tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-37148773.post437534864200099607..comments2024-03-27T14:50:47.345-04:00Comments on <center>Sandwalk</center>: Guns and the Moral LawLarry Moranhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05756598746605455848noreply@blogger.comBlogger140125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-37148773.post-12979005395722328572011-01-07T20:42:33.652-05:002011-01-07T20:42:33.652-05:006/6 To suggest I am making appeals to the existenc...6/6 To suggest I am making appeals to the existence of concepts I’ve provided no evidentiary basis for, logic and reason, is disingenuous. First of all, I didn’t introduce that aspect of the discussion; you did, on November 20th, when you first asserted the concept of reason (without yourself feeling the need to provide an establishing underpinning) as the basis for supposing the existence of the metaphysical, and thus, your god. You did so again on the 23rd and the 30th. Despite that, you’re now scolding me for not having established evidence for the existence of reason. If you are not actually convinced of its existence, how can you try to claim it establishes the existence of your god? If you are convinced of it, why am I now required to provide establishment for something the existence of which you do not dispute and we both agreed existed Nov. 30th/Dec. 1st? <br /><br />I think the most curious thing in your recent contribution to the discussion is that there are clear indications that you are taking issue with what were, not too long ago, your own points, and never mine. You fault something I said on the basis that it “presupposes the unproven and immutable existence of logic and reason”. I never made such a claim. But you did, on Dec. 5th, insisting on both the existence and immutability you now purport to be without basis. That is to say, you’re criticizing me for a stand you attribute to me that is actually the one you asserted a month ago. You also claim it’s impossible to actually demonstrate the existence of such things by experimentation because they partake of the process – in other words, there’s no way to demonstrate the existence of such things, period. Regardless of the fact that I don’t agree; on what basis, then, do you claim to know they exist, and to know their specific attributes, and that they establish the existence of your god, as you’ve asserted since Nov. 20th? These claims actually take issue with your own first positions, and contradict what you asserted initially.Lone Primatehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15746801663695992138noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-37148773.post-41055049037799130622011-01-07T20:42:06.552-05:002011-01-07T20:42:06.552-05:005/6 To say “what are we to do with an entity that ...5/6 To say “what are we to do with an entity that has no physical components” is, again, simply to insist it is so (this is what is meant by “ipse dixit”; see below). It offers nothing in evidence but your personal incredulity that that natural universe we know to exist can be the basis for conceptualization leading to an evidentially unjustified extrapolation of agencies beyond it; or else the fact that the fact that we don’t know everything about the working of the mind to your momentary satisfaction. It is forever the same circular logic that shoots off to the god of the gaps argument the moment you feel it’s achieved high enough velocity. It is always the same, and has been for thousands of years: we don’t know something, or you can’t credit something; therefore, god. But even where we don’t explicitly know something, this leap of logic is unjustified simply on the basis of what we do already know: We know the brain is physical; we know that damage to it impairs certain functions, and that the operation of the mind is limited and impaired by physical and chemical disturbances in the brain – observations consistent with a physical model of the mind but inconsistent with a metaphysical one. We know that the operation of the body by the brain requires a physical connection, and that there is nothing “transcendant” about the brain’s control of voluntary and involuntary processes of the body – would that it were for the sake of people like Christopher Reeves and Michael J. Fox. Conceptualizing and wishing cannot make anything so if the physical links between the brain and the rest of the body are compromised. There is no reason to assume a magical aspect to any of this but vanity, and the need to exalt human beings beyond what they naturally are. <br /><br />When I talk about the scientific method, I’m not making any claims about the immutability of anything, or some attribution of perfection to human discernment. What I’m talking about is a method that enables skeptics to reproduce the steps of a process meant to establish the veracity of a proposition, and independently confirm those results or uncover flaws in the methodology that invalidate them. It denies faith, because it insists on evidence. These are things freely and fairly objectively available to anyone who cares to do the work. And over the last few hundred years since the Renaissance, it’s produced the unparalleled results that are our modern world. I don’t claim it’s perfect, because no human endeavor can be. But it’s abundantly clear to me, to paraphrase Winston Churchill, that science is the worst way to comprehend the world... except for all the others. <br /><br />To say “I see no reason to view the mind as anything other than the sum of physical operations” does not constitution an ipse dixit. And ipse dixit is a statement of opinion hung without substantiation in the hopes that its factuality will be summarily accepted without challenge (e.g., “all swans are white; everyone knows that” technically constitutes two). For me to say “I don’t see a reason for X” is not such a statement; that in itself is a fact, one concerning myself. On the matter of evidence external to my awareness, it makes no statement or judgement. Such evidence may exist; I am simply not aware of it (or not persuaded by what has been offered as such so far). <br /><br />(cont’dLone Primatehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15746801663695992138noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-37148773.post-73044379951387605322011-01-07T20:41:41.281-05:002011-01-07T20:41:41.281-05:004/6 The dictionary description of abstraction as s...4/6 The dictionary description of abstraction as something “apart” from the object causes no consternation; it states the obvious. The abstraction is not the thing itself; of course it is apart from the object. If conceptualizing “chair” caused or required the material object to be manifest in the brain, rupturing the skull, few of us would live long enough to talk about it and inflict this tragic experience on others. The whole point of the abstraction is that it’s something the mind formulates to stand for something else, which can then be manipulated on an symbolic rather than literal level. But this is not to say the abstraction is immaterial; it has a physical, electrochemical character in the brain. Similarly, a hundred of something can be represented by writing “100” in ink on a page, or in electrons in a CPU reflected by photons striking a screen: these are abstractions, separate from the objects they stand for, and yet still themselves have their own physicality which can itself be abstracted (as I just have). As well, pointing out that a trip to the thesaurus yields words related to mysticism as parallels to “abstract” is merely to point out that some lexicographers either hold views similar to yours, or acknowledge their existence. Obviously, this is in no way binding on me. <br /><br />The part of the brain that generates and manipulates abstractions is known; it is the neocortex. Abstraction is not localized to a spot in the brain, but is a generalized ability of the neocortex. My concern here is to head off a tedious and pointless discussion where finer and finer localizations within the brain will be demanded for first trees, then maple trees, then sugar maple trees... Obviously the power to abstract must be generalized if we’re going to deal with events, items, and concepts we’ve never encountered before; clearly it would be impossible to wire a brain such that every possible object or idea in the universe is precisely pre-wired into it someplace. That’s exactly the point of abstraction: it’s a modeling process, and is as such a plastic operation at which human beings particularly excel. As for the comprehension of abstraction, this is itself an abstraction, and thus, the province of the neocortex. <br /><br />(cont’d)Lone Primatehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15746801663695992138noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-37148773.post-67856438162874849002011-01-07T20:41:16.764-05:002011-01-07T20:41:16.764-05:003/6 To suggest that the existence of reason is imp...3/6 To suggest that the existence of reason is impossible without first explaining how consciousness arose by natural means is a flawed argument. We both agree nature exists, and we both agree reason exists; that’s established (and I did provide a non-circular definition of reason on Dec. 2; “Reason is the faculty of the mind that enables someone to compare and contrast two or more propositions, weigh their likelihood or desirability, and reach a conclusion based on their relative weight.” I see nothing in the description that is self-referential and thus “circular”.); where we differ is in how absolute it is and where it comes from. But given that we both agree that it exists, it’s a moot point to suggest it can’t if I don’t provide an explanation for it. You might as well claim the moon doesn’t exists until we can explain its presence in the sky. Furthermore, the position presents two problems: first, it presumes by extension that the existence of something requires it to exist prior to its own existence, which is nonsensical; secondly, it implies that consciousness is somehow different in fundamental character from any other phenomenon of the universe without explaining that belief or specifying in what particulars it’s the case. If it is, as I’m persuaded, just another complex interaction of matter, what is there to prove with regard to how it came about? Like anything else, it came into existence over time as conditions permitted, in the same manner as any other adaptation. In this case, it evolved from processing sensory input. The better you get at it, the better you survive. It has a clear survival advantage that’s selected for and thus improves and increases in complexity over time like any other ability or attribute, such as swimming, stealthy hunting, a poisonous skin, or a myriad of other properties you might obsess in awe over, except that this one happens to be self-referential. <br /><br />Similarly, another point falls on the same basis of denying the obvious. To suggest that materialism obviates that we can know what is true ignores the simple evidence of the everyday. Even if there were some way to step outside of our own perceptions and see the world for what it “truly”, and we were to discover it looked, smelled, and felt vastly different from our experience, that would still not disestablish the consistency of the world as brought to us by our limited senses and our perceptions of them. Up would still be the opposite of the direction of gravity’s influence, days would still be 24 hours long, and stepping in front of a train would still tend to bring an abrupt end to one’s personal interactions with the world in general. In other words, regardless of how funny things might look to us compared to what they might actually be, certain things are still internally consistent with externalities. This is the practical refutation of what is merely philosophical wordplay. Moreover, even if the metaphysical were to exist, interacting as it does with the material brain the same problems of perceptions and comprehension would still be factors and so postulating the existence of the magical offers nothing in the way of a solution; merely an unexplainable dunsel strapped onto what’s known to exist and function the same one way or the other. <br /><br />(cont’d)Lone Primatehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15746801663695992138noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-37148773.post-77892652328057693462011-01-07T20:40:55.426-05:002011-01-07T20:40:55.426-05:002/6 The suggestion that consciousness having arise...2/6 The suggestion that consciousness having arisen by means of evolution implies at least a degree of subjectivism is, again, not to raise an insoluble problem as to state the obvious. Can there be any doubt that we view the world subjectively? The fact that people can differ based on the same facts establishes that; no one finds that remarkable (merely occasionally frustrating). For this even to be an issue, reason would have to be an absolute, and I’ve said before I don’t take it as such. I believe reason to be a trend, rather than an absolute. Human reasoning is often flawed. It’s simply an evaluative tool and is largely dependent on the information and values entered into it for its results; I see no evidence for supposing it to be an external absolute that is, by some unknown and forever elusive manner, internalized. That said, elsewhere I’ve seen this point taken to its ad absurdum extremes – the issue being that if our perceptions aren’t shaped by application of an external template, how is it possible that we share any of the same perceptions of the world? This is an issue that’s solved merely by considering the basics of it. Regardless of how we may perceive or fail to perceive aspects of the world, the world remains the world. It is consistent in and of itself and requires neither our permission or acknowledgement to be what it is. This is an external standard to which we are all subject. With regard to our interactions with it, we interface with it using bodies with the same organs, the same chemistry, the same senses, and the same brains. It would seem to me a greater conundrum if, all these things being standards, we did not share common perceptions of the world. It would be as though chlorophyll did not routinely use sunlight to produce sugars, but produced gasoline and Freon and DDT utterly at random. On what basis would we expect this? We wouldn’t, because it’s the same mechanism doing the same thing in every plant. Therefore, why wonder at the fact that the same senses and the same brains and the same electrochemistry in every human being should result in consistent perceptions of the outside world and the invented concepts we share and teach one another, from person to person? That is, where is the issue in this? <br /><br />(cont’dLone Primatehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15746801663695992138noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-37148773.post-59121716642430922152011-01-07T20:40:21.563-05:002011-01-07T20:40:21.563-05:00JCC:
1/6 In all honesty, I don’t claim to person...JCC: <br /><br />1/6 In all honesty, I don’t claim to personally understand the physical mechanics of thought. What I accept is what is demonstrable by those who’ve made the study their work. In this I am nothing exceptional. Even scientists working in other fields of their own cannot be experts on everything, and must apply the same standard. Where we all agree, however, is that what is demonstrable has earned the right to be considered fact, and what remains to be demonstrated must be treated as conjectural. Nevertheless, it’s obvious to me that quite lot has been learned in recent years and that a very good and increasingly profound understanding of the mechanics of thought, motivation, intention, and perception has been and continues to be achieved; none of it magical, all of it physical. A fascinating digest of the state of the art can be found at (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neural_prosthetics); the science is way beyond what I had even imagined. <br /><br />With regard to the question of the evolution of consciousness, I think the problem stems from considering consciousness to somehow be a phenomenon apart from all others in biology. The fact that we tend to find it impressive and even awesome does not necessitate that it is therefore magical and different in fundamental aspects from anything else biological. As to defining it, I would simply describe it as a state of awareness qualified by whatever that state is focused upon at any given time. I think that the natural state of the mind is actually sleep, not consciousness, and that consciousness is an energy-intensive process: an adaptation selected for in higher animals as an enhancement of what would otherwise be simple instinctive responses to cues of finding a mate, finding food, and avoiding becoming food oneself. In some higher animals, it includes elements of abstraction that aid in problem-solving and organizing the world in complex ways. Again, I am not aware of any reason to regard this as anything other than a physical process, particularly since it’s one we share, to greater and lesser extents, with other animals. One of the most remarkable was Alex, an African grey parrot (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R6KvPN_Wt8I). If attributes of language, abstraction, and rational discernment are meant to be imbued by a metaphysical source to humans who have a unique relationship with that source, rather than attributes of the brains evolved in related beings, one wonders what we are to make of these impressive abilities in other species. <br /><br />Relatedly: most higher animals show evidence of ability to think in basic abstractions, to greater or lesser degrees. The difference in the matter raised is “shared intellectual consensus”. The fact that it’s shared, by definition, connotes a cultural aspect. These are acquired rather than typically synthesized independently (although obviously they can be, given that someone has to be the first to think of something). <br /><br />(cont’d)Lone Primatehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15746801663695992138noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-37148773.post-68575768874334694592010-12-27T13:12:56.144-05:002010-12-27T13:12:56.144-05:00Lone Primate (3 of 3):
