knowledge that we call scientific, is somehow apart from the forces that rule our everyday lives and tha goven the structure of our society... The problems that science deals with, the ideas that it uses in investigating those problems, even the so-called scientific results that come out of scientific investigation, are all deeply influenced by predispositions that derive from the society in which we live. Scientists do not begin life as scientists after all, but as social beings immersed in a family, a state, a productive structure, and they view nature through a lens that has been molded by their social structure."

Coincidently, I just happened to be reading Science Fictions an excellent book by Stuart Ritchie who also believes that science is a social construct but he has a slighly different take on the matter.

"Science has cured diseases, mapped the brain, forcasted the climate, and split the atom; it's the best method we have of figuring out how the universe works and of bending it to our will. It is, in other words, our best way of moving towards the truth. Of course, we might never get there—a glance at history shows us hubristic it is to claim any facts as absolute or unchanging. For ratcheting our way towards better knowledge about the world, though, the methods of science is as good as it gets.

But we can't make progress withthose methods alone. It's not enough to make a solitary observation in your lab; you must also convince other scientists that you've discovered something real. This is where the social part comes. Philosophers have long discussed how important it is for scientists to show their fellow researchers how they came to their conclusions.

Dawkins, Coyne, Lewontin, and Ritchie are all right in different ways. Dawkins is talking about science as a way of knowing, although he restricts his definition of science to the natural sciences. The others are referring to the practice of science, or as Jerry Coyne puts it, the profession. It's true that the methods of science are the best way we have to get at the truth and it's true that the way of knowing is not a social construct in any meanigful sense.

Jerry Coyne is right to point out that the methods are employed by human scientists (he's also restricting the practice of science to scientists) and humans are fallible. In that sense, the enterprise of (natural) science is a social construct. Lewontin warns us that scientists have biases and prejudices and that may affect how they do science.

Ritchie makes a diffferent point by emphasizing that (natural) science is a collective endeavor and that "truth" often requires a consensus. That's the sense in which science is social. This is supposed to make science more robust, according to Ritchie, because real knowledge only emerges after carefull and skeptical scrutiny by other scientists. His book is mostly about how that process isn't working and why science is in big trouble. He's right about that.

I think it's important to distinguish between science as a way of knowing and the behavior and practice of scientists. The second one is affected by society and its flaws are well-known but the value of science as way of knowing can't be so easily dismissed.

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1. The book is actually a series of lectures (The Massey Lectures) that Lewontin gave in Toronto (Ontario, Canada) in 1990. I attended those lectures.

The Function Wars Part VII: Function monism vs function pluralism

This post is mostly about a recent paper published in Studies in History and Philosophy of Biol & Biomed Sci where two philosophers present their view of the function wars. They argue that the best definition of function is a weak etiological account (monism) and pluralistic accounts that include causal role (CR) definitions are mostly invalid. Weak etiological monism is the idea that sequence conservation is the best indication of function but that doesn't necessarily imply that the trait arose by natural selection (adaptation); it could have arisen by neutral processes such as constructive neutral evolution.

The paper makes several dubious claims about ENCODE that I want to discuss but first we need a little background.

Background

The ENCODE publicity campaign created a lot of controversy in 2012 because ENCODE researchers claimed that 80% of the human genome is functional. That claim conflicted with all the evidence that had accumulated up to that point in time. Based on their definition of function, the leading ENCODE researchers announced the death of junk DNA and this position was adopted by leading science writers and leading journals such as Nature and Science.

Let's be very clear about one thing. This was a SCIENTIFIC conflict over how to interpret data and evidence. The ENCODE researchers simply ignored a ton of evidence demonstrating that most of our genome is junk. Instead, they focused on the well-known facts that much of the genome is transcribed and that the genome is full of transcription factor binding sites. Neither of these facts were new and both of them had simple explanations: (1) most of the transcripts are spurious transcripts that have nothing to do with function, and (2) random non-functional transcription factor binding sites are expected from our knowledge of DNA binding proteins. The ENCODE researchers ignored these explanations and attributed function to all transcripts and all transcription factor binding sites. That's why they announced that 80% of the genome is functional.

Alternative splicing and the gene concept

I just learned about a workshop scheduled for the end of this month. The topic is: Evolutionary Roles of Transposable Elements and Non-coding DNA: The Science and the Philosophy.

I'd love to attend but it's a just small workshop designed to encourage dialogue between scientists and philosophers who are interested in the topic. Here's a list of the speakers ...