You also accuse me of asse...Lone Primate (3 of 3):<br /><br />You also accuse me of asserting multiple <i>ipse dixits</i>, yet succumb to the same failing yourself with: <i>I see no reason to view the mind is anything other than the sum of physical operations in the brain</i>; and <i>If one believed in “reason alone”, one would necessarily have to discount the existence of religion</i> all while making appeals to the existence of concepts that you’ve provided no evidentiary basis for—reason and logic. At least I’m willing to acknowledge what my arguments presuppose.<br /><br />And I found this:<br /><br /><i>What I do claim is that only demonstrable explanations for the phenomena of life and the universe around us are of any real value and practical use</i><br /><br />to be a particularly curious statement in that there are <b>no</b> demonstrable explanations for the “phenomena of life and the universe” outside of pure conjecture. If anything, at this point in our understanding, only <i>transcendent</i> explanations of them make for the most likely possibilities. And furthermore, in a supposedly arbitrary and random universe where the very concept of values is necessarily subjective, to what objective standards do your values appeal?<br /><br />And your conclusion of:<br /><br /><i>to discount the supernatural is not “conform to [a] chosen worldview”. It is quite the opposite: to form one’s view of the world based on the demonstrably real, rather than the merely (and forever) conjectural. On the contrary; to believe in the supernatural is to conform to a chosen worldview, to cling to things merely supposed but never proven, and to do so even in spite of conflicting evidence – that is, after all, the very definition of faith.</i><br /><br />is itself, self-defeating in that it, too, is conjecturally based and presupposes the unproven and immutable existence of logic and reason. You seem to regard science as the only source of finding objective truth. This is interesting because if that’s so, then that assumption claims to be an objective truth claim itself—which is <i>philosophical</i> in nature, <b>not</b> scientific, because it cannot be proven by the scientific method (it <b>presupposes</b> the scientific method)—therefore it is self-defeating.<br /><br />Science cannot be done without a <i>philosophical</i> underpinning. In fact, science is a slave to philosophy because one cannot prove the existence of the tools of science (i.e. logic, reason, First Principles, etc.) by performing an experiment on them because they are presupposed in order to <i>do</i> the experiment!<br /><br />Ultimately, materialism, if true, renders the existence of reason to be impossible because it cannot explain <i>how</i> consciousness arose by chance in a universe where consciousness did not pre-exist and what makes reason <i>reasonable</i> to conscious minds. In the end, you, the materialist, are <b>forced</b> to use reason by <i>faith</i>, and faith <b>alone</b>.jccnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-37148773.post-11982947430529052132010-12-27T13:02:26.278-05:002010-12-27T13:02:26.278-05:00Lone Primate (2 of 3):
And given that your respon...Lone Primate (2 of 3):<br /><br />And given that your responses were replete with references to the <i>abstract</i> (and <i>abstractions</i>) indicates just how heavily your argument depends on this adjective. I find the dictionary’s definition of <b>abstract :</b> <i>expressing a quality <b>apart</b> from an object</i> quite telling in how you carefully eschew any mention of immateriality, and yet closer scrutiny reveals that you simply cannot avoid its implication when using that word.<br /><br />As I mentioned before, you quite eloquently elucidated how and what physical entities can be empirically detected. However, given your inability to avoid <i>implied</i> references to the existence of the immaterial by your heavy use of <i>abstraction</i> lends credence to my assertion that an immaterial reality not only exists, but is experientially unavoidable to conscious minds. Your citing of the human use of numerical symbols to facilitate the intellectual <i>abstraction</i> of quantification perfectly exemplifies such an immaterial reality. The abstract symbology of numerals inarguably <b>exists</b>, yet the intellectual connection between the two has <b>no</b> physical attributes (I claim this in consideration of the fact that you have yet to produce indisputable evidence of which physical area of the brain is responsible for the <i>comprehension</i> of the concept of abstraction). So, what are we to do with an entity that has no physical components, yet whose existence cannot be denied?—we have <b>no</b> choice but to categorize it as being <i>metaphysical</i>. Again, we know what it <i>isn’t</i>—physical, therefore it <b>must</b> be something else. Just because materialism fails to account for it does <b>not</b> mean that it cannot exist. Any thesaurus search for the term <i>abstract</i> yields the following synonyms: <i>conceptual, ideal, notional, theoretical, <b>metaphysical, immaterial, nonphysical</b></i> and <i><b>transcendent</b></i>. Clearly, lexicographers had no choice but to acknowledge its existence and constructed the language around it accordingly.<br /><br />This inflicts a devastating blow to your accusation of the supposed fallacy of circular reasoning on my part. Yes, I’ve claimed the existence of an immaterial reality but I’ve demonstrated it by personal experience—experience that <b>every</b> conscious mind, <b>including yours</b>, shares but cannot be discounted as imagined or anecdotal. Your very own words indicate <i>your</i> inability to <b>not</b> indirectly acknowledge the transcendent, yet you will not confront this cognitive dissonance.<br /><br />You claim that for it to have any epistemological value, <i>reasoning</i> cannot be self-referential. Fair enough, but unfortunately, nowhere in any of your responses did <i>you</i> provide a <b>non-circular</b> definition of what constitutes reason—yet you made no less than <i>eleven</i> a priori appeals to it. If I were so inclined, I could easily stoop to a tu quoque accusation of <i>you</i> employing such circular logic.jccnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-37148773.post-7015860874716045932010-12-27T12:53:25.393-05:002010-12-27T12:53:25.393-05:00Lone Primate (1 of 3):
My apologies for this late...Lone Primate (1 of 3):<br /><br />My apologies for this late response. It has been a very busy couple of weeks.<br /><br />It’s abundantly clear that your primary objection to the assertion that reason is metaphysical lies in what you perceive to be a circular argument of mine: <i>it has no empirically detectable substance therefore it must be immaterial, or metaphysical—and yet an immaterial entity, by definition, cannot be detected therefore it cannot be said to exist.</i> Fair enough. Superficially, this objection seems well grounded in <i>reason</i>.<br /><br />In your copious expository you were quite careful to avoid giving the impression of any tangential acknowledgement of the immaterial nature of reason or even use terminology alluding to such. My hat’s off to your consistent attention to that detail.<br /><br />So, given your utter rejection of any immaterial aspect of it, one must conclude that you <i>believe</i> reason to be an entirely material entity. To some extent this is true (given the undeniable electrical activity detectable in the brain when the mind is employing it). However, what you’ve consistently failed to provide is an explanation of exactly <b>how</b> the physical movement of electrons through neural pathways defines the intellectual <b>concept</b> of reason, or logic or even consciousness itself. You not only fail to cite what demonstrable circuits in the brain are responsible for the <b>comprehension</b> of <i>concepts</i> like existence or negation or equality or necessity, but more importantly, with regard to your scientifically unsubstantiated belief in the evolutionary genesis of consciousness, you completely neglect to address the most troublesome aspect of that genesis—the unavoidable subjective relativism it implies, particularly with regard to reason. <i>If</i> the materialistic view of reason (and consciousness) is true (i.e. consists solely of electro-chemical reactions in the brain) then there is no <i>reason</i> to believe that <b>anything</b> can be regarded as reliably true (including the theory of materialism itself). Inanimate chemicals and electrons have yet to be shown to possess the ability to assess the validity of an intellectual, <i>immaterial</i> assertion. I believe it’s safe to claim that chemicals, electrons, and electrical currents <b>cannot</b> reason, they only <i>react</i>.<br /><br />Your <i>see[ing] no reason to view the mind [a]s anything other than the sum of physical operations in the brain</i> is utterly bereft of explaining <b>how</b> two separate minds (whose respective consciousness’ supposedly evolved under random, Darwinian circumstances) can possibly hope to concur on <b>any</b> intellectual endeavor.<br /><br />You offer no scientific explanation for what constitutes or concisely defines exactly what consciousness is, yet you find <i>reason</i> to believe that it <b>must</b> be solely accounted for by some material agency. Your every assertion presupposes that the ability of healthy brains to communicate with each other was not only made possible by the Darwinian processes of chance and mutation, but that those brains can somehow reach a shared intellectual consensus on <i>abstract</i> concepts in a supposedly relativistic universe where, by definition, that cannot be guaranteed.jccnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-37148773.post-54971650254191146802010-12-13T15:49:41.575-05:002010-12-13T15:49:41.575-05:00JCC:
Been there, done that. :)JCC:<br /><br />Been there, done that. :)Lone Primatehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15746801663695992138noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-37148773.post-1172248992629256612010-12-13T09:09:21.028-05:002010-12-13T09:09:21.028-05:00Lone Primate:
I had a disk crash over the weekend...Lone Primate:<br /><br />I had a disk crash over the weekend. Please be patient.jccnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-37148773.post-14700041580303963282010-12-09T16:32:20.335-05:002010-12-09T16:32:20.335-05:00Lone Primate:
Due to heavy restrictions on my tim...Lone Primate:<br /><br />Due to heavy restrictions on my time, I may not be able to reply before the end of the weekend. But, stayed tuned...jccnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-37148773.post-66012242589696089492010-12-07T14:49:26.426-05:002010-12-07T14:49:26.426-05:006) Asserting that logic has no physical attributes...6) Asserting that logic has no physical attributes is, once more, simply an unsubstantiated ipse dixit. No evidence is given in support of the insistence that it is something other than an attribute of the working of the brain. Previously the discussion turned to how the fact that its operation is affected by physical conditions (e.g., damage to the brain or the introduction of intoxicants) is a clear indication of it as a physical process in and of itself, rather than metaphysical one reflected by physical reactions (in which case, logic itself, being non-physical, should be unimpaired, and only the brain’s operation of the body carrying out its dictates should show impairment – doing “the right thing” sloppily, that is). Conjecture was offered in explanation for how a non-corporeal operation in interaction with a physical one might be conceived of in a manner consistent with these observations – not actual proof, just speculation hand-carved to a flush fit as close as possible with reality. This is as fruitless a pursuit as conjecturing upon the number of angels that can dance on the head of a pin: one may suppose anything without fear of ever being proven wrong... or of ever adding anything useful to the sum of human knowledge... since the supposition is in practice untestable and cannot be either proven or disproven. It is simply a philosophical game of conceits that are at best tangential to reality.<br /><br />If one believed in “reason alone”, one would necessarily have to discount the existence of religion, among other things. I for one don’t disbelieve in the existence of religions (only some of the things they hold to be true). Human beings are not unfailingly reasonable or universally rational. They believe things for many causes other than reasonable ones. They may hold things to be true because they fear the conclusions of their not being true (for example, that death is the end of consciousness and being). They may hold things to be true because it pleases them to, or bonds them to a group (for example, that a man walked on water, or that an angel commanded an illiterate to read the words of a god into the world, or that another translated golden plates using seer stones in the bottom of his hat). They may hold things to be true because doing so gives them influence and power over others, or justifications for actions that would otherwise be reprehensible (for example, that it’s right for our soldiers to kill whomever they have to in furtherance of our principles, even if those principles are violated by so doing). They may believe things simply because not to do so would cause them to give up hope (that the cure is just around the corner, despite every indication it is in truth years or decades in the future yet). There are all kinds of causes for belief that do not spring from, and will not yield to, reason. So I don’t claim to believe we are driven by reason alone. What I do claim is that only demonstrable explanations for the phenomena of life and the universe around us are of any real value and practical use to humanity, and thus are greatly to be preferred over magical explanations which, in their multiplicity and mutual contradiction, give every appearance of having been drawn solely from the imagination.<br /><br />Finally, to discount the supernatural is not “conform to [a] chosen worldview”. It is quite the opposite: to form one’s view of the world based on the demonstrably real, rather than the merely (and forever) conjectural. On the contrary; to believe in the supernatural is to conform to a chosen worldview, to cling to things merely supposed but never proven, and to do so even in spite of conflicting evidence – that is, after all, the very definition of faith.Lone Primatehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15746801663695992138noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-37148773.post-9219062711372129262010-12-07T14:49:02.451-05:002010-12-07T14:49:02.451-05:005) The argument that the particulars of arithmetic...5) The argument that the particulars of arithmetic apply to all aspects of reason is a logical fallacy; it conflates logic and reason, which are not actually synonymous. It’s possible for something to be logical but not reasonable. For example, you can draw a logical inference from a group of facts: most children acquire their parents’ religion; in the southern US, most people (and thus, most parents) are Christian. A logical inference can be made that therefore, the average child in the southern US will be raised Christian. This follows the rules of logic. But it says nothing as to the reasonability of having a religion, or indoctrinating a child in it, or of the precepts of that religion itself. The reasonability of all these can be disputed while the overall logic describing the statistical operation of a cultural phenomenon itself holds true. Getting back to the point on mathematics, the fact that a set of concepts that were specifically designed to promote the abstraction of real physical values outputs constant values that, again, apply to real world physical values (or abstractions initially rooted in them) does not imply the same applies to other concepts that were not designed to define constants. To suggest that they do is operant overextension, and thus a logical fallacy.