• Ryan Gregory: Junk DNA, genome size, and the onion test.
• Stefan Linquist: Four decades debating junk DNA and the Phenotype Paradigm is (somehow) alive and well.
• Chris Ponting: 92.9% of the human genome evolved neutrally.
• Paul Griffiths: Both adaptation and adaptivity are relevant to diagnosing function.
• Ford Doolittle: Selfish genes and selfish DNA: is there a difference?
• Justin Garson: Biological functions, the liberality problem, and transposable elements.
• Joyce Havstad: Evolutionary Thinking about Critique of Function Talk.
• Guillame Bourque: Impact of transposable elements on human gene regulatory networks.
• Ulrich Stegman: On parity, genetic causation and coding.
• Steven Downes: Understanding non-coding variants as disease risk alleles.
• Alexander Palazzo: How nuclear retention and cytoplasmic export of RNAs reduces the deleteriousness of junk DNA.
• David Haig: Pax somatica
• Cedric Feschotte: Transposable elements as catalysts of genome evolution.

One philosopher's view of random genetic drift

Random genetic drift is the process whereby some allele frequencies change in a population by chance alone. The alleles are not being fixed or eliminated by natural selection. Most of the alleles affected by drift are neutral or nearly neutral with respect to selection. Some are deleterious, in which case they may be accidentally fixed in spite of being selected against. Modern evolutionary theory incorporates random genetic drift as part of population genetics and modern textbooks contain extensive discussions of drift and the influence of population size. The scientific literature has focused recently on the Drift-Barrier Hypothesis, which emphasizes random genetic drift [Learning about modern evolutionary theory: the drift-barrier hypothesis].

Most of the alleles that become fixed in a population are fixed by random genetic drift and not by natural selection. Thus, in a very real sense, drift is the dominant mechanism of evolution. This is especially true in species with large genomes full of junk DNA (like humans) since the majority of alleles occur in junk DNA where they are, by definition, neutral.¹ All of the data documenting drift and confirming its importance was discovered by scientists. All of the hypotheses and theories of modern evolution were, and are, developed by scientists.

Nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of population genetics.

Michael Lynch
You might be wondering why I bother to state the obvious; after all, this is the 21st century and everyone who knows about evolution should know about random genetic drift. Well, as it turns out, there are some people who continue to make silly statements about evolution and I need to set the record straight.

One of those people is Massimo Pigliucci, a former scientist who's currently more interested in the philosophy of science. We've encountered him before on Sandwalk [Massimo Pigliucci tries to defend accommodationism (again): result is predictable] [Does Philosophy Generate Knowledge?] [Proponents of the Extended Evolutionary Synthesis (EES) explain their logic using the Central Dogma as an example]. I looks like Pigliucci doesn't have a firm grip on modern evolutionary theory.

His main beef isn't with evolutionary biology. He's mostly upset about the fact that science as a way of knowing is extraordinarily successful whereas philosophy isn't producing many results. He loves to attack any scientist who points out this obvious fact. He accuses them of "scientism" as though that's all it takes to make up for the lack of success of philosophy. His latest rant appears on the Blog of the American Philosophers Association: The Problem with Scientism.

I'm not going to deal with the main part of his article because it's already been covered many times. However, there was one part that caught my eye. That's the part where he lists questions that science (supposedly) can't answer. The list is interesting. Pigliucci says,

Next to last, comes an attitude that seeks to deploy science to answer questions beyond its scope. It seems to me that it is exceedingly easy to come up with questions that either science is wholly unequipped to answer, or for which it can at best provide a (welcome!) degree of relevant background knowledge. I will leave it to colleagues in other disciplines to arrive at their own list, but as far as philosophy is concerned, the following list is just a start:

• In metaphysics: what is a cause?
• In logic: is modus ponens a type of valid inference?
• In epistemology: is knowledge “justified true belief”?
• In ethics: is abortion permissible once the fetus begins to feel pain?
• In aesthetics: is there a meaningful difference between Mill’s “low” and “high” pleasures?
• In philosophy of science: what role does genetic drift play in the logical structure of evolutionary theory?
• In philosophy of mathematics: what is the ontological status of mathematical objects, such as numbers?

[my emphasis LAM]

Before getting to random genetic drift, I'll just note that my main problem with Pigliucci's argument is that there are other definitions of science that render his discussion meaningless. For example, I prefer the broad definition of science—the one that encompasses several of the Pigliucci's questions [Alan Sokal explains the scientific worldview][Territorial demarcation and the meaning of science]. The second point is that no matter how you define knowledge, philosophers haven't been very successful at adding to our knowledge base. They're good at questions (see above) but not so good at answers. Thus, it's reasonable to claim that science (broad definition) is the only proven method of acquiring knowledge. If that's scientism then I think it's a good working hypothesis.

Now back to random genetic drift. Did you notice that one of the questions that science is "wholly unequiped" to answer is the following: "what role does genetic drift play in the logical structure of evolutionary theory?" Really?

Pigliucci goes on to explain what he means ...

The scientific literature on all the above is basically non-existent, while the philosophical one is huge. None of the above questions admits of answers arising from systematic observations or experiments. While empirical notions may be relevant to some of them (e.g., the one on abortion), it is philosophical arguments that provide the suitable approach.