<br /><br /><br />It’s true to say that the “laws” of non-contradiction, excluded middle, and cause and effect, and so on, exist in the mind (no issue since I see no reason to view the mind is anything other than the sum of physical operations in the brain). But in calling them “laws”, we are not acknowledging that they are granted by an authority, but using a euphemism about sets of observations about the realities of the physical universe that reflects upon the consistency of those phenomena. Even when there were no minds at all yet in the universe, a given thing would still have had to have been what it was and could not have been what it was not. No mind needs to exist for that to be a characteristic of existence in the universe (though it requires a mind to state even something so painfully obvious). A mind needs to exist in order to observe a given circumstance and formulate a general principle about it: a “law”. But again there’s no reason to assume brains are themselves incapable of this and that the concept has to be external. And, again, we know brains exist. We don’t know anything metaphysical does. Some people choose to infer it, but that’s not the same thing as knowing it.Lone Primatehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15746801663695992138noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-37148773.post-74985855358330757632010-12-07T14:48:40.072-05:002010-12-07T14:48:40.072-05:004) I reject the suggestion that no mechanism has b...4) I reject the suggestion that no mechanism has been shown in discussions here underlying the physical nature of thought, impression, abstraction, memory, and so on, in the brain. That was dealt with some time ago. That the brain physically changes in reliable, predictable, and demonstrably repeatable ways, and in particular areas with regard to the activities undertake or contemplated, has been evidentially established. What hasn’t been established is any reason to make an inference that this is a response to something metaphysical, rather than a material phenomenon whole and entire unto itself, other than an insistence on doing so out of sheer philosophical need. Simply demanding that concepts are metaphysical is nothing more than that. It constitutes no proof; simply airs an objection. And, again, it sidesteps the initial problem that the metaphysical has not been demonstrated to exist, and every pretense of doing so retreats to the same circular arguments set out in my first paragraph.<br /><br />I also reject the notion that the brain cannot be responsible for conceptualization of numbers, because no such limitation has been demonstrated, but has instead been merely offered as an ungrounded ipse dixit. That is, no explanation is offered for why the brain ought not to be able to conceptualize any concept at all, other than the insistence that concepts are metaphysical. This is, once again, an appeal to that same circular logic. Further, to suggest that the numbers would be arbitrary if they were not transcendent fails on two counts: first, it ignores the fact that quantities of real objects exist in the physical world of which human beings can have direct knowledge, and which have noticeably different effects that human beings can grasp and conceptualize; and secondly, it carries the implication that everything would be arbitrary without it being poured into our heads from without, and no meaningful communication would be possible. How, then, do two people communicate using the English language? If the hard and fast (and false) dichotomy of arbitrary/transcendent is true, then this would either be impossible, or else proof of transcendence because the words of English are necessarily conceptual. But then if they are transcendent concepts, first, how are we to explain the existence of thousands of other languages? The fact of the matter is that symbols are actually entirely arbitrary, and they apply to concepts from the real world (such as the numbers of objects) that aren’t, and those arbitrary abstractions for features in the real world can be used to facilitate deeper abstraction. Secondly, if the concepts are truly transcendent, then language should not matter: to say “seven” in English or “sabt” in Arabic should provide no barrier whatsoever to conveying a concept between the two minds if it actually is transcendent. But clearly this isn’t the case.Lone Primatehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15746801663695992138noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-37148773.post-61054757275158958192010-12-07T14:48:18.784-05:002010-12-07T14:48:18.784-05:003) The suggestion that the immutability of numeric...3) The suggestion that the immutability of numeric concepts implies they are metaphysical is another instance of the circular logic I mentioned previously. What’s immutable is that three objects are more than two and less than four (which is materially true: three atoms always have more gravity than two and less gravity than four, and in precise proportions, regardless of whether minds exist to make that observation or not, and thus, whether the concept of numbers characterizing the phenomenon exist or not). The concepts are meaningless if they change, precisely because human language has defined them to reflect and represent immutable amounts. It’s in no way extraordinary that terms we’ve created precisely to describe constants evident in the world around us should turn out to describe constants evident in the world around us. The very immutability of numeration is a strike against the idea of numbers as things created independent of substance, because the latter suggestion implies a choice in the matter on the part of the author. But is there a choice to, say, create the numbers 1, 2, and 4, but omit 3? Does it make sense to imagine, for example, there’s an arbitrary integer value between, say, 11 and 12 that could have existed, but does not? If there’s no choice in the matter, and it does not appear that there is, then what reason would there be to imagine they are transcendent creations, rather than simple depictions of the pinch-points between sets of objects for the convenience of social interaction in complex societies? Numbers are simply one more abstraction that we have come up with to describe the world in which we live, because most cultures have found it important to have a convention to do so.<br /><br />Even so, there are limits. Germanic languages like English have native terms such as “hundred” and “thousand” that are common among themselves. But they have had to borrow the word for “million” from Latin languages, which spring from a more sophisticated culture that eventually had need to define a number that large; while the ancient Germanic peoples never did: like the peoples of the Amazon and Australian Outback, never having a “million” of anything; they lacked the concept, and thus a name for it. Similarly, even the Romans had no need for a “billion” or a “trillion”, and these concepts had to be invented and named in more recent times by taking the word “million” and prefixing an exponential indicator (bi, tri, quad, quint, etc.). If these were transcendent, all languages ought to have native words for them; moreover, one would expect those words to all be the same across languages. The theory of transcendence is forever silent on the question of why concepts exported to all human minds from a single source evoke a universal experience and reaction in every one of those minds, with the singular, striking, and inexplicable exception of evoking a universal name. Everything else they stir in us, we are assured, is innate and shared (and thus deemed proof of their transcendence); but for some reason, not that.Lone Primatehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15746801663695992138noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-37148773.post-54184132322791709912010-12-07T14:47:57.932-05:002010-12-07T14:47:57.932-05:002) The problem with the idea of the transcendence ...2) The problem with the idea of the transcendence of numbers in particular is the same as the idea of the transcendence of reason in general. If they were transcendent – more to the point, if they were actually innate – then any and all human beings ought to manage and apply them. But it’s obvious they don’t. Children are not born with the ability to count; they must be taught to do so by the culture in which they live. Like the acquisition of language, there appears to be a crucial time during the development of the brain when the ability to count must be culturally defined and acquired, outside of which it becomes difficult or even impossible. Studies of indigenous cultures in Australia and the Amazon have borne this out. These are cultures that lack words for numbers (some have no other words for them but “one” and “many”, differentiating between the singular and the plural, but not actual integers). A study released by Nature in 2004 of an Amazon culture indicated that its adults found it increasingly difficult to organize and track tasks involving numbers beyond three, and that their inability increased rapidly as the numbers mounted. The concepts did not exist in their minds, because they didn’t exist in their language, and they didn’t exist in the language because they were of little use in such an elementary culture where the tracking of objects beyond a few was unnecessary. The fact that children must be taught to count, and that in some cultures, they never do (and beyond a certain crucial age, never can), is a strong indication that numbers are not innate concepts, but are culturally acquired (or not, if they’re of no value to your culture) like any other class of abstractions, like language, religious beliefs, laws and social customs (relatedly, most of these cultures also lack nudity taboos because they have not practical use for clothing), and so on. It may be said that we have an innate ability to facilitate numbers, but that’s not the same thing as saying numbers themselves are innate: we also have innate abilities that enable us to drive automobiles – manipulating objects indirectly by means of other objects, judging speed and distance, orienting ourselves in space, and so on – but to suggest that implies the concept of driving automobiles itself is innate is obvious nonsense.<br /><br />Even if it were to turn out that the concepts for specific integers were innate in humans, it does not follow that the concepts are thus metaphysical. Breathing is innate, but no one has championed a metaphysicality for it on that basis. How, then, does it proceed from that that numbers themselves need to be created by something nonhuman and outside of the universe? All a number really is is a semantic convention humans have conceived of to close a set of objects (for instance, there is either “three” of something, or there is not; in the circumstance that there is, we apply that label to differentiate it from its non-states, or from objects we want to exclude from the set). I can see no reason to assume human beings themselves are not capable of doing this if there is a cultural need to do so – or neglecting to do so if there is not.Lone Primatehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15746801663695992138noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-37148773.post-49467675786900410702010-12-07T14:47:35.981-05:002010-12-07T14:47:35.981-05:001) The problem that I have with the latest stateme...1) The problem that I have with the latest statement of principle is identical to the objection I raised previously. Every claim made for the supernatural, spiritual, metaphysical, transcendental, etc., is a function of the same circular argument. It first moots the existence of the metaphysical, then labels something with the concept, and then demands that since that something is deemed metaphysical, therefore the metaphysical (and dropping the coy pretence, what’s ultimately meant is “god”) exists: ‘I declare A exists, I declare B has attribute A; since B exists and has attribute A, therefore A must exist (and by extension, A-Prime, which I claim to have created A)’. At no point does this do anything to substantiate the initial preconception. It’s easy to see how flawed this logic is by simply replacing the word representing the attribute A: “Fire trucks are indisputably skoozoggiful, and therefore, fire trucks prove the existence of the skoozoggiful”. The premise falls at the first hurdle, because it’s self-evident that the skoozoggifulness of fire trucks is entirely debatable – if for no other reason than that the concept hasn’t been demonstrated in the first place, but merely insisted upon. Anything can be asserted on evidence this flimsy, particularly when the concept is constructed such that it never has to be or can be proven, except spuriously by the provable existence of things deemed to have this attribute. All these assertions are simply based upon a circular argument with the characteristics of a cartoon rabbit pulling himself out of a magic top hat and up into thin air by his own ears.<br /><br />To state “it is clear that since the logic of arithmetic is independent of the brain that contemplates it” is merely an ipse dixit. It isn’t clear that this is the case, and it isn’t established by simply insisting that it is. Furthermore, the statement “only an intelligent agent has been demonstrated to be capable of creating such a phenomenon” does not tell us why that intelligent agent can’t be human, particularly since the only verifiable demonstration of such agency we have is human. We all agree humans exist. We don’t all agree gods do.<br /><br />The idea that numbers pre-exist the abstraction of sets – that is, that they are “created” and somehow exist independently of minds capable of quantification – is nothing more than an inference, like any other dabbling with the metaphysical. It is not borne out by any evidence; in fact, it’s actually contra-indicated by a number of studies.Lone Primatehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15746801663695992138noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-37148773.post-87744554554023483522010-12-05T21:22:14.623-05:002010-12-05T21:22:14.623-05:00Lone Primate (con’t):
What you’re apparently ref...Lone Primate (con’t):<br /><br />What you’re apparently referring to as reason in your treatise can only be construed to be a subjective interpretation of facts tempered by an imperfect perception of reality via emotions and desires. You say yourself that:<br /><br /><i>If reason is both transcendent and absolute, then its application and results should not vary.</i><br /><br />which <b>is</b> the case when arithmetic is correctly executed. It is clear that since the logic of arithmetic is independent of the brain that contemplates it, then the reason of arithmetic <i>must</i> be an intrinsic, yet <b>immaterial</b> property of the universe.<br /><br />Your objection to the conclusion that <i>this implies the existence of the supernatural</i> is baseless if by “supernatural,” you’re referring to an antecedent intelligence that is responsible for creating such a pure reason—because <b>only</b> an intelligent agent has been demonstrated to be capable of creating such a phenomenon.<br /><br />And pure reason need not be restricted to the concept of arithmetic. All “first principles” (e.g. the <i>law of non-contradiction</i>, the <i>law of excluded middle</i>, the <i>law of cause and effect</i>, etc.) are axiomatic and immaterial. They are what Aristotle referred to as <i>metaphysical</i>—they exist only within the domain of consciousness, utterly without physical substance.<br /><br />To claim that these are immaterial entities is <b>not</b> an argument from ignorance because in order to assert that something is immaterial (i.e. metaphysical) we must <b>first</b> know what <i>material</i> is—and kudos to you for beautifully elucidating how and what physical entities <i>can</i> be empirically detected. Since it can be shown that <i>pure</i> reason (i.e. arithmetic, etc.) <b>does</b> exist, and yet possess no physical attributes, then to assign it to the realm of the metaphysical is not an anti-intellectual or circular argument because we know what it is <i>not</i>—physical, therefore it <i>must</i> be something else. What is circular is to attempt to characterize a reference to pure reason as “unreasonable” without first defining reason in an absolute, non-circular fashion (which you have failed to do).<br /><br />Also, I find it fascinating that your assertion of:<br /><br /><i>When it comes to value judgements, the process of reason can yield very different results.</i><br /><br />effectively torpedoes the atheist credo of “Reason Alone!” by hoisting it on its own petard.<br /><br />Your attempt to relegate demonstrably immaterial entities that can only be perceived by a conscious mind as non-existent must therefore also relegate the very conscious mind contemplating them as non-existent since you cannot produce any physical properties of, or more importantly, concisely define what consciousness is in the first place. <br /><br />To accept <i>only</i> a materialistic explanation for a phenomenon that clearly eludes such a description demonstrates a paralysis of the will—an emotional denial of the realities that the mind cannot intellectually dismiss, yet it continues to do so simply because they do not conform to its chosen worldview.jccnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-37148773.post-53020681252061776542010-12-05T20:53:45.045-05:002010-12-05T20:53:45.045-05:00Lone Primate:
Thank you for your treatise on reas...Lone Primate:<br /><br />Thank you for your treatise on reason. My apologies for taking so long in responding (it is has been the end of a very busy week).<br /><br />While you go to great pains in attempting to prove reason to ultimately be a relativistic by-product of materialism, the veracity of your arguments, and the <i>reasoning</i> you used in their presentation are, when carefully scrutinized, easily refuted.<br /><br />First, can it not be said that simple arithmetic is pure, objective reason? If so, then it can be demonstrated that the <b>concept</b> (or intellectual “mechanics”) of adding, subtracting, multiplying or dividing one quantity by another irrefutably exists outside and <i>independently</i> of any physical process of the brain. No one brain originally formulated the rules of arithmetic, rather, individual brains simply <i>become aware</i> of them when taught. And those rules are <i>immutable</i>; the sum of 1 and 1 will <b>always</b> be 2 everywhere and at any time in the universe regardless of what brain cognates on the concept. Simply put, the rules of arithmetic are comprehensible only to a conscious mind—<b>and</b> are inarguably <i>immaterial</i>—there are <b>no</b>“arithmetic particles” which power the brain’s comprehension of it. This directly refutes your assertion that:<br /><br /><i>[reason] is an evolved faculty of sophisticated brains.</i><br /><br />because if arithmetic is reason, then for it to have any practical intellectual value it <b>must</b> be immutable—and by definition, an immutable entity <b>cannot</b> evolve.<br /><br />You mention results of equations, and then attempt to cover your bases with:<br /><br /><i>I anticipate here that the equation in my analogy will be seized upon as the transcendent constant that some suppose reason to be, and that in turn, this implies the existence of the supernatural. My immediate objection is that there is no reason to suppose that it is supernatural, and that there are demonstrable indications that it is a physical process of the brain.</i><br /><br />But fail to demonstrate how a physical brain can be responsible for creating the underlying, universally comprehensible, immutable and immaterial logic that an equation represents. The intellectual construct of an equation, like arithmetic, exists independently of any physical brain that can comprehend it. The mind, facilitated by the brain, can comprehend that logic, but it <b>cannot</b> be held responsible for creating it. If it were then the rules of arithmetic and logic would be entirely subjective and vary from one brain to the next—and we know <i>by experience</i> that this is <b>not</b> the case. Oddly enough, this affirms your assertion that:<br /><br /><i>If reason actually were, instead, transcendent and absolute, then the outcome would necessarily be the same in every instance.</i>jccnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-37148773.post-33154366713556390452010-12-02T14:07:01.756-05:002010-12-02T14:07:01.756-05:004) One of the things that most higher animals can ...4) One of the things that most higher animals can do is display a preference for greater quantities of things they desire. A dog, given the choice of either one treat on the left, or a pile of several on the right, will immediately select the pile on the right. This is elemental reason in action. It has nothing to do with angels or a god whispering the wisdom of the ages in the dog’s ear, and everything to do with the response of parts of the brain where neurons are keyed to respond to quantities – the greater the quantity, the greater the excitement, and thus, the greater the preference that informs the response. (Note that this is not the same thing as saying that a dog has the ability to count; that he can apply the abstraction of an integer standing in for a specific quantity to that quantity; only that he can judge more from less (given a sufficient sensory dissonance in the excitement caused by one sample as opposed to the other), and express a preference for the greater quantity). Some animals have the ability to subject not just physical quantities to this process, but actual abstractions like value judgements. A dog or cat, for example, may exhibit a marked preference for a particular chair, perhaps because it’s warmer, or higher, or more strongly smells of a favourite person. These are applications of reason involving more abstract qualities that, nevertheless, excite those same regions of the brain that respond to relative quantities. But what’s being subjected to evaluation now is the relative quantity of the value of abstract propositions. More comfortable in my experience: this chair or that chair? Or, better view of the room; or, favourite person most often in...?<br /><br />Humans are particularly adept at this. We’re far better at dealing with abstractions, and so far better at quantifying them and subjecting them to this process. Reason, in the end, simply weighs the relative values we give to various combinations of propositional elements and seeks to find the option with the greatest overall value. If reason actually were, instead, transcendent and absolute, then the outcome would necessarily be the same in every instance. There would be an eternal, universal “menu” from which the absolute right answer would spring in any given event or in response to any proposition, and everyone would intuitively agree. But it’s clear that there is not. The answer to a question depends entirely upon to whom it is put: what his values are, what his life experiences have taught him, what his peers think, what the circumstances of the moment are, and so on. <br /><br />It’s true that we don’t know everything about how the process works. But that doesn’t justify making up an answer and insisting it must be the case (observation: we don’t know everything about the human brain; conclusion: Jesus was born of a virgin). There’s still more we can know, more we will learn. We already know quite a bit more than we did, and we should be proud of that. Some people cannot bear the idea that there are gaps in our knowledge and insist on claiming to have an answer; any answer being better than none. And for uncounted millennia, this has provided the basis for metaphysics, the supernatural, superstition, and religion. Bertrand Russell put it perfectly this way: “Man is credulous animal, and must believe <i>something</i>; in the absence of good grounds for his belief, he will be satisfied with bad ones.”Lone Primatehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15746801663695992138noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-37148773.post-60650879388830393072010-12-02T14:06:37.267-05:002010-12-02T14:06:37.267-05:003) On the nature of reason
Martin Luther held rea...3) <b>On the nature of reason</b><br /><br />Martin Luther held reason to be the enemy of faith. He was correct in that. It was reason that led me, as a child, to doubt the existence of God, at least as he was held to be by Christian dogma, by considering the questions I outlined in my previous thesis. Even when I was very young, the claims of Christianity made were to me unreasonable. If God loves us, why would he do these things to some, actually most, of the peole he loves? And if he does these things, how could it be that he loves us? That both could be true at once was unreasonable. Reason, then, was what freed me to ask questions and reach conclusions not spoon-fed to me by, and often at odds with, Christian doctrine.<br /><br />Reason is the faculty of the mind that enables someone to compare and contrast two or more propositions, weigh their likelihood or desirability, and reach a conclusion based on their relative weight. In matters of pure logic, the results are <i>effectively</i> universal in their obviousness to people in general and their applicability: in general terms, to have ten dollars is reasonably preferable to having only five (this is only <i>absolutely</i> true in a mathematical sense such as “10>5”, as I will explain). When it comes to value judgements, the process of reason can yield very different results. That five dollar difference, for example... One person may consider keeping the five dollars for something concrete preferable to spending it on, say, a lottery ticket (for the record, I’m one of those people). Another person could feel just the opposite. The operation of reason is the same in both people; what’s different is the degree of compulsion in the likelihood of the reward that’s being weighed against the value of the five dollars. If you are persuaded that some aspect of buying a lottery ticket – the fun, the excitement, the prospect that someone has to win and your chance is as good as anyone’s – outweighs the basic utility of five dollars, then reasonably, you will buy a ticket. If you’re persuaded you have better uses for five dollars, you reasonably will not buy a ticket.<br /><br />So reason is not some transcendental, perfect entity in and of itself that graces the human brain like lacework spread on a cherry wood table. It’s part of the table. It’s a natural property of the wood. And it has to contend with the knots and grain native to the wood, and to carvings, grooves, and gouges worked into the wood from without during the existence of the table. No two minds are the same in terms of content, so while the process may be the same, the outcomes of its application may be very different based upon the factors of the input. It’s the same as an equation with variables. The result is dependent on the input values.<br /><br />I anticipate here that the equation in my analogy will be seized upon as the transcendent constant that some suppose reason to be, and that in turn, this implies the existence of the supernatural. My immediate objection is that there is no reason to suppose that it <i>is</i> supernatural, and that there are demonstrable indications that it is a physical process of the brain.Lone Primatehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15746801663695992138noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-37148773.post-24996112620310375282010-12-02T14:06:07.262-05:002010-12-02T14:06:07.262-05:002) What actually does it mean for something to be ...2) What actually does it <i>mean</i> for something to be “metaphysical”? Part of the problem is that there’s no commonly-accepted definition for what it is (probably because there’s nothing we can see, examine, or otherwise qualify in any way by means of which to arrive at a definition); and so the usual definitions of it are negative and exclusionary: they simply say what it’s not. “A realm beyond what is perceptible to the physical senses”. What could this be? Well, there are many things that we cannot sense directly, such as atoms, electrons, quarks, x-rays, radio waves, ultraviolet light, the odors of some chemicals, sound at 100 kHz, and so on. Nevertheless, these can be demonstrated to exist, and moreover to have a <i>physical</i> existence. They have real and independently verifiably effects in the physical universe. A sound of 100 kHz, for instance, cannot be heard by the human ear, but can be confirmed by the effect it has on an oscilloscope. There’s no reason to declare this phenomenon is “metaphysical” simply because it’s not directly available to our senses (though of course, we may if it pleases us to, I suppose). But since a vast number of entirely physical things exist “beyond beyond what is perceptible to the physical senses”, this definition is really not of very much use to us when it plainly includes things it is meant to differentiate an entire class of (postulated) phenomena from in the first place. That’s the problem with the word “metaphysical”. Anything that would tend to evidentiarily confirm its existence would also be something physically quantifiable, which is the antithesis of the concept. So really, it’s a useless word in any practical sense. It presumes to categorize the existence of those things that, if ever proven to exist, don’t belong in that category by definition.<br /><br />And not surprisingly, any number of things that were supposed to be metaphysical for thousands of years have in fact been rescued from this limbo by science over the past few hundred, with increasing speed and practical effect. Historically, metaphysical explanations for natural phenomena have continually yielded to natural ones. There is no device, no technology, no utility that was ever provided to humanity by appealing to assumptions of the supernatural. Investigations into nature have provided them all. Adherence to medieval presumptions that only a metaphysical agency could possibly order the colours of the rainbow could never, would never, have led to the science of optics by means of which millions of people today see rainbows who otherwise could not. And this is because, to put it bluntly, metaphysical explanations simply beg whatever question they purport to answer, and offer us nothing useful. In allowing ourselves to make such assumptions, we learn nothing of value about the either ourselves or the reality in which we live. Relying on the supernatural as an explanation of anything is the end of hope for new knowledge about it, because it implies that we already have an answer: that the <i>real</i> answer is fundamentally unknowable to and inapplicable by us, and that really, we don’t even have any business asking. Such notions need to be opposed, just on general principles.Lone Primatehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15746801663695992138noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-37148773.post-81975443772622139462010-12-02T14:05:41.731-05:002010-12-02T14:05:41.731-05:00JCC:
1) I agree that reason exists, and I agree t...JCC:<br /><br />1) I agree that reason exists, and I agree that it is used for the comprehension of reality. I also agree in principle with the idea that is exists in conscious beings, although I would qualify that to say in <i>some</i> conscious beings and not others (that is, it’s possible to be aware of your surroundings without necessarily possessing the faculty to form rational decisions about it... I don’t believe beings like crocodiles and sharks, for example, are reasonable, despite the fact that they are clearly conscious). Where we differ, not surprisingly, is on whether reason is natural or supernatural. I’m persuaded it’s natural; that it is an evolved faculty of sophisticated brains. I take issue with the notion that it is metaphysical, and deny it is demonstrably so – in part because the existence of the metaphysical itself remains undemonstrated. Before insisting that object B possesses attribute A, it is necessary first to demonstrate the existence of A. Magical explanations typically ignore that necessity, which is why they’re generally disregarded as unreliable and irrelevant in the modern age. <br /><br />My understanding of reason is as a physical process of the brain. I understand the supernatural explanation for it as a transcendent absolute. Several problems arise in the contemplation of that model, with which I have an axiom to grind.<br /><br /><b>Objections to the metaphysical</b><br /><br />The first problem is that the logic underpinning the suggestion is circular. It first presumes the existence of something – the metaphysical – for which no evidence exists, and goes on to apply it as a fundamental attribute of reason (“reason is metaphysical”). Having done so, it immediately turns around and insists that, reason being after all metaphysical, the existence of reason is perforce a demonstration of the existence of the metaphysical! The obvious flaw in the logic is that it proceeds initially from an unproven assumption. The fact that the metaphysical could conceivably be established otherwise, somehow, someday, does not save this particular argument from invalidity as the basis of a logical position. Thus the characterization of reason this way is itself, ironically, unreasonable.<br /><br />(As an aside, I think it’s worth commenting here that even if at some point a metaphysical aspect to reality were somehow demonstrated, that in and of itself is still not proof of the existence of a god (that is, by any other name, a guiding intelligence behind that phenomenon), much less the specific god of the Bible. In other words, establishing reason to be metaphysical does not provide a justification to leap immediately to the conclusion that “therefore, Jesus is Lord”, any more than it would that “therefore, there is no god by Allah and Mohammed is His prophet.” Much more would still have to be proven or ruled out to reach such a conclusion.)<br /><br />The second problem is evidentiary. If reason is both transcendent and absolute, then its application and results should not vary. It’s obvious that they do. Reasonable people can and do reach very different conclusions about the same issue. Moreover, if reason had these attributes, then its observed function, application, and results in babies and children ought to be identical with those of adults; it goes without saying that this is not the case. It’s clear that reason develops in the mind over time, rather than coming into it fully-formed from outside. These facts deny the notion of transcendence and absolutivity of reason; they speak much more plainly of reason as a subjective process rather than an objective attributive entity or agency of some kind.Lone Primatehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15746801663695992138noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-37148773.post-9100508322958803612010-12-01T10:26:33.250-05:002010-12-01T10:26:33.250-05:00JCC:
Thanks for your reply and especially your ca...JCC:<br /><br />Thanks for your reply and especially your candor. I have about four pages of my impressions on reason and it'll take me a day or two to organize them into something coherent. Now that you've stated your impressions, I'll see about how to integrate them into my take on the matter.Lone Primatehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15746801663695992138noreply@blogger.com