I hardly know what to say.

How many of you believe that the following statements are true with respect to random genetic drift and evolutionary theory?

1. The scientific literature on all the above is basically non-existent.
2. The philosophical literature is huge.
3. The question does not admit of answers arising from systematic observations or experiments.
4. It is philosophical arguments that provide the suitable approach.

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1. There are some very rare exceptions where a mutation in junk DNA may have detrimental effects.

A philosopher defends agnosticism

Paul Draper is a philosopher at Purdue University (West Lafayette, Indiana, USA). He has just (Aug. 2, 2017) posted an article on Atheism and Agnosticism on the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy website.

Many philosphers use a different definition of atheism than many atheists. Philosophers tend to define atheism as the proposition that god(s) do not exist. Many atheists (I am one) define atheism as the lack of belief in god(s). The distinction is important but for now I want to discuss Draper's defense of agnosticism.

Keep in mind that Draper defines atheism as "god(s) don't exist." He argues, convincingly, that this proposition cannot be proven. He also argues that theism—the proposition that god(s) exist—can also not be proven. Therefore, the only defensible position for a philosopher like him is agnosticism.

Another contribution of philosophy: Bernard Lonergan

The discussion about philosophy continues on Facebook. One of my long-time Facebook friends, Jonathan Bernier, took up the challenge. Bernier is a professor of religious studies at St. Francis Xavier University in Nova Scotia, Canada. He is a card-carrying philosopher.¹

The challenge is to provide recent (past two decades) examples from philosophy that have lead to increased knowledge and understanding of the natural world. Here's what Jonathan Bernier offered.

But to use just one example of advances in philosophical understanding, UofT (specifically Regis College) houses the Lonergan Research Institute, which houses Bernard Lonergan's archives and publishes his collected works. Probably his most significant work is a seven-hundred-page tome called Insight, the first edition of which was published in 1957. It is IMHO the single best account of how humans come to know anything that has ever been written. The tremendous fruits that it has wrought cannot be summarized in a FB commend. Instead, I'd suggest that you walk over and see the friendly people at the LRI. No doubt they could help answer some of your questions.

Here's a Wikipedia link to Bernard Lonergan. He was a Canadian Jesuit priest who died in 1984. Regis College is the Jesuit College associated with the University of Toronto.

Is Jonathan Bernier correct? Is it true that Lonergan's works will eventually change the way we understand learning?

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Note: In my response to Bernier on Facebook I said, "I guess I'll just have to take our word for it. I'm not about to walk over to Regis College and consult a bunch of Jesuit priests about the nature of reality." Was I being too harsh? Is this really an examples of a significant contribution of philosophy? Is it possible that a philosopher could be very wrong about the existence of supernatural beings but still make a contribution to the nature of knowledge and understanding?

1. Jonathan Bernier tells me on Facebook that he is not a philosopher and never claimed to be a philosopher.

Contributions of philosophy

I've been discussing the contributions of philosophy on Facebook. Somebody linked to a a post on the topic: What has philosophy contributed to society in the past 50 years?. Here's one of contributions ... do you agree?

Philosophers, historians, and sociologists of science such as Thomas Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend, Bruno Latour, Bas van Fraassen, and Ian Hacking have changed the way that we see the purpose of science in everyday life, as well as proper scientific conduct. Kuhn's concept of a paradigm shift is now so commonplace as to be cliche. Meanwhile, areas like philosophy of physics and especially philosophy of biology are sites of active engagement between philosophers and scientists about the interpretation of scientific results.

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An Anglican says that science and religion don't conflict

Are you surprised to hear a religious person say that science and religion are not in conflict? Of course you aren't. That's just what you expect religious people to say.

Why in the world would Nature publish an article where an Anglican makes such a claim? [See Religion and science can have a true dialogue] And why in the world should its readers pay any attention at all to the nonsensical first paragraphs ...

I work for the Archbishops’ Council in the Church of England, and this summer I did something that many people would think is impossible. I sat in a dark lecture theatre engrossed in a computationally generated 3D journey through the Universe. Virtual stars whizzed past and seemed narrowly to miss colliding with my head as we accelerated through galaxies and past exploding stars. I listened to cosmologists speak on research into dark matter, particle physics, the rate at which the growth of the Universe is accelerating and the possibi­lity of multi­verses. I asked questions and they responded.

According to the popular narrative on the relationship between science and religion, this event should not have happened. The entire audience was made up of bishops and church leaders. Science and faith, we are constantly told, are in conflict and have little in common.

Really? What "popular narrative" says that Anglican church leaders can't learn about science? What "popular narrative" says that Anglicans cannot accept the findings of physics and cosmology? Who says that?

The problem here is not the ridiculous false claim but the fact that it's published in a leading science journal. I'm not aware of any Nature articles on the conflict between science and religion and the claim that belief in god(s) is not compatible with a scientific way of knowing. Why is Nature getting involved in this debate and why is it taking sides?

Read Jerry Coyne's take on this article at: Fulsome accommodationism in the journal Nature.¹

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1. Keep in mind that Jerry uses the word "accommodationist" to mean anyone, atheist or theist, who thinks that science and religion are compatible. In its original sense, the word "accommodationist" referred only to those people who Dawkins referred to as "Neville Chamberlain evolutionists." These appeasers were atheists who argued that science and religion are compatible. Only atheists can be accomodationists according to this original definition—they one I still adhere to. I don't think it's noteworthy that religious people try to make science and religion compatible.

When philosophers write about evolution

The latest issue of Evolution: Education and Outreach contains a review of two books about evolution written by philosophers. The author of the review is Egbert Giles Leigh Jr. You can read it for free at: Questions about NeoDarwinism: a review of two books.

The books are,

Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist NeoDarwinian Conception of Nature is Almost Certainly False by Thomas Nagel. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012. ISBN 978-0-19-991975-8.

Are You an Illusion? by Mary Midgley. New York, NY: Routledge. 2014. ISBN 978-1-84465-792-6.

Both of these books challenge the idea that random mutation and natural selection can explain the world we see around us today.

The reviewer responds with a defense of natural selection from an adaptationist perspective.

I think Nagel and Midgley are wrong but for different reasons. I think that the history of life is the culmination of many random and accidental events and it could easily have gone in different directions [see Replaying life's tape]. I also think that lots of modern features are epiphenomena and not adaptations. Consciousness, to the extent that it actually exists, is one of them.

Nevertheless, Leigh's review is interesting and informative and I urge you to read it if you are interested in knowing why philosophers attack evolution. It helps us understand, once again, where philosophy is going wrong.

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Paradigm shifting

I was reading up on non-coding RNAs and came across this recent paper.

Bhartiya, D., and Scaria, V. (2016) Genomic variations in non-coding RNAs: Structure, function and regulation. Genomics 107:59-68. [doi: 10.1016/j.ygeno.2016.01.005]

Abstract: The last decade has seen tremendous improvements in the understanding of human variations and their association with human traits and diseases. The availability of high-resolution map of the human transcriptome and the discovery of a large number of non-protein coding RNA genes has created a paradigm shift in the understanding of functional variations in non-coding RNAs. Several groups in recent years have reported functional variations and trait or disease associated variations mapping to non-coding RNAs including microRNAs, small nucleolar RNAs and long non-coding RNAs. The understanding of the functional consequences of variations in non-coding RNAs has been largely restricted by the limitations in understanding the functionalities of the non-coding RNAs. In this short review, we outline the current state-of-the-art of the field with emphasis on providing a conceptual outline as on how variations could modulate changes in the sequence, structure, and thereby the functionality of non-coding RNAs.

The concept of a scientific paradigm and a "paradigm shift" was promoted by Thomas Kuhn. His most popular work was The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, published in 1962.

When philosophers talk about genomes

Postgenomics is a compendium of twelve scholarly articles by philosophers and sociologists who write about the implication of the human genome sequence and subsequent work on interpreting the results. The volume is edited by Sarah Richardson, a professor in Social Sciences (History of Science) at Harvard University (Boston, Massachusetts, USA), and by Hallam Stevens, a professor of History at Nanyang Technology University in Singapore (Singapore).


The first essay is by Stevens and Richardson and it outlines the goal of the book.

Is there a conflict between science and religion?

Some of you may not be able to come to our little "dialogue" tomorrow night. Don't worry, you can watch it on YouTube: Is There a Conflict Between Science and Religion?.

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Are the humanities a different way of knowing?

The answer is "no" according to Jerry Coyne and I agree with him [“Other ways of knowing”: Out of Africa].

What about music, art, and literature? I agree with him on that as well. Read Faith vs Fact.

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Massimo Pigliucci tries to defend accommodationism (again): result is predictable

Massimo Pigliucci is an atheist who thinks that science and religion are compatible because they rule in different domains. He takes a very narrow view of "science"— one that excludes the work of historians and philosophers who are presumably using some other way of knowing. (He doesn't tell us what that is.)

I prefer the broad view of science as a way of knowing that relies on evidence, rational thinking, and healthy skepticism. This broad view of science is not universal—but it's not uncommon. In fact, Alan Sokel has defended this view of Massimo Pigiucci's own blog: [What is science and why should we care? — Part III]. According to this view, any attempt to gain knowledge should employ the scientific worldview. Historian and philosophers should follow this path if they hope to be successful. Pigliucci should know that there are different definitions and any discussion of the compatibility of science and religion must take these differences into account.

Discussing the conflict between science and religion with Denis Alexander